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The principle of causality has enjoyed a unique pre¬
eminence in metaphysical speculation ever since Aristotle
identified the quest for wisdom with the quest for first
■cmd C. ev <A J e -J (l)
principles1in the first book of the Metaphysics. The title
\
of causality, however, for this pre-eminent role in the
undertaking of knowledge has not been left unchallenged by
scepticism on grounds of usurped and fictitious supremacy.
Scepticism has invariably found itself on the path leading
to the repudiation of the alleged coincidence of the spheres
of causality and knowledge. This alleged coincidence, the
proponents of scepticism have urged, is a gratuitous
assumption born of an illegitimate imposition upon the
ontological order of an absolute logical pattern with which
nature is compelled to conform. The real, in the contingency
of its life-process cannot be subsumed, however, under any
universal and necessary principle of metaphysical deter¬
mination. The philosopher, therefore, must surrender
the false hope of discovering a causal "logos" underlying
cosmic phenomena, and with it the whole undertaking of
knowing.
That scepticism, in this nihilistic abolition of
causality, re-affirms Aristotle's definition of knowledge
in terms of causality is obvious. Eor in this abolition
is brought out the indissoluble bond which unites causality
and knowledge in the common battle of survival they are
called upon to fight. It is no part of our design here
to undertake a complete refutation of scepticism. Let
it suffice for our present purpose to point out the
j necessary recipiocity involved in the relation of
causality to knowledge and knowledge to causality - and
in wider terms, of the ontological to the logical realm,
wherein causality and knowledge have their respective
domains.
Viewed in this broad perspective, the thesis maintained
in the present essay is an attempt at tracing the fate of
causality in a metaphysical framework of partial scepticism,
wherein is affirmed the disjunction of the ontological and
the logical realms and with it, the negation of the causal
nexus. The issue with which we propose to grapple has grown
out of the celebrated controversy of the Peripatetic Arabian
Philosophers and the Ash'arite Muslim theologians, as
epitomised in the controversy of Al-Ghasali and Averroes,
in problem 17 of Tahafut al-Falasifah and Tahafut at-
Tahafut. This c ntroversy will be recounted at length
in due course. In order to specify the sphere in which
our argument will move,' we ought to set forth, at the outset,
the basic motives of the two parties and the metaphysical
and theological interests involved in the controversy.
Al-Ghazali, following the Ash'arite theologians,
abandons the Peripatetic metaphysics in the interest of
an occasionalism calculated to serve a twofold purpose:
1. The vindication of God's absolute omnipotence
and uniqueness ; and
2. The demonstration of the actual possibility of
miracle, as a phenomenon capable of rational insertion in
the natural scheme of things.
That the Aristotelian, Peripatetic metaphysics, in
the judgment of Al-Ghazali, cannot be accomodated to
the theological needs involved in these two theses derives
from its conception of the cosmic order as homogeneous f
I
and endowed with the predicates of essential being.
This homogeneity and essentiality are the consequence of
an implicit metaphysical determinism latent in the
*
Aristotelian system ana its notion of substance as
causally operative. Substitute for this system a
heterogeneous, occasionalist metaphysics of accidental-
contingent being and thereby the omnipotence of God and the
possibility of miracle are vindicated in philosophic terms'
i.
beyond the possibility of dispute.
For Averroes, Virho sets out to expose the incoherence
of Al-Ghazali's doctrine, the contingent-accidental
metaphysics of the Ash'arites amounts to a total
repudiation of the possibility of knowledge and of the
-4-
specific qualities and operations of individual
substances. For this repudiation is nothing short
of the negation of the possibility of definitions and
demonstrations alike and of the ultimate dissolution ,
of all things in utter and undifferentiated identity# I ^
"It is self-evident," Averroes writes, "that things
have quiddities and properties necessitating the
specific operations of an existing being and on account
of which the quiddities, names and definitions of things
are differentiated. Were an existing being devoid of a j
specific operation it would be devoid of ,a specific /
nature,,, and therefore shorn of a specific name and
a specific definition. Thus things would become one f-
, (2) Ithing and nothing (at the same time),"
This re-affirmation of the Aristotelian doctrine /
of substance, as a center of efficient causation flowing
from its specific nature, leads Averroes to the re-affirmation
of the Aristotelian doctrine of fourfold causality.
Since the effect always bespeaks the cause and its
perfection ; and since phenomena are tied up to each
other by a necessary principle of conditionality, causality
is an indispensable clue to the knowledge of things^and
of their natures ; so much so that "whoever repudiates
(3)
causality repudiates reason," arid with it the
possibility of all genuine science.
This jsunot the place for a thorough examination
of the Averroist critique of Al-Ghazali and the
-5-
assessment of its exact significance. It should be
pointed out however, at the outset, that the inadequacy
of Averroes's acute refutation of Al-Ghazali's position,
to which we will have occasion to return, derives from the
circumstance that Averroes leaves the major question ate
issue unanswered. The problem of the possibility of
miracle, with which Al-Ghazali is pre-occupied, is waived
aside by Averroes as philosophically irrelevant. Averroes
in fact, relaxes into his celebrated position of a twofold
\
science (philosophy and theology) entailing a twofold truth,
each valid in its own sphere. The full development of this
position is to be fouhd in his tract on the "Agreement
between Philosophy and Theology", which we will examine
later. What Averroes does in this manner is to challenge
the very legitimacy of the problem at issue and of its claims
for philosophic treatment. In the face of this radical c
challenge the problem of rationalising miracle with which
i
Al-Ghazali is wrestling - instead of being settled inaa
satisfactory manner-, re-emerges in its entire acuteness.
To Al--Qhazali must be assigned the merit of having
undertaken to wrestle with it philosophically. It is
true that the metaphysical perspective in which he
seeks a solution holds out no promise of success. It
is true,further, that Averroes's disdainful rejection
of this precarious metaphysical edifice upon which
Al-Ghazali erects his thedogical structure is fully
legitimate. But Averroes, by evading the real issue,
-6-
has failed to fathom the problem of miracle to its "'
depths. No wonder his cosmic determinism marks a
radical failure to see into the supernatural and the
meta-cosmic and thus to scan the outermost boundaries of
the metaphysical sphere.
Here onfcatches a glimpse of the antinomial
character of the problem at issue. The philosopher is called
upon toe wrestle with a twofold error; the error of
\
theistic occasionalism as metaphysically indefensible, and
the error of cosmic determinism as theologically in¬
complete. It will be aeen that the summaty dismissal of
miracle as philosophically irrelevant is the logical con¬
sequence of the intrinsic structure of the Averrois' system.
The characteristic tone of this system is its total and
absolute determinism; a determinism bornnof a monistic view
of the universe and grounded in an absolute intellectualism
which refuses to admit faith into the domain of episteraology,
on the grounds of heterogeneity. The monistic determinism
of the Averroist metaphysics, it will be seen, entails three
pernicious metaphysical theses which are of the utmost
significance to our present discussion. These are;
(1).The
eternity of the world and the impossibility of tae creation
t
ex nihilo. - (2).The
Neo-Platonistic theory of the necessary emanation of the
intelligences and the spheres; and .
(3) .The rejection of an
-7-
actually effective divine providence.
In order to achieve a complete critique of Al-Ghazali's
doctrine of causality, therefore, we must proceed a step
beyond Averroes. For in rehabilitating causality, Averroes
has answered only one half of the metaphysical question
which perturbs the mind of the philosopher when he reflects
upon the nature of things and the course of cosmic events.
Before the philosopher thenerises, however, a novel problem
no less disturbing than the former : This is the problem
of the possibility of God's direct intervention;:in this
course of events miraculously and providentially. Once
more, we are confronted with a galaxy of acute problems:
"Is the admission of causal efficacy compatible (
with faith in divine 'sovereignty ?
"How can the homogeneous cosmic process allow
for the heteregenemus incursion of the Deity into the
Domain of concrete existence ? >
"And what becomes, finally, of the rational unity
of this cosmic process 6nce the irrational and the
extraordinary are allowed to make their surreptitious
inroads into it s domain? "
The issue out of which the present essay has grown,
it will be recalled, is the problem that Al-Ghazali
proposes in his attack on the Peripatetic doctrine of
causality. This can be called the problem of "rationalizing
miracle"; i.e. the metaphysical justification of the
supernatural in its emergence into the domain of the real.
Whoever, in wrestling with this problem, contents himself
-8-
with dismissing it as insoluble or as philosophically
irrelevant - like Averroes, betrays himself into the
hands of his own foes. For he avows thereby his in¬
capacity to give an adequate account of a striking and
meaningful aspect of historical reality. WhQVer, on the
other hand, pushes the enquiry into the very province of
reality,and calls into account the actual fact of miracle as
a historic event, with a view to affirming the fact of
miracle or denying it, is seeking tq prove too much. He
would beip that is to say, shooting beyond the mark. The
actual reality of miracle as historic fa ct falls outside
the province of metaphysical enquiry. It is a problem for
the historian to reso've, not the metaphysician. The meta¬
physical rationalization of miracle, therefore, begins
where the historical ascertaining of the fact of. miracle, as
a unique and extraordinary emergent in the midst of the
historical process, ends. The problem with which the
metaphysician can legitimately grapple philosophically is
a problem which belongs to a different order from the order
of authentic historicity. Its formula is as follows:
"Does the miraculous and the extraordinary compromise
in any way the rational unity of the natural process? Is
there, that is to say, in the $hole gphere of natural realily
no room for the heterogeneous and the extraordinary?"
That the formulation of the problem in these terms
narrows the field of enquiry to unsuspected limits and
determines the direction in which...the solution of the
apparent antimony between the natural and the miraculous
must be sought can be readily conceded. We have to
content ourselves at this stage of the argument with
submitting as a mere hypothesis the maxim that meta- i
physical speculation must bet out from the given reality \
of that which is. The most primordial metaphysical
postulate is the postulate of the priority of being over
everything else. A metaphysic which does not have its
roots in Being is a metaphysic of non-being and, thehfore
a metaphysic of sheer inanities. Metaphysics can soar
to the loftiest heights and gauge the most abysmal depths,
but at the threshold of the sanctuary of Being it must halt
with awe. Only of the fountain-head of its ov/n life it
cannot and ought not to seek a Justification. Only of
the most elemental of principles, it cannot and ought not
to seek the principle.
From the standpoint of metaphysics, and ontology,
Al-Ghazali's occasionalist solution of the problem of
miracle amounts to an impoverishment of the real, a
stripping of the real ofthe positive predicates of
essential substantiality. The praisworthiness of his
motive in achieving this solution must not blind us to
theinadequacycof the metaphysical system in which his
thought revolves. Nor must the legitimate re-habilitation
of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance as causally
operative, blind us on the other hand, to the inadequacy
of Averroes's approach to the problem of miracle, in his
-10-
attempt to expose the fallacies of Al-Ghazali's meta¬
physical presuppositions. If a total synthesis of the
problem at issue is to be achieved, the conscientious
searcher must do complete justice to the metaphysical
and the theological interests involved in the controversy.
Such a synthesis must be sought beyond the metaphysical
determinism of Averroes and the theological occasionalism
of Al-Ghazali,
It is our purpose in the present essay, once the
critical ground has been covered, to formulate a solution
of theproblem in terms of a metaphysic which admits of
the aforesaid synthesis. In this task, we are turning
to the Thomist system in which, we believe, the respective
claims of philosophy and theology, as regards our problem,
are safeguarded. Thomas Aquinas, in stripping the
Aristotelian metaphysics of its deterministic implications
achieves the signal feat of accomodating it to the
theological needs of revealed religion, and thus
succeeds in resolving the problem at issue in a
satisfactory manner. To vindicate the omnipotence of
God, Al-Ghazali pronounces the cosmic scene a purely
fictitious stage upon which is displayed the cosmic might
of the Creator. No wonder he^educes every cosmic agent
to a mere marionette engaged in the perfonmance of a
fictitious role ina world of mere ghosts and shadows.
That is why a metaphysic of essential being is totally
-11-
inacceptable to him. It was this total de-naturalization
of nature, this impoverishment of the world of concrete
existence which led Thomas Aquinas, as we shall see at
length, to engage in an uncompromising polemic against
the Ash'arite "Loquentes",- the spiritual forbears of
Al-Ghazali and of his occasionalist metaphysics, in
(4)




Against the occasionalist metaphysics of the
loquentes and their consequent the&is of the inertness
of being, Thomas Aquinas teaches that the world of
concrete existence is subsistent and real in its own
right. This subsistent rbality of things is not an
I
external cycle of cosmic inertia, as Aristotle and his
Arabic commentators, Avicenna and Averroes held; but it
is rather the gracious positing in being by the Creator
of the whole manifoldness of the real, generously permitted
to develop its life-process in accordance with the laws
of its own being. Whenever Thomas Aquinas discusses the
problem of free choice, providence, grace, predestination,
he insists in emphatic terms that "it is part of the design
of God's providence to allow the operation of secondary
causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved
in the universe,..and (in order that God) may communicate
(6>
to creatures the dignity of causality." For such is God's
generosity and God's lave that He communicates to His creatures
the power for causal efficacy, which in the most pre¬
eminent sense, is the prerogative of the Almighty
Himself,
It will be readily perceived at this juncture
wherein the Thomist reconciliation of the omnipotence
of God and the causality of concrete agents is to be
sought-,, a reconciliation with which is bound up the
y
possibility of a complete solution of our problem.
The divine omnipotence is not the sole principle of
\
divine activity and of divine self-revelation. Upon
God's creative act there presides a twofold principle
no less significant than the former: This is the
principle of divine wisdom and divine love. The
\
absolute monotheism of Islam must thus give way to a
trinitarian theogony,if the rights of the creator and
the rights of the creature, as it were, are to be
safeguarded.
The pages that follow represent a modest endeavour
to corroborate this thesis philosophically.
-15-
Chapter One.
Al-Ghazali's Repudiation of Causality,
I
Preliminary Remarks,
The controversy between Al-Ghazali and the Peripatetic
(1)
philosophers of the East, as epitomized in Tahafut al-
Falasifah, can be described as the controversy between
Naturalistic Determinism and Supernatural!stic Theism in
\
Islam-, The foremostpre-occupation of the Arabian philosophers
consisted in the attempt to give a purely rational account
of the universe in stringent metaphysicalterms.. Problems of
Islamic theology exercised no appreciable influence upon the
metaphysical edifices in the construction of which they were
engaged, except limitatively. In fact, the historian of
Arabian philosophy can scarcely find the traces of aa
philosophico-theological synthesis in their systems or even
an endeavour to achieve such a synthesis philosophically.
What impresses this historian is the circumstance that those
philosophers thought and wrote in a well-nigh complete
unconsciousness of the contents of Islam, It is as though
Islam did not exist for those arrogant heirs of the meta¬
physical heritage of Greece and Alexandria,
Yet there are two considerations which would seem to
prove that philosophy, far from opting for a total abandonment
of the battlefield of doctrinal controversies in the East was
fully involved in the most bellicose of doctrinal and
theological engagements. There is in the first place, the
-14-
paramountcy which the nietaphysic of oneness enjoyed in
Arabian metaphysical speculation; and in the second place,
the hostility and the wrath which Islamic theologians and the
Islamic masses nourished face-to-face with the philosophers
and their pernicious teachings.
We have no intention of recounting the story of doctrinal
v/arfare ;vhich raged intermittantly between the Philosophers
and the theologians of the East, at the end of the Umayyad
period and throughout the reign of the Abbasid dynasty
and thus gave birth to Islamic Scholasticism, designated in
(5)
the East as Kalam. What concerns us here is the extent of
the reciprocal impact of philosophy on theology and theology
on philosophy and the role of Al-Ghazali in the tale of such
an impact. That the triumph of Al-Ghazali in Islamic
consciousness represents the final bankruptcy of Arabian
philosophy in the East an-4 proves conclusively how fruitless
was the endeavour of the Muslim scholastics to reconcile the
claims of philosophy and theology. It proves, too, how unreal
was the allegiance of the Arabian Philosophers to Islam. To
put the matter epitomically: The Arabian Philosophers achieved
the reconciliation of philosophy and theology, through a
total abolition of theology, as it were. The Muslim.,
scholastics, on the other hand, achieved this reconciliation
through a total disavowal of philosophic speculation as
radically pernicious and blasphemous. Thus was born the
theory of the "two .truths » - which pervades all Spanish-
Arabian. philosophy, on the one hand, and the theory of the
irredeemable irreligiousness of the philosophers so forcibly
set forth in .Al-Ghazali's Tahafufc al-FAlasifah, on the other.
The radical charge which Al-Ghazali levels on the Peri¬
patetic philosophers in his Tahafut as I hinted previously, is
that of naturalistic determinism j viz. their reluctance to admit
of the possibility of the heterogeneous incursion into the
\
natural process of the supernatural and extraordinary. The
eternity and perpetuity of the world, the negation of the
possibility of creation ex nihilo, of God's knowledge of
singulars, of the rational possibility of miracle, and finally,
the negation) of the possibility of corporeal resurrection -,
all these errors betray in the judgment of Al-Ghazali, the
reluctance of these Peripatetics to admit the reality of a
supernatural order at the head of which stands a Sovereign
Agent capable of effecting the designs of His providence
imperiously and miraculously.
In the present essay we will confine ourselves to the
examination of Al-Ghazali's treatment of one aspect of the
problem which, we believe, is typical of the solutions which
he adduces to these basic metaphysical and theological issues
out of which the twenty questions of the Tahafut have grown.
This is the problem of causality in its relation to divine power
Al-Ghazali touches upon this problem in the course of his
(4)
discussion of the 16th. question of the Tahafut , wherein
-16-
it is shown " that the thesis (of the philosophers)regarding
the knowledge of the "heaYenly souls" of all contingent
singulars in this world is gratuitous". Here he expounds
the thesis of the philosophers according to which the
"separate intelligences" dispose the movements of the heavens
and of the bodies in the sublunar world through the mediacy
of the " souls of the heavens". Yet for these "souls of the
heavens" to effect the particular movements of the spheres
\
they must have a particular knowledge and a particular volition
of these movementsr distinct from the universal knowledge of the
Forms imparted to them by the separate Intelligences. The
significance of ..this Neo-Blatonic theory is that it leads to
a deterministic scheme of things, the norm of the dynamic
development of which is grounded in the knowlddge and volition
of the celestial agents. The philosophers, in fact, teach
that the "souls of the heavens", through their knowlddge of
the particular movements in question, arrive at the knowledge ■
of all earthly contingent everts, as necessarily ensuing upon
their (own) original knowledge and will. The logical consequence
of this doctrine is that "every event has a contingent cause,
until we traverse the series and arrive at the eternal heavenly
movements, whereof one part is cause of the other. Hence the
series of causes and effects terminates with the particular
heavenly movements; since the cogitation - of the movements
amounts to a eogitation of their consciences and the
"(5)
consequences of these consequences till the end of the series .
-17-
The Philosophers, Al-Ghazali pursues the argument, seek to
account, through this theory of determined heavenly movements,
for the possibility of prognostication in a purely naturalistic
way, whereby prophesies and dreams are attributed to the soul's
keenness ih unravelling the secrets of the heavenly movements.
Yet the Philosophers, he hastens to remark, are incapable of
repudiating the teaching of revealed religion according to which,
prophecies and dreams are the outcome of divine revelation,
either directly or through the agency of'the angels.
The ultimate ground of the untenability of the philosophers'
position, however, is the circumstance that it does not tally
with the explicit teaching of revealed theology (Shar')
regarding the 'primordial G.oaex' (al-lawh al-Mahfuz) which the
Philosophers identify with the cogitations of the Intelligences;
or with the possibility of miracle, as a definite departure from
the habitual course of events. Indeed that the imaginative,
intellective and practical faculties - on the assumption of
the Philosophers,- can attain to such a degree of acuteness that
the prophet ( of even the common man) is capable of prognostication
or of miraculous deeda, though complicity with the elements is
not to be denied, "What we deny", writes Al-Ghazali,"is(the
Philosophers') contention that (the miraculous power of the
prophets) is confined to these deeds; and their repudiation of
the possibility of transmuting the stick into a snake and of
the resuscitation of the dead, etc." Thus we ought to treat
of this question," he concludes," in ordet to prove the
-18-
posslbility of miracles and for another reason: namely, the
defence of the common belief of the Muslims regarding God's
(6)
power to do all things"
II
Necessity, Causal and Logical.
With these introductory remarkd, Al-Ghazali embarks upon a
critical analysis of the principle of causality, with a view to
determining its logical and metaphysical status. The problem
that preoccupies him at the outset is the problem of the alleged
necessity of the causal nexus. For if the chain of events in
nature is determined by the movements of the heavenly bodies
and the volition of the 'celestial souls' (an-Nufus as-Samawiyyah),
on the one hand, or the irrevocable laws of generation and
corruption, on the other - as the peripatetics contend-, then
the philosopher has one and only one recourse, i.e.: the admission
of the inexorable necessity of the mechanism of nature, and with
it, the autonomy of the cosmic life face-to-face with the BrovideDce
of the Almighty.
Yet, at this very point, Al-Ghazali puts in a fully legitimate
question: 'What, indeed, inheres in the notion of necessity, in
its relation to the logical and the ontological realms ? And what
are the grounds of the predication of this notion ofthe ontological
order, eyen if its legitimacy in the logical order is readily
conceded?'
That Al-Ghazali, in this matter, places us at the very heart
of the problem of causality and its alleged inclusion in the notion
-19-
of necessity is obvious. For only thus can the cr-itical examination
of the twofold notion of necessity and causality yield any
positive gain.
"The correlation between what is wont to be taken as cause
and what is wont to be taken as effect," he writes at the opening
page of Q.17,"is not necessary according to us. For any two
entities, neither of which is the other, nor the affirmation
or the negation of which is implied in the affirmation or the
negation of the other, are not necessary concomitants as regards
the existence or inexistence of one or the other; like the
quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety anil eating, .combustion
(?)
and contact with fire,etc,"
It will be noted here that Al-Ghazali encounters no
difficulty in admitting readily the legitimacy of the notion of
necessity, which the argument pre-supposes, in the sphere of
mere logical relations. The notion of necessity ought, in fact,
%
to be confined to the logical categories of identity, implication
ana disjunction. This is tantamount to saying that the notion
of necessity is valid only in the sphere of the specific logical
relations underlying the three fundamental laws of logic : the
laws of identity, contradiction and excluded middly. Outside
this sphere necessity has absolutely no scope, as we shall see
more fully in the sequel. The genesis of this notion in the
world of contingent, natural relationships-is of a purely
psychological nature, as Hume later maintained. It is the out¬
come of a mere psychological habit which the philosophers
mistake for imperative, logical necessity. Yet of this alleged
-20-
necessity they have none but an empirical proof : viz: recourse
to experience. Experience, however, proves merely that the
(8)
effect "occurs with the cause and not through it " (Cum se,
non per se : 'Indahu la bihi). Philosophy must content itself,
therefore, with the notion of logical necessity, as rationally
admissible. Causal necessity, as a predicate of the order flf
being, must be abandoned as irrational and inadmissible. For
in the order of being, unlike the order of thought, we are not
dealing with laws in the strict sense, but merely with contingent
processes the terms of which are extrinsic to each other and,
therefore, unrelated except in the consciousness of the subject
observing them.
^1-Ghazali, thus, proposes to find the solution of the
problem at issue in the introduction of a cleavage between the
logical and the ontological orders a cleavage which permeates
his whole metaphysical and theological thought. This position,
which we will assess fully later, is inspired by his desire to
affirm a twofold thesis:
(l), The total dependance of the cosmic order upon the
divine fiat, and (2) the impossibility of transition from the
order of thought to the order of being. In this way, not only
the whole cosmos is suspended to the throne of the Almighty, as
it were; but likewise the possibility of any conclusive
knowledge of reality is independent of the drama of becoming
enacted upon the cosmic scene. Neither sensibility nor reason
can yield man any certitude; only the immediate ana direct
(9)
revelation of the Creator can enlighten his heart. Thus is
-21-
&ffirmed God's sovereignty as the unique source of all activity,
all being and all knowledge.
It is to the credit of Al-Ghazali that he concedes, at
least, the reality ;of logical necessity. The precise; status of
this necessity in Al-Ghazali's episteraology need/not detain us
here. So much at least is certain: Al-Ghazali asserts, whenever
the problem of causality recurs in his works, that necessity is
admissible only where a logical absurdity is involved. Thus in
the last pages of Q.17 of Tahafut, he finds himself driven to
concede that God's power does not extend to impossibles, as some
(10)
of the Mutakallims maintained, on the grounds of the inherent
necessity of the logical relationship between the conditioned
and its condition. The same concession is made in the Iqtisad,
in the course of the discussion of God's power in its relation
to natural opera tions. Here Al-Gha zali envisages the problem
of production or generation (Tawallud), enshrined by the Mu'tazilites
and the Peripatetics as a fundamental metaphysical principle
The opponent afcgues that the notion of God's universal and
absolute power is incompatible with this phenomenon of generation -,
according to which one'object is generated by another - a
phenomenon the reality of which is confirmed by the testimony
of reason and sense - experience alike. Against this thesis
Al-Ghazali argues that, the notion of generation is reducible
(12)
upon examination to the notion of "issuing forth" _ as the
"child is said th jssue forth (yakhruii ) from its mother's
aomb". Whenever, therefore, there is no container and no
contained, the notion of a cause 'producing of generating t
-22-
an effect is unintelligible. Nor can it be urged that such
'production' of the effect by the cause is attested by experience;
since all that experience attests is that it is "contemporaneous
•with it only". ( 1 3 ■)
If the notion of generation, in this crude materialistic
guise, is discarded then presumably all activity must he referred
unconditionally to God, God's power being.the sufficient reason
of every natural operation, the thesis that "God could create
the movement of the hand without that of the ring,... and could
(14)
create will without knowledge and knowledge without life,"
all of which are presumed to be conditionally related one to the
other -, would receive the semblance of plausibility. To this
Al-Ghazali retorts by invoking two principles :
1. The principle of necessary conditional relationality;
and 2. The principle of limitation of pwwer to the sphere of
possibility ; since God's power does not extend to what involves
contradiction in itself, because this is logically impossible.
The claim that God can create knowledge in the inanimate and
will in the irrational,(as some Mutakallims held) or assign'two
objects to the same space is absurd, because itviolates both of
(15)
the two said principles. v/henever, on the other hand, there
is no necessary conditional relationality between two entities,
nor does their interrelation involve any logical contradiction,
we can in no -way assert any necessary correlation between them,
(16)
And of this order is the principle of causality.
In fact, we can find according to Al-Ghazali three modes
of relationship between paird of entities;
1. The relationship of reciprocity,- according to which
the negation of the one implies necessarily the negation of the
i
other. Ex.right and left, above and below.
2. The relation of antecedance and consequence - as in
the relation of the conditioned to its condition. Here, too, the
negation of the antecedent entails the negation of the consequent;
"so that if we find the knowledge of the person follow upon his
life and his will upon his knowledge", we conclude necessarily
"that the assumption of the privation of life leads to the
privation Cintifa') of knowledge and the assumption of the negation
of knovfledge to the privation of will. This is described as the
condition, viz, that which is indispensable for the wxistence
ofthe object, but only in such a way that the existence of the
(17)
object is not through it but with it and alongside it".
3. The relation of cause and effect - whereby the negation
of the cause entails the negation of the effect,qnly when the
effect has one cause. Assuming, however, that the effect has
*
more that one cause, then it follows that the negation of all
■
the causes would lead to the negation of the effect, but not
the negation of any one single cause.
■ ■ '
The validity of this causal relationship, as necessarily
■
imperative, Al-Ghazali goes on to argue, rests on the validity
of two antecedant suppositions: a. The a priori admission of the
principle of causality, as applicable to any real sequence under
examination -, which is in question; and b, The exhaustive knowledge
(18)
of the series of causes operating in that sequence.
I
It will be readily perceived that Al-Ghazali has restated
here the position maintained in the Tahafut, according to which
-24-
a necessary relationship exists only between logical concepts,
but not between real entities. The principle of causality, as
the third class of relationships shows, is necessary only on the
assumption of a necessary causal law, universally valid,(and
this is a petitio principi)- or on the assumption of a complete
knowledge of all the causes operating in any given natural process.
Al-Ghazali discounts emphatically the latter possibility, in
the first alternative(al-Magam al-awwal) of Q.17 - on the grounds
of a theory of 'Qccult causes' eluding'the discernment of human
(19)
sensibility. There, remains, therefore, two modes of necesaary
relationship which are logically valid: logical implication and
conditional relationality,. The transiion from these two categories
to the category of causality, as an ontological principle,- as
we have seen, is illegitimate, as is all transition from the order
of thought to the order of being,
III
The Divine Prerogatives of Sovereignty and Omnipotence.
The critical analysis of the principle of eausality and its
deterministic implication has led Al-Ghazali thus to confine the
notion of necessity to the sphere of pure logical relations.
3 0 G
Following the Ash'arite Mutakallims (as we shall^at length in the
subsequent chapter), he achieves this conclusion with a twofold
purpose:
|
1. The reduction of the cosmic order to a series of purely
contingent events upon which reason exercises no positive sway,
-25-
and wherein nothing is ontologically necessary or absolute,
2. The vindication of God's absolute powefc to effect his
creative designs through His sheer arbitrary fiat. In as much
as any form of cosmic determinism would militate against this
absolute power, Ehe norm and principle of the development of the
cosmic life must be grounded in the free determination of the
divine will.
True to the Ash'arite spirit of Orthodox Islam, Al-Ghazali
asserts that God is the sole agent whose foremost and exclusive
prerogative is unlimited and gratuitous activity. Outside this
activity there is nothing but sheer inertness and passivity.
Viewed in its totality, the metaphysical and theological system
of Al-Ghazali presents itself to the vision ofthe observer as a
sidereal system -, at the summit of which shines forth the infinite
light of the Almighty devouring in its superabundance all things
and reducing them to the complete nullity of utter transparency
with the divine luminosity. Being, as the' superabundant store of
all perfection, is the unique predicate of God, outside whom there
is only non-being and darkness. Power, wisdom, will and life are
not ontological predicates of the Creator in which the creature
participates, albeit in an imperfect and fragmentary manner. They
are predicates of God alone, exclusively and pre-eminently, "The
picture of the universe", as depicted by Al-Ghazali, writes
(20$ (21)
Wensinck, "is of a different aspect, Ghazali does not see in
existence anything save the Unique Being, who for some unknown
eeason, has at one moment of eternity figured out and realized a
world which possesses in itself neither existence nor the faculty
for action. This conception of the world could be described a s
pantheism. In fact; this designation is altogether inappropriate.
For, if for pantheism, all is God, to Ghazali on the contra ry,
God is all. According th pantheism God does not exist except
through theuniverse. According to Ghazali the universe does
not exist at .all, God being' the sole existent. The doctrine of G:
uhazali is somitio monotheism seen throughnthe prism of neo-
Platonism."
(22)
It is this vision, this obsession , with the uniqueness
of God and His absolute sovereignty which leads Al-Ghazali to
discourse at length on the total nullity of things when viewed
in the perspective of God's infinity and uniqueness, in the
'Niche of lights'. At the highest stage of mystical vision, when
the Truth of Truths is disclosed to their sight,"the Seers (al-
'Arifun) rise from the plane of figures(fflajaz) to the pinnacle of
reality... and perceive through visual sight (al-Mushahxudah al-
'Iyaniyyah) that there is nothing in being but God, and that
everything is perishing save His face, not because it perishes
at one moment of time, but because it is perishing eternally and
everlastingly, since it cannot be imagined otherwise. For every¬
thing other than God, when considered in itself, is absolute not-
being; and when considered from the standpoint of the being which
it receives from the First Truth is seen to be-not in itself, but
only from the standpoint of the author of its being,- so that the
sob existent is God's Face, Everything thus has two faces:
-27-
a face unto itself and a face unto God. With respect to its own
face it is not; with respect to God's face, it is. Therefore,
nothing is, save God anu His Face; and hence everything is transient
(25)
eternally and everlastingly, except His Face", Nor do these
Seers, Al-Ghazali goes on,"have to await the last Day to hear
God's call: 'Whose is the sovereignty today - It is God's, the
One and the TriumpherP Because this call dins endlessly in their
ears. Nor do they understand by this saying : God is greatest
(Allahu AX:bar) that !te is greater than others. God be exalted I
There is no other being with Him,for Him to be greater than it.
None has the rank of equality (al-Ma'iyyah) with Him but only that
of posteriority(at-Taba'iyyah); indeed, none has being save through
(24)
His Face - so thX His Face alone is". ■
In the Ihiya'(vol.IV), Al-Ghazali returns with the same
insistence to this theme. The confession of God's uniqueness
(at-Tawhid)is here described as comprising fouu gradational levels
or stages:
1. There is, first, the stage of verbal avowal of God's
unity, without any awareness of its implications,
2. There is, second, the consent of the heart to the
profession, of the lips,
5, Third, there is the stage of the Elect ( al- Mugarrabun)
"who; see intuitively through the light of Truth th^t the multiplicity
of things derives entirely from the one source, which is the
Unique, the Triumpher."
4. And,finally, there is the stqge of the Truthful(as-
-28-
Giduidun)-, "who see only the One In the universe. It is this
vision of the Truthful which the mkstics call:'Extinction in
(25)
Unity' (A3.-Fana'fit-Tawhid) ,
In the moral sphere, the total resignation of the will unto
(26)
God (Tawakkul) can rest only on the last two stages. For at
a/
At these stages man attains to a consciousness of God as the sole
//
Agent, from whom is all penury «.nd all abundance, all fortune and
all misfortune. When you have attained this stage, Al-Ghazali
\
writes, "you perceive that there is no agent but God; and that
everything that is (whether a creature or a possession, a giving
or a denying, death of life, poverty or wealth, etc,,,) are to be
referred to God as their unique source and author. When you have
i i
perceived this you cease to direct your gaze to any one d.se, Thus x
your hope, confidence and trust woulu be placed in Him, since He
(27)
is the unique and Exclusive Agent,"
It is, therefore, not merely a sign of feeble faith for the
believer to attribute activity to siy agent other that God; it is
the very definition of polytheism(Ishrak), the disavowal of the
real uniqueness of God -, a disavowal occasioned by the cunning
insinuations of the Devil or by manJ.s ignorance of God's hidden
ways in executing His designs mysteriously and imperceptibly. Thus
the belxver, in his ignorance and short-sightedness,can be likened
unto an ant,which, perceiving thepen tracing its course on the*
paper, imagines that the pen is the real cause of writing, and not





Yet the paradoxical aspect of it is that, despite this unawareness
of the uninitiated to the mystical mysteries, God is the most
evident of things, of whom the whole creation tells overtly as its
sole Author and Sovereign. He is like the light which is impercep¬
tible owing to the intensity of its luminosity. Therefore, its
brilliance is best discerned through its privation, i.e. darkness.
But of God's light there can be no setting, and of His everlasting
presence no recession. That is why it is only given to the elect to
discern the radiance of His light and to-be utterly extinct therein,
Y/hen these Elect have attained the stage at which "they see the
whole world as the workmanship of God and know it as the workman¬
ship of 0od, and love it as the workmanship of God", they would in
effect "be seeing, knowing and loving God alone". And of them
would it truly be said that they are real confessors of unity (Mu -
Wahhid), who see God alone and who are conscious of themselves
(29)
only inasmuch as they are God's slaves. Of these it is said :
"They are dead to themselves; and to them is the allusion made in
the phrase: 'We were through we; now that we are dead unto we.
we are without we.'"
Here the intellect -, overwhelmed by this grandiloquent
exaltation of the Creator to the unattainable altitudes of absolute
I
transcendance and sovereignty and bewildered at this sense of
awesome obsession with His uniqueness, as though in the grips of
dread lest this uniqueness be challenged or gainsaid to the jeopardy
of God's divinity, as it were -, is led naturally to enquire:
'"Wherein does Al-Ghazali find the specific predicate of God's
uniqueness ? In what depths of the abyss of the inner life of God
-30-
that is to say, is the exclusive Godhead of the Almighty to be
sought? It is a cardinal tenet of Ash'arisra, to which Al-Ghazali
subscribes, that in God there is will, wisdom, power and life.
The determination of the manner in which these predicates inhere
in God's essence and the controversy which raged in Ash'arite-
Mutazilite circles over the distinctness of these attributes
from God's essence,leaves unaffected the positive reality of
these attributes. Against the non-Attributists (al-Mu'attila3q),
the Mu'tazilites and the peripatetic philosophers,the Ash'arite
school taught that these attributes exist in God, distinctly
from His essence; the (modality of this distinctness being
(SI)
waived agnostically aside as rationally indeterminable.
Yet once this has been conceded, it remains legitimate to ask:
In what relationship do these attributes of wisdom, will and life
stand to each other in the theology of Al-Ghazali? The question
becomes all the more disturbing when it is contended, in the manner
of Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite doctors, that thefcattributes are
(32)
distinct from God's essence. For whoever affirms the identity
of these attributes with God's essence may well be relieved of
XEtxxxxxing the burden of determining the organic relationship in
which these attributes stand one to the other; since for him the
Almighty knows, wills and acts through the same identical movements
of self-unfoldment. But such is not the position of Al-Ghazali
anu of his spiritual Ash'arite forbears.
It might be suggested in answering the question proposed above
that these attributes stand to each other in a position of equality
of metaphysical moment. Despite the instability of such a position
which threatens to introduce multiplicity into the unity of the
Divine Being, it has at least the merit of conceding to God an-.,
'ontological equipoise of self-subsistence1. It is, as we shall
see later, an imperative requisite of any adequate conception of
the inner life of God and of His ontological completeness and
I
integrity, as it were; because in it God is seen in the }.ight of
the 'ontological opulence of His being1. The temptation to subject
God Himself to the inexorable dialectic of monistic reduction is a
grave temptation, ^et any theology whidh fails to do Justice to
thefullness of God's being, by stripping Him of the positive
predicates of ontological perfection, finds itself worshipping in
the temple of a semi-deity, in fact, of a false surrogate of the
Deity, an>\ idol and a scarecrow.
When we turn to Al-Ghazali's theology to see wherein the
uniqueness of his all-wise and all-powerdlul God consists, we find
ourselves face-to-face with a striking divinity - a divinity in
whom the attribute of omnipotence has devoured all other attributes.
(3S)
We believe, he writes, in 'Kitab qawa'id al-Aqa'idJ " that God the
»
»
Almighty is living, omnipotent, sovereign, victorious; is free from
imperfection and irapotency and succumbs notto dormancy or slumber;
ana is not subjected to extinction or death> That He is Lord of
the worlds, visible and invisible; the -^ord of majesty and
sovereignty. His are dominion and victory, creation and ordination.
Heaven is at the reach of His outstretched arm; and the Creation is
subdued to His might. That His alone are the prerogatives of
creation and authorship; production and invention. He fashioned tte
creatures and their deeds, and.meted out their possessions and their
-32-
terms (sing. ajal). Nothing ordained can liberate itself from His
£rip orvrest its freedom from the decrees ofHis power. Of His
"(3^
designs there is no count and to His knowledge there are no bounds.
The cotention of the Philosophers and the Mu'tazilah, that God's
absolute might is conditioned by His wisdom and justice, is repudiated
by Al-Ghazali as blasphemous. The arbitrariness of God's will and
the absoluteness of His power are such, Al-Ghazali argues, that no
limitative condition can be assigned to the operation of His power.
V/isdom and justice can ha ve no scope where the decrees of His will
are involved. God, in fa ct, can exact the intolerable (ma la yutag);
torture the innocent without remuneration (bila 'iwad). He can even
• 0
refrain from exacting righteousness or assign reward and punishment
to righteousness and sin. Since nothing devolves upon Him, whether
His creatures be consigned to eternal bliss or exrternal damnation,
He needs nothave regard to the fitting in their behalf ( ri'ayat alt
aslah). It is true He has commanded the prophet to admonish and
• •
exhortj but whether men hearken unto these exhortations or not is a
matter of complete indifference to Him. For it is upon themselves
(35)
that they bring judgment.
'Yet what becomes of God's wisdom ana justice and its nominal
affirmation by Al-ghazali in the face of this naked and despotic
sovereignty of the Almighty ?' one might candidly ask at this juncture.
There is in man's soul a deep-seated will-to-holiness Which refuses to
to bend before injustice and tyranny even if perpetrated by God
Himself. Whenever the alleged absoluteness of God's sovereignty and
His total independence from every rational principle is vindicated,




/ ' ' ■ I
name of a no less absolute law of justice ana righteousness to
which the Almighty Himself is compelled to submit. And yet the
dramatic aspect of thematter is that fihis will-to-holiness is
docile to the point of meekness and utter self-effacement. The
voice of censure it raises is not the rebellious and nihilistic
outburst of the wicked and untamed will which refuses to abide by
any transcendant law of righteousness, I'or the hdty" are meek and
humble like children. Therefore they rejoice in nothing more than
they rejoice in the peace of identifying themselves with the
righteous will of the Almighty; but only because the name of the
.Almighty is 'Holy, God the Lord of Hosts.' \
For Al-Ghazali, however, this, rebellious disposition of man
to question the authority and sovereignty of God is the outcome
of the pernicious teaching of the Mu'tazilah who have "imposed
(36)
constraint upon God's acts," To speak of injustice in God is
unintelligible. Justice and injustice are as impredicable of God
as "'distraction of the wall and playrof the wind". Injustice is
an intelligible concept only in a sphere of volitional activity
where conflicting wills intercross; or the order of their
hierarchic subsumption Nis violated. Thus the acts of an agent ate
said to be unjusy when he encroaches upon the domain of another
or, when he disobeys the injunction of a legitimate superior. But
where is a domain to be found which is not God's? And where is
(37)the sovereign to whom it is given ,to command theLord of lords?
Nor is the Mu'tazilites' subjection of God to a 'law of
Reason', in the nam «r of iritis sovereign wisdom admissible either.




of the order of things ana the power to dispose them providentially.
And in this notion there is nothing to vitiate the notion of
God's arbitrary fiat and His power to do anything, ho7^ever re¬
pugnant to man's moral consciousness. Without undertaking at this
stage of the argument to examine the doctrine of Al-Ghazalj. , we
cannot omit to observe how unreal is his admission of the notion
of divine wisdom and divine justice. For in point of actual fact
thaabtribute of divine wisdom , as conceived by Al-^hazali is
wholly reducible to the attribute of pov/er; the two are indeed
indistinguishable. The wisdom Yfhich he predicates of God is not
the wisdom which the philosopher, in the manner of Aristotle, can
describe as the beatitudinous act of God enjoying the contemplation
of His essence and in which the highest manifestation of the notion
(39)
of life is revealed. Nor is it a mode of participation in
this highest and most godlike of the operations of the soul, which
is the prerogative of those who are given to the contemplation of
(40)
the Truth, The wisdom which Al-Ghazali predicates of God is
reducible to the notion of 'practical cunning', the sheer crafts¬
manship of the 'Dehs F?xber', Its: definition is conceivable only
(41)
in terms of power.
The most striking aspect of this notion of divine wisdom,
conceived is mere'practical cunning' is that it leads to the
impoverishment of the inner life of God, In fact, one is left at
a loss in,seeking to specify in its terras (as Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas do) the very notion of divine life. For what indeed can
Al-Ghazali mean by predicating life (Hayat) of God, except this
buoyant and aimless activity of a capricious despot who acts for
(42).
the sheer pleasure of acting; a creator who brings forth into
being, in accordance with the precepts of His sheer creative might,
a whole host of creatures, about whose existence and destiny He
is totally unconcerned? And yet what a paradox?- The knowledge
of the most insignificant movement of the most insignificant of
these creatures, Al-Ghazali hastens to add, escapes not the vision
(45)
or fore-ordination of this inuifferent Creator i
A far graver paradox will be displayed to sight when we turn
to Al-Ghazali's conception of the cosmic order in its relation to
this absolute omnipotence of the God-Despot of orthodox Islam.
This is the paradox of the Mighty Creator producing a world of
ghosts and shadows, an unreal and flimsy world which has no life
and no energy in its bowels. Here, the observer having'hearkened \
with complete composure to the tale of God's creative might,
cannot help crying out in amazement : "The Almighty has travailed
and brought forth lifeless corpses. He has conceived and, behold,
His offsprings are Ghosts and Shadows!"
Witnessing the incommensurability between the might and wisdom
of God and His warped workmanship, he cannot help reflecting how
unavailing is the allegedly infinite resourcefulness of the Almighty j
...Why, indeed, should it be otherwise and why should the Almighty
generate a genuine progeny, endowed with the predicates of dynamic
being; a progeny capable of rising to the plane of participation
in the very life of the Creator - is a riddle which Al-Ghazali's
metaphysics and theology cannot unravel.
The Inertness of the Ontological order.
The absolute ana arbitrary might of God, having been vindicated,
there remains a serious problem to reckon with : the apparent
dynamism ofthings and their capacity for self-development, "^o
reconcile this apparent causality of things with the omnipotence
!
of God, the philosopher must show the point at which these two
i
I
parallel dynamisms (that of the Creator and that of the creature)
I
impinge one upon the other, and the nature of theiinner relation-
i
ship between them. Without nullifying either term iD this
relationship, he must be capable of unravelling the secret of the
ontological process in which the creator and the creature are
mutually^involved and the principles presiding upon this process.
It should be pointed out, at the outset, that the solution
of the apparent antinomial conflict between the fact of natural
causality and the fact of divine omnipotence might take one of two
forms : ,
1. The insistence on the irreducible autonomy of the cosmic
order, as a self-contained system, developing its life-process in
u
accordance with the immanent laws of its own being, independent of
any extrinsic agency (even if such an agency were said to exist);
2, Second, the vindication of the absoluteness of the divine
power, as the unique principle of ontological determination, beyond
which there is only inertness and not-being. The former we shall
(44)
call naturalistic(or deistic) Determinism ; the latter we shall
Theistic Occasionalism.
-57-
The Peripatetic Philosophers and the Mu'tazilah alike
professed a doctrine of causal efficacy, as a concomitant of their
(45)
metaphysic of substa nee. In this they set themselves in
opposition to the Ashfarite doctors, who predicated efficacy of
uod alone, as will be seen later. In refuting this doctrine, Al-
Ghazali undertakes to show, from the standpoint of God's might,
the perniciousness of this deterministic theory and, especially,
its consequences for the doctrine of miracle. Having stripped the
causal nexus of the predicates of necessity, as we have seen, he
proceeds to show the errord implicit in a theory of substantial
determination.
A. It might be maintained,in .the first place, that it is
the natural agent (e,g,fire) which is cthe cause of the effect
'
\
following upon it (i,e,combustion). Yet the only evidence which
can be adduced in support of this thesis is the empirical
perception of the sequence according to which combustion ensues
upon ignition, satiety uponqnutrition, death upon the cutting
of the throat. Experience (al-Mushahadah), however, is incapable
of assigning the necessary grounds of thfcs cause-effect,in question
(46)
to the empirically assignable agent. Inasmuch as sense-
experience cannot exhaustively circumscribe the data with which the
validity of any universal proposition is bound up, no necessary
(47)
judgments can be enunciated on merely empirical grounds.
1® view of this incapacity of sense-perception to exhaust all its
data, it can be maintainedWith complete plausibility that "there
might exist in the principles of things(Mabadi'lhVujud) certain
agents and causes from which,..events emanate whenever they
impinge one upon the other; and yet are so constant that we are
S30BSK53
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unable to discern their presence, owing tothe fact that they do
not perish or recede, like variable objects whose recession enables
/
uj to discern their reality by discerning the difference (between
(48)
their existence and non-existence)" This hypothesis is actually
conceded by the authorities among the Philosophers (Muhaqqiquhura),
• * #
who teach that things receive their specific qualities and forms
(49)
from the 'dator formarum' , once they are naturally disposed for
their reception .
Although there is a 'formal'likeness between the Kantian and
the Ghazalian theses, the motives of the two thinkers are in no way
identical. The thesis of Al-Ghazali is that 'the testimony of
experience, not being exhaustive, the critic can assume the hypo¬
thetical possibility of the existence of 'occult causes' operating
in nature. To proceed beyond this hypothetical possibility,
however, two theses have to be sustained ;
a, ^he insufficiency of the empirical causal series, attested
by experience, to account for the natural effect under consideration-
b. The actual reality of an occult cause, (or of a series of
such causes) to which the natural effect can be positively referred.
The former is the old Ash'arite thesis according tov which
bodies are wholly shorn of any power or efficacy and, therefore,are
incapable of generating any form of natural movement. The full
development of this occasionalist theory is to be found in the
(50)
sequel. It is noteworthy in this context that Al-Ghazali is
silent on the metaphysical justification of this theory, both in
the Tahafut and in his major works; as though the doctrine stood in
bo need of any justification but had to be accepted as the tacit
groundwork ofhi's metaphysics. There is no doubt, however, that
he subscribes to this Ash'arite theory as a necessary corollary
of the thesis which, as we have already seen, represents the
coping-stone of his whole theological scheme; I mean, the doctrine
of the absolute sovereignty and omnipotence of God.
As to the positive reality of an (occult cause1 to which
efficacy in all the operations of nature ought to be referred
this too is no other than the Almighty whose all-pervading light
is so dazzling that it wannot be discerned except by the privileged
(51)
visionaries. These visionaries, unlike the common run of men,
are not deceived by the appearances of things, so as to presume
to see the forms of existing things as subsisting in themselves.
Indeed^; the^ see nothing save God's Face in all things. Thus it
is "that they see nothing but God is seen with it. Some of them
even go the length of saying: we have seen nothing but God was
seen before it. For some of them see things through Him, others,.,
see Him through things,,.because He is indissolubly united to all
(52)
things, and like the light, makes all things visible,"
The total presence of God to the creature , as we have already
seen, ought to be construed in terms of His absolute power and *o
sovereignty. God's consciousness of the Creation, His fore-
ordination of all things, in accordance with the designs of His
Providence are all reducible to one and only one reality: the
arbitrary fia t of the Creator of whose might egery movement and
every activity is the overt manifestation,
B. The existence of a primary cause, distinct from secondary
-40-
ugents, might be conceded by the opponent without surrendering
the deterministic thesis. The opponent, in fact, faight argue
that the dispositions of things for the reception of the 'forms(
emanating from the 'Primary Cause'(or causes) are determined by
the specific natures of these agents which are the substrata
(sing.Mahall) of generation and corruption. The mode of emanation
of the 'forms' from these primary causes, being determined by their
intellectual nature; and the specific dispositions of the substrata
being immutable, it follows that a natural agent must needs act
in a uniform and determinate manner, when the primary cause
(53) .
impinges upon it.
To rebut this argument of neo-Platonic eman&tionism, Al-
Ghazali adopts two courses. The first consists in showing that the
mode of activity of the Primary Cause (or causes) in question,
contrary to the gratuitous assumption of the nwo-Platonists, belongs
to the category of voluntary activity, ^he issue between voluntary
and necessary activity, as regards God, represents the substance
of the Third Disputation of the Tahafut. Here Al-Ghazali launches
a vehement attack on the deterministic doctrine of emanation, as
(54)
professed by the ifeo-Platonists. Their verbal avowal of creatio9
he argues, is mere dissimulation and duplicity. For on their
teaching, it follows that God, being divested of all attributes,
volitional activity is impredicable of Him, so that whatever
emanates from Him emanates through a mode of absolute necessity,
"as the effect ensues necessarily upon the cause... the shade upon
(55)
the figure and light upon the sun." Whenever, therefore, they
VI-
speak of God. as the Creator (Khali*}) or the D e. rr> I a r )
they are only speaking figuratively, Fornany adequate notion of
creation or of activity is unintelligible except in correlation
(56)
with the notions of knowledge and will. To speak of God,
therefore., in the manner of the Philosophers, as the necessary
cause of the universe, of rather the logical ground "without which
(57)
the existence of the universe cannot be conceived," is to miss
the import of creation altogether - and is in fact, a mere
subterfuge whereby the Philosophers seek to appease the orthodox.
This circumstance is confirmed by the specious theory of the •
eternity of the world, which is incompatible with the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo; or the predication of volitional activity of
IS'
^od, For according to our belief, Al-Ghazali writes, " Production
(56) :
(Ihaath) is the translation of an object from non-being to being"
I
ffjl
- a doctrine which is absolutely incompatible with the notion of
an externally subsisting universe.
As a final evidence of the disavowal of Creation by the
Philosophers, one can adduce their very monistic metaphysics.
For according to them the One can give rise, only to the one
the multiplicity of created things being the final stage in a
:
progressive series of emanations. To give the semblance of
verisimilitude to this preposterous theory, the neo-Platonists
invent a fantastic emanationist scheme, at the head of which stands j
->
.
the One,'who knows hims&lf- and thereby gives rise to the whole
series of Separate Intelligences. Unlike the One, the First of
these separate Intelligences cogitates the One as the supreme
%








the one from which it emanates, and as contingent through its
own being. The former act of self-gogitation gives rise to the
Second Intelligence, the latter to the soul of the first planetary
|
sphere and its body respectively. Yet upon close scrutiny this
fantastic emanationist scheme crumbles like a baseless construction,!
because it tests on no other ground save the idle play of the
(59)
imagination. The only recourse left before the conscientious
searcher, Al-Ghazali pursues the argument, is to accept the
teaching of revealed religion respecting a free and omnipotent
Agent "Who executes whatever He pleases and decrees as He wishes;
Creator of things in their distinctions and identity in accordance I
(60) ' '
with 0is sheer fiat" - a teaching enunciated by the Prophets
and corroborated by their miraculous deeds, The philosophers had
better accept "these precepts on the authority of the prophets...
and leave aside queries about quantities, qualities and quiddities,
for this is beyond the grasp of human faculties. (Was it not
on this account that the Prophet(Muhammad) enjoined): 'Ponder
(61)
God's creation but do not enquire into ^is:essence.(dhat) I
Yet Al-Ghazali is not unaware that the admission of the
arbitrary fiat of the Creator as the sole ground of all operations
in nature entails a whole host of serious absurdities. For if
we let the notion of a necessary causal sequence drop and refer
all operations to the caprice of the Creator, then knowledge would
lose all, its stringency and the configurations of things would be
shorn of any recognizable Natures, In the midst of this fanciful
world, where everything is shorn of the predicates of constancy
of necessity, man is reduced to the impossibility of making any




the identity of anything that is.
In grappling with this problem, Al-Ghazali finds himself
driven in perfect consequence with the initial assumptions of
his theistic occasionalism, to consent to beat the whole burden
of this revolting scepticism. The power of God is to be defined,
according to him, as an absolute faculty capable of reference to
all possibles, and since there is clearly no limit to the range
of possibilities then there is no limit to the scope of this
(63)
faculty. xt would seem, however, that the allegedly unlimited
range of possibility must give way, upon closer scrutiny, to the
law of contradiction, for obviously whatever involves any
logical contradiction is impossible even, for divine power, 1'his
Al-Ghazali concedes without abandoning however thejootion of
infinite possibility or acknowledging therein any rational
limitation of digine power. The revised notion of possibility
(64)
becomes thus coterminous with that of logical consistency.
Whatever involves logical contradiction must be dismissed as being
outside the sphere of possibility. Such, as we have seen, is the
whole class of entities whose correlation involves logical
(65)
necessity or coditional relationality, The relationship between
a natural agenjr and a natural patient falls oulside these two
categories, as we have shown previously. From the standpoint of
God's infinite power every real entity is in effect contingent
and therefore possible. The intellect cannot postulate a
necessary coincidence between the existence of the possible and
our consciousness of this existence, since God can create in us
-
. (66)
knowledge about the inexistence of the possible. No a priori
-44-
I
judgment can therefore be enunciated, with respect to the
modality of the possible. In its objective reality, and
consequently in relation to the intellect, the possible stands
in a position of utter indeterminateness, The ground of its
modal determination lies in the free activity of God, with Whom
alone rests the decree to bring it into being or withola from it
the title of ontal actuality. Thus does it come about that God
Eight decree that a phenomenon shall depart from its natural
course, vwithout violence to the contingent ontological order in
which this departure is effected. Such a departure would not
entail any violence with regard to our knowledge of the phenomenon
in question, because God woula infuse in us simultaneously with
the event, the knowledge corresponding to the modal determination
(87)
He has decreed that it should receive since all eternity,
C, Throughout this whole polemic against the Peripatetics,
"l-Ghazali has obviously been arguing at a disadvantage. For he
has been fighting the Peripatetic philosophers on their own
territory. This, he keenly perceives, is bound to entail meta¬
physical concessions which he is only too reluctant to make.
The emanationist scheme of the Phihsophers, their doctrine of
elemental dispositions; their theory regarding the primary cause
or 'Dator Formarum'; their illuminationist hypotheses; ana their
affirmation of a necessary causal nexus in nature are fundament¬
ally gratuitous and baseless. The critical examination of these
questions might help to reveal to the uninstructed the incoherence
©f their systems' and the inconclusiveness of their arguments
agaiflSt "the rational possibility of miracle. But this procedure
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is fraught with dangers and misconceptions which could be
avoided if these metaphysical phantasies are allowed to go.
At this juncture, Al-Ghazali casts off the 'metaphysical
mask' he has so cunningly worn throughout this whole dialectical
conflict with the philosophers. At one stroke he casts to the
wind all metaphysial. structures and all metaphysical assumptions.
Once mor eh is vision is fixed upon the focal center of absolute
divine power. To rationalize the possibility of miracle in a
%
conclusive manner, the metaphysician needs none save this 'magic
rod' of divine, omnipotence. Having consigned all metaphysical
presuppositions to the wind, Al-Ghazali breathes the free air of
self-emancipation. It might be conceded, he argues, that natural
agents (e,g,fire) are endowed with certain specific properties.
It might be conceded too that the same agent operates always in
the same manner, We main tain, however, he adds, that the same
agent might inJpinge upon a patient in such wise as to leave it
totally unaffected. And that by reason of the intervention of
God^either directly or through!, the agency of the angels, whereby
the specific nature of the patient is altered or the specific
operation of the patient withheld. Thus fire might seem to touch
(68)
the body of a prophet and yet leave it totally uninjured.
Similarly the intermediary terms of the causal sequence, which
represents the series of conditions culminating in the emergence
of a natural effect through-out a given time-process might be
abolished; and yet God might still decree that the effect shall
-46-
ensue upon the first term of the series and outside the
temporal process altogether. The miraculous intervention of
God would amount thus to a mere relaxation of the time-process
to a minimal degree .-, a circumstance which is not altogether
unreasonable; since we can conceive of a progressive short§nibg_;
of the period in which an event comes to pass, without jeopardy
1 \ (69) |
to the actua^i unfolding ofjthe process culminating in this event.
This assumption is not more unplausible than the Peripatetic
hypothesis according to which quasi-miraculous deeds are
attributed to the soul, and notably to the soul .of the prophet.
• • ■ \ II
The Philosophers teach, in point of fact, that the soul can bring
about extraordinary phenomena which are outside the ken of the
i
1
generality of men, such as rain, lightening and earthquakes,
(70)
through complicity with the elements. Although this hypo¬
thesis is philosophically plausible, it nevertheless suffers one
li
limitation, born of the failure of the Philosophers to rise to a
consciousness of the untold wonders of nature and the unsearchable |
1
depths of God's creative resources. For whoever catches a glimpse
of God's boundless power cannot fail to perceive the complete
verisimilitude of prophetic miracles. The Philosophers themselves ;
explain that the various natural processes, like the processes
of germination and animal generation, depend upon two conditions:
v V.
1. That of the propitious disposition of the elements, ana
(
2 That of the emanation of the specific and appropriate forms
(71)
from the primary causes, when that emanation has become
!>l
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seasonable owing to the timely movements of the heavens. Yet
by teaching that the determination of the modes and seasons of
the impingement of these two factors one upon the other transcends
human faculties, the Philosophers open the way for the possibility
of the most extraordinary of. natural wondets. In fact, the
'elemental dispositions of things( ate so mysterious that the
adepts of sorcery, alchemy and astrology have achieved well-nigh
miraculous deeds, through the crafty manipulation of the elements
• (72)
under the propitious auspices of the stars. Thus the mind is
naturally led to ask: "Are we warranted in maintaining the
impossibility of the propitious dispositions of certain bodies,
whereby they are capable of transmutability (from one phase to
another) in the shortest conceivable time; so as to become disposed
fcr the reception of a form to which they were not formerly
disposed and thus give rise to miracle -, it being granted $ha t
the principles of elemental dispositions are inscrutable ana their
(73)
multitudes inexhaustible." The hidden secrets of nature and
of God's wonders leave ample scope in nature, therefore, for the
admission of the possibility of the most miraculous phenomena
the depths of which our limited consciousness is incapable of
fathoming. To call the rational possibility of miracle into
(74)
question, therefore, is nothing short of sheer obscurantism.
Here it will be noticed, Al-Ghazali lapses, once more,
t
into his initional position of partial agnosticism, professing
thereby to save the conclusive reality of miracle. By casting
-48-
upon the natural process the cloak of mystery, he professes to
give a rational account of the surreptitious and miraculous
incursion of the Divinity into the domain of nature. The
'rationalization* of miracle has thus been achieved through a
singular paradox:- The quest of the rational grounds of miracle








Our analysis of Al-Ghazali's doctrine of causality and his
motives in repudiating the alleged necessity of the causal nexus
has revealed the three major movements in the development of his
thesis; namely, the absolute sovereignty1 and omnipotence of God;
the contingence of the ontological order; and the validity of the
category of necessity in the realm of logical relations of* of
tconditional relationality'. That Al-Ghazali, in grappling with
this grave metaphysical issue, has shown a unique acuteness of mind
and a remarkable ability to dispose of the data of the problem with
complete mastery can scarcely be gainsayed. It is true that Al-
Ghazali 's success in reconciling the antithetic .conflicts involved
in the antinomy of deterministic .and divine power has been achieved
at the cost of the 'integrity of the cosmic order' - and the unity
of its ontological life. Yet such a defdct is the natural outcome
of the inadequacy of the material of which Al-Ghazali's solution
represents the synthesis, rather thah of any radical inconsequence
vitiating the dialectical movement of his thought. His dialectic
acumen, in fact, is nowhere displayed as fully and as masterly as it
is in this very freedom and rythm with which his mind moves in the
orbit of this absolute divine sovereignty which has devoured every
thing. Like the «agle soaring aloft in 'airless space', his maind
encounters no resistance because it has dissolved all multiplicity
and all being in the unity of the unique and Absolute Being, Here is
a striking iiuvstopce of the dialectical stringency with which the
actaphysic of oneness can be so artfully woven into a seamless
fabric, wherein perfect consistency has been achieved at the cost
' of adequacy.
Once the acuteness of Al-Ghaz ali and his ingeniousness in
handling his material are admitted, the issue regarding his doctrinal
debt to his historical forbears can be settled in a fair way. It is
our purpose in the present chapter to determine Al-Ghazali's specific
debt to the outstanding representatives of traditional Kalam, in w "
general, and the Ash'arite school, in particular. Because it is
only in this manner that the historic .significance of the problem
at issue can be brought out and the unique contribution of Al-
Ghazlli to Its settlement properly assessed, likewise a final
critique of Al-Ghazali's doctrine of causality and of the meta¬
physical framework in which it is conceived, <.caq be adequately
undertaken only in the perspective of the intellectual heritage
to which it is historically affiliated.
It has become patent by now that the metaphysical system of Al-
Ghazlli falls in line with the great metaphysical heritage of the
Ash'arite school. Of course, an exhaustive account of the debt of
Al-Ghazali to Ash'arism would have to show the extent of his docility
in accepting the corpus of Ash'arite doctrine as well as his
departure from the doctrinal path traced by his spiritual forbears.
As far as I know such a task has not been undertaken. Nor is it my
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design in this short survey to acconplish such a task, howevermuch
it night contribute to the understanding of the doctrinal history
of Islam and the specific genius of Al-Ghazali in it. To those,
who, discoursing at length on Al-Ghazali's rebellion against
(1)
traditional Kalam , are led to counsel moderation in any endeavour
to reduce so outstanding a thinker to a mere name in a register of
historic names, I content myself with remarking: Indeed there is no
genius whose thought and whose life are achieved in the pure vacuity
of a trans-historic process and no rebel'whose insurrection against
the thraldom of the past is without remorse.
I/hatever the extent of the affiliation of Al-Ghazali to
Ash'arism in other directions, his debt to Ash'su-rite Kalaqm as
regards our main theme is immense. The absolute sovereignty and
omnipotence of God, the contingence of the ontological order, and
with it the causal nexus; the notion of necessary 'conditional
relationality' - are among the grand themes of A/Sh'arism which are
taken over almost integrally by Al-Ghazali, as the present chapter
proposes to show,
f • v '
II
Divine Sovereignty and Omnipotence
in Ash'ari Kalam.
/
The grand theme around which the whole of Muslim theology
revolves,,like celestial galaxies around their stellar center, is
the theme of the absolute uniqueness of God. What sets Islam apart
-52-
affirmation of the irreducible, absolute and quasi-incomprehenaible
unity of God. The orthodox profession of Islam, in fact, centaiis
!
no other article of faitm save this primordial admission of divine
(2)
unity. The Muslim believer like the Muslim theologian is obsessed
liby no other thought save this sovereign vision of divine,transcendant
unity, the confession of which/is the sole pre-requisite of salvation. ij
||
whatever threatens to impair the purity of this vision is waived •
contemptuously aside as polytheism and impiety.(Shirk or Ishrak)
•111
In their apologetic controversies with pagans or with christians \
the Muslim theologians have no other pre-occupation save the
vindication of this unity against any doctrine which savours,
however remotely, of polytheism. It is as though they are in the
grips of an infernal nightmare which threatens to choke the breath
of life in their breasts, of a positive dread lest this unity should
be gainsayed and therefore jeopardized. Commenting on Muhammed's
failure to perceive the inchherence of his Koranic teaching, -c'
Schmolaers writes.: "Une seule pensee s'etait emparee de son ame,
une pensee grande et sublime, il est vrai, mais qui dans un esprit
ardent comme le sieo, devait bientot tourner en fanatisme.dette
t / '
peneee, c'etait l'unite a'un Dieu invisible. Iln'ya qu'un aieu et
noi je suis son prophete - voila 1'Islam entier. Aucune religion
peut-etre n'a eh des dogmfts si peu nombreux et si simples a la fois,
aucun n'a promis le ciel a si bas prix que 1-e, sienne;car vous seriez
heureux, pourvti" que vous professes ces deux dogmasj vous serez
heureux pourvu que vous vous rangiez sous le drapeau glorieux qui
,.(3)
ralliera tous les peuples.
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This absolute and irreducible uniqueness of God commended
itself to the primitive mind of the Arabs of the Seventh Century
that they subscribed to it with utter docility. Yet no sooner the
penury of this impoverished notion of the God-Despot began to
impinge on the other aspects of Muslim thought and life than the
liberal minds began to question this usurpation by the Deity of
all the predicates of being and activity. For such a notion had
stripped the creature of its subsistence and despoiled man of his
legitimate title for self-determination. The theological school
which 'was destined to lead the rebellion against this despotic
notion of the Deity was the Mu'tazilite schocil. The Koran, in
vindicating this absolute sovereignty of God, had dissoved the
reality of everything else ana subjected it to the arbitrary and V
tyrannical will of the Almighty, Face-to-face, with the Almighty
the creature had no rights and no prerogatives, or any efficacy
for self-fulfillment. To counterbalance this notion of arbitrary
d
Fiat, the Mu'tazilah introduce two novel limitative principles:
1. The principle of divine righteousness and the"rationality
of divine Providence.
2. The reality and self-subsistence of the creature and its
capacity for effective self-determination.
To establish the first principle, the Mu'tazilah had to subsume
the notion of divine po'wer to the notion of divine wisdom. God
does not act capriciously and despotically;, rather does He act in
l
accordance with the precepts of prudence ana justice in whatever
He executes in the order of His all-embracing Providence. Neither
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pre-destination nor tyranny are, therefore, compatible with the
notion of the righteous God. The All-wise Creator disposes all
things in order and in measure and has left upon all things the
(4)
ispress of His wisdom and His righteousness.
It is important to note, in this context, a very significa nt
corollary of this doctrine of "rational divine providence". We
(5)
have seen how Al-Ghazali disposes summarily of the illicit
predication of justice and injustice of the omnipotent Creator,
whose will can be subordinated to no fcther will and whose dominion
can infringe no. other dominion.' We have also seen how A 1-Ghazali
levels the charge of blasphemy on the Mu'tazilites for subjecting
God to a lav/ of Reason, in the name of His justice and wisdom. It
is, 6 f course, strangd to find Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite school
in general reject so uncompromisingly the implications of divine
)
justice and wisdom, in their repercussion on the providentia 1
ordering of the creation, when they were so zealous in defending
the majestic sovereignty and perfection of the Divine'Being, The
significance of this rejection, when viewed in its ethical per-
f!!
spective, is that it culminates necessarily in the notion of a
it?
contingent ethical doctrine which, in perfect consequence with the
notion of arbitrary divine Fiat, finds the ground of obligation
/ fijjjjf:




enquires into the grounds of moral duty and the ultimate justificati<r ih
of the Ought, he cannot in the framework of this contingent ethica 1 |
teaching, lay down as an irreducible ethical postulate: 'It inheres




can he set up Reason as legislator in the moral sphere, by virtue
of the intrinsic rationality of the Idea of the Good and the
Sovereign legitimacy of its Ought-to-be, for such would impair
the sovereignty of the unique moral legislator and the absoluteness
of His dominion.
The contingency of the ethical order is of course on par with
the Ash'arite doctrine of a contingent ontological order. That is
why the elaboration of this ethical doctrine deserves to be
'
According to Shahrastani, (6)
attended to here. ^ "It is a tenet of orthodoxy that reason cannot
determine what is good or evil...For men's actions are not intrinsic-
ally good or base in such wise that they earn'God's rewa rd or
punishment in fulfilling the former and refraining fcom the latter. •
The good is -what the revealed lav/ (as-shar') commends, the bad v/hat
(7)
it prohibits." To demonstrate this assertion we have only to
consider the compelling nature of knowledge pertaining to the
speculative order, as against moral maxims whose validity is
(8)
relative and whose scope is limited. The appeal to a 'natural
code of ethics' whereby men do the honourable and shun the dis¬
honourable is no conclusive: evidence for the absoluteness of moral
principles, either' because it is with a view to social praise that
men conform their conduct to this code of ethics, and out of fear
of social cenuure that they refrain from doing the dishonourable
O)
ana the vile.
The Mutazilah, in fact, in perfect consequence with their
notion of the paramountcy of the concept of 'wisdom', in divine
and human activity alike, preached that,goodness is intrinsic to
the act itself;so that unaided reason is capable of discovering the
grounds of the rational justification of the Ought,prior to the
(10)
revealed,commandments of the law. In proof of this the
Uu'tazilah argued, through^ a process of 'reductio ad absurdum',
that reason was indispensable for the explicitation of the contents
of the law, as well as the discrimination between acts of a contro¬
versial moral character. To banish reason altogether from the
noral sphere would amount to banishing the law itself. "For if we
abolish the (rational) categories of good and evil from human acts
and refer them to the mere commandments of the lav;, then therational |
principles which w e deduce from the fundamentals of the la. w would
. hQ-
be invalidated; so that it would impossible tp compare acts of views
and to determine the why and the wherefore thereof -, inasmuch as
no rationality inheres in subjects (Dhawat) ana no specific properties
attach to their acts in such a way that a controversial precept might
be referred to it or compared therewith. This would amount to a
total abolition of the law with respect to its affirmation and of
(11)
the religious precepts with respect to their acceptance."
The teaching og the Philosophers on this question, Shahrastani
further explains, consists "in showing that goodness has its grounds
in the Idea of the Good. According to them, it is a postulate of
reason that "Being is divisible into absolute goodness, abs olute
(12)
evil and a category of good and evil combined." It is likewise
a postulate of reason that the intellect desires the absolute good
and shuns the absolute evil for their own sake, regardless of whether
they are enjoined or prohibited by the lawgiver or not. For the
soul attains to a state of likeness to God and perfects its:;
practical and speculative faculties, qnly by conforming itself to
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tfcis ethical postulate. The role that the 1a.iT plays in this
process of self-fulfillment and self-perfection is to confirm the
assertions of reason rather than to abrogate them, and to minister
to the natural incapacity of the generality of men to arrive at the
(IS)
knowledge of the necessary principles of ethical obligation.
In its polemic against the Mu'tazilah a nd the Philosophers,; .
the Ash'arite school re-affirms the absoluteness of God's arbitrary
Fiat, as the sole ground of the moral lav/. Unlike speculative
principles, ethical maxims have no conclusiveness about them, as we
have already seen. They derive their authoritative character from
the pragmatic consideration of the social praise or reproach tha t
their fulfillment or their contravention would entail. Yet the
only consideration that matters with fcespect to the validity of
these moral maxims is God's own verdict. This divine verdict is
conditional upon God's own will as revealed to man ana not upon the
intrinsic goodness or vileness of deeds considered in themselves.
Moral obligation, therefore, is not only conditional upon the
commandments of the law but is historically co-eval with it; so
that divine judgement can have regard only to the explicit
(14)
injunctions of the, law.
And yet ethical rationalism, exasperated with this notion of a
gratuitous ethical doctrine, instead of surrendering the enquiry
into the rational grounds of obligation, turns finally to divine
wisdom, as the ultimate foundation of the moral law. Even if man's
title to legislate morally is disputed, and even if the authority
_ - -too
of reason to arbitrate in moral conflicts is repudia ted, might it
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not be that the Sovereign ethical, Legislator and Judge Himself
legislates and arbitrates in accordance with the dictates of His
sovereign wisdom?
It will be recalled here how natural is the disposition of
human reason to call into accouht the Divinity Himself, bidding him
submit a rational justification of the designs of His Providence
in the name of an absolute law of justice to which the Almighty
Himself is compelled to submit. For Ash'arism and Al-Ghazali,
however, such a disposition is nothing short of blasphemy. We
realize at this point how consequent the Ash'arite theologians a re
in reducing the moral law to the expression of the sheer Fiat of
the Almighty; and how the notion of injustice, as Al-Ghazali keenly
(15)
Perceived, can have no other meaning in this perspective than
insurrection against the will of a superior or the infringement of
the domain of another. For thus, God who stands at the summit of
Creation and whose dominion extends to the outermost reaches of
space, can be brought to account before no judgment-seat. To Him
alone is it given to exact judgment and to administer justice; but
of Him nbither justice nor righteousness can be exacted, since
above His dominion there is no dominion.
The appeal to the authority of reason as presiding over the
providential designs of the Almighty is, therefore, of no avail.
Indeed, the foremost predicate of God is power and might, a power
(
which extends to the uttermost limits of possibility, even where
(16)
injustice itself is involved, "We believe"^ writes Al-Ash'ari
in a passage too classical not to be quoted here in full, "that
God created everything by bidding it 'Be'*"..; that nothing on earth,
whether a fortune or a misfortune, comes to be, but God has willed
i
it; that things exist by God's fiat; that none can perform an act
prior to its performance , or dispense with God or elude His
knowledge...; that there is no creator save God; and that the deeds
of the creatures are created by Him and predestined by Him, a s it
t
1s written:'He created you and your deeds'. That the creatures can
create nothing but are rather created themselves... That God has
pleased to give it to the pious to obey Him, through His grace, His
care, His reform;.and His guidance; as He has pleased to delude (
(uuhallah) the impious by refraining from gliding them graciously...;
That God could reform the impious and conyept them unto godliness,
tut for his foreordination that they shall be impious as He fore¬
knew, leading them thus to perdition and blindness. (We believe)
that good and evil are the outcome of God's decree and fore-ordinatioi[
and we profess faith in God's decree and fore-ordination (Kada'
wa Qadar): good or evil, auspicious or ominous, and. know that what
has failed to attain us would not have attained us and what has
befallen us would not have failed to attain us, and that creatures
do not have it in their power to benefit or injure themselves,
(18)
save through God". In his polemic against the Mu'tazilah, Al-
Ash'ari expounds at great length the logical'absurdities involved
In any preposterous limitation of the scope of divine power in hhe
disposition of His providence and the fulfillment of His arbitrary
(19) . j-
decrees. No wonder he can find no other ground for obligation
(20)-
save the divine fiat. In demonstraying this cardinal thesis,
the Ash'arite doctors, following in the steps of themaster,
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repudiate the notion of goodness as intrinsic to the moral act,
or as an absolute category predicable of Being as such, as we have
(21)
already seen. Goodness can only mean, upon examination, conform-
ity with the injunctions of a sovereign-absolutec.goodness conformity
with the injunctions of the Absolute Sovereign. The contention
'
i;.
that wisdom is the ultimate ground of God's exacting obedience
and dispensing justice, argues Shahrastani, in a manner altogether
-
similafc to that of Al-Ghazali's, does not avail in assigning a
rational justification of the Ought.. For according to us, he
•
. ' * }j.
writes, "wisdom is the occurence of the event in accordance with
knowledge, abstraction being made of interest 'or utility ensuing
(22) - , .
thereupon.". Such a conception of wisdom is clearly irrelevant
to the validity of the ought; as is indeed the consequential
consideration of an 'ulterior motive' underlying all divine activity.
For is it not legitimate to ask here:'What motive can the Almighty
have in enjoining obedience? And what profit can accrue to Him
in the very creation of the universe?' If it is answered: (The
good of the creature or the remuneration of gratitude', then one
might ask:'But what secure good does the moral adventure upon which
the creature is launched yield, when his destiny might issi-s in
eternal damnation; and what positive gain does gratitude bring unto
(23)
the self-sufficient Creator"?
The problem of a rational justification of moral obligation is
i
thus seen to involve a metaphysical problem .of great moment: the ■!
ti
problem of a rational justification of the very act of creation; In
.




iic'can a reason be assigned to the primordial movement of the
creative will of God?'
It is significant to note that the Mu'tazilah gave an affirmative!'
retort to this question; God created the universe, they said, for the
manifestation of his uniqueness, through the signs of visible •
(24)
things and thereby the acknowledgment of His Godhead. In
rebutting this argument, the Ash'arites urged that we have only
to consider the fragmentariness and the insecurity of the creatures'
.
. * ijj
consciousness of God, to realize how precarious and unavailing is the |
(25)
fulfillment of this alleged purpose of the Creator, God's-
might, says Al-Baghdadi, one of the leading Ash'arite authors, is
w (26)boundless and the decrees of His providence irrevocable. His
wisdom is so indissolulably bound up with His creative might "that
whatever He creates, He creates wisely. Were He to refrain from
creating thee-.universe altogether... to create the ungodly without
the godly, or the godly without the ungodly; or to create the
inanimate without the animate, the animate without the inanimate
He would be acting in accordance with the precepts of righteousness,
(27)
justice and wisdom." It is natural in the perspective of this
theory of unmitigated divine omnipotence that the destiny of the
creature should be wholly surrendered to God. For moral obligation,
with which this destiny is bound up, consists in mere conformity
to the commands of the law, as we have already seen in Ash'ari
t
and Shahrastani, Whatever the law enjoins is morally laudable,
whatever it prohibits morally reprehensible. Prior to such an




seaningless. Reason can furnish no justification of moral dut£,
t.nether prescriptively or selectively; for this is the prerogative
of God, with whom alone it rests to aetermine the season and the
(28)
contents of the law, in accordance with His sheer pleasure.
The question of God's gratuitous fia t in enjoining moral
precepts is tied up in the Mu'tazilitp-Ash'arite controversies with
the question of divine judgment and chastisement, as the passage
quoted below shows. The absolute arbitrariness of uod in
dispensing justice is nowhere revealed more strikingly than in
the Ash'arite contention that God can inflict suffering on the
' ' ' (29)
innocent, without jeopardy to His justice. We have seen how
outspoken Al-Ghazali is in the vindication of this thesis against
(30)
the Mu'tazilah. Witness here Al-Baghdadi's .account of God's
gratuitous dispensation of- punishment and teward. Having shown
that punishment and reward are contemporaneous with the predication
of the law, he proceeds to show that man's discernment of God's
existence and unity through unaided reason, prior to the predication
of the lav/ (Qabl wurud ish-shar'), entails no necessary reward; that,
on the other hand, in the event of failure to arrive at a demonstr¬
ative knowledge of God - though undeserving of punishment, - God
might, if He so wishes, consign him to eternal damnation; as he
(31)
can indeed freely chastise the infants and the innocent.
The Ash'arite reduction of the notion of moral responsibility
and guilt td sheer conformity to the injunctions of the law is the
natural consequence of their ethical determinism. For an agent
whose moral activity is woven into the texture of divine power
and fore-ordination can be saidto be a bearer of responsibility
-63-
ar;ci guilt .oPly within the orbit circumscribed around his moral
being by the sovereign decrees of the Almighty. And yet even here
his moral integrity as a responsible agent is not altogether safe¬
guarded, Th notion of moral responsibilityjwhen rationalized to
its depths, is found to be the condition^rather than the consequent
or the concomitant, of conformity to the moral law, whatever its
source and justification. Any ethical doctrine which proclaims,
in the manner of Ash'arism, that reppdnsibility is coeval with a
historic revelation of the commands of the law threatens to nullify
O
uhe meaning of responsibility and morality alike, The of
human res ponsibility with which the reality pf freedom and duty is
bound up, is in fact the most primordial, moral category - a
category which is independant of the will of the Almighty or of the
positive contents of the moral law. It is true that an adequate
conception of morality must concede that responsibility is in¬
conceivable save in the perspective of a personalistic metaphysics
a metaphysic, that is to say, which places the moral agent face-to-
face with a sovereign Person in whose gratification the fulfillment
of the moral uught acquires ethical significance. But the
gratification of this sovereign Person is itself conditional upon
the free response of a responsible agent, Man is not responsible
because he fulfills the moral Ought, For the moral Ought has no
meaning unless responsibility is pre-supposed as the quality of
a free agent who submits to the moral Ought or violates it freely
and nihilistically, and thus consents to load himself with
responsibility and guilt. Responsibility is, in the last analysis
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therefore, a constitutive element of man's entitative being, of
his actual being as man - rather than an element of his finished
ethical actuality. For responsibility, oar sensibility to the
positive imperatives of the Ought, lies on this side of finished
ethical actuality. In this respect it is not unlike aesthetic,
or even noetic, sensibility . For noetic, aesthetic and.onoral
values alike there' is an elemental condition of ontological actuality i
grounded in the actual structure of man. If this structure is not
.
presupposed, these values are found to forfeit their axiological
I
meaning because they have been cut off from the ontological center
' ' ' I
in which they are rooted -, I mean, the actually constituted
consciousness of the personal bearer of whom they are predicable.
We cannot, of course, elaborate this point any further here.
The upshot of the whole question at issue is that Ash'arite, moral
occasionalism rests upon a false conception of responsibility
which threatens to nullify the meaning of morality altogether.
By its identification of the two logically distinct planes of
responsibility and obligation, it fails to perceive the irreducible
priority of responsibility without which obligation becomes
meaningless. And as it cannot assign any rational justification
to the validity of the Ought, it commits the further guilt of
identifying the Ought, in its inexhaustible wealth, with the
arbitrary decrees of a capricious legislator,' Here It not only
bits the very heart of ethics, by reducing .it Id pure legalism
ana Pharisaism; it eVen hits the Almighty in the boundlessness of
: " '
His will, which it professes to read in. the promulgations of a
primitive ethical code."
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Th e Ash'arite nullification of moral responsibility can be
verified from another direction: and that the direction of moral
freedom. Ethical philosophers of the most conflicting schools
of thought seem to concur in this: that the fate of moral
responsibility is bound up with the fate of moral freedom. An
ethical theory in which freedom has no place can scarcely leave





Ethical Determinsm and Human Freedom,
The Mu'tazilah invoke a second principle, as we have seen, in
their polemic against the Ash'arite doctrine of unmitigated
\
divine Sovereignty, This is the reality and subsistence of the
creature and its capacity for self-determination. It is well-
known how the Mu'tazilah figure in the history of Islam as the
advocates of free-will, in the name of divine justice. Their
fanaticism in upholdingsfree-will against the thoroughgoing
fatalism of the Ash'arites is nowhere brought out more vividly
than in their hyperbolical notion of man as the 'creator of his
(32)
deeds'- , which aroused the staunchest opposition among
Ash'arite doctors as tantamount to polytheismi We have already
quoted Ash'ari's inveterate polemic against this Mb'ta^silite
blasphemous teaching in his statement of the Orthodox creed in
Ibahah. Witness how lustily he re-iterates the word'creator' as
the exclusive predicate of God in that classical passage. "We
believe", he writes, "that there is no Creator save God and that
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nun's deeds are created and fore-ordained by Him as it is- said
( in Scripture):'He engaged you and your deeds'...'They create
nothing but He alond creates' .. ,q .and 'Is He who creates 1ikev.unto
him who does not'; and 'Have th'ey been created from naught or are
(33) '
they the Creators'."
The same note-is sounded by practically all Ash'arite doctors
in their polemic against the Mu'tazilite doctrine of self-determin-
(34)
ation. Al-Ghazali himself strikes this note throughout his
ethical writings. Discoursing on God's fore-ordination (the word
is creation) of man's decisions, his deeds and even his repentance,
he writes:"Knowledge, repentance, acting and willing, activity
and the agent (al-Qudrah wal-Qadir) all is of God's creation and
(35)
doing. For 'He has created you and your deeds'". (Koran:2- )
From the standpoint of the major theme with which we are
concerned, this absorption of the dynamic efficacy of the self-
determined agent by divine might is another instance of the
Ash'arite repudiation of the reality and subsistence of the
Creature. The ■o.pp'qrrent dynamism of cosmic life, even in its
supreme manifestation as exhibited in the phenomenon of human
self-determination, is represented as the unilateral procession of
the divine.will and the divine might. Yet, when it has been
conceded that this procession, this movement of cosmic life, has
its initial starting-point in the spontaneous fiat of the Almighty,
thenmind is led naturally to ask: "Whither this dynamic .current of
divine activity, welling out imperiously from the bosom of God?"
For the mind cannot rest in a hypothesis of^randora dialectical,
sclf-unfoldment of the divine Essence whose principle and whose
tern is the sheer dynamism of the Almighty,- a hypothesis
according to which the Almighty is engaged in a purposeless and
a senseless game of outgoing 'vagabondage1 on the'wings of cosmic
space. If thxis divine movement is to have any meaning, there must
csist somewhere in the cosmic order a center towards which divine
activity gravitates -, a real entity upon which the unilateral
movement of the divine will impinges. Otherwise the solitude of
the Divine Being would be stifling, and the divine inner life
hollow and unchallenging like a grave. We shall see later that in
this dialectic of divine self-unfoldment there inheres a twofold
necessity grounded in the reality of divine love; the necessity of
filial companionship and that of subsisting otherness, >
It is this inexorable dialectic which '.has driven rationalism,
in general, to set up the creature in the face of the Creator,
as a center of dynamic activity. The Mu'tazilah's position on
this point, as we have seen, confirms the general principle. Even
the Ash'arite school, engaged as it was in a dual polemic against
human and divine determinism (Qadariyyah and Jabriyyah), found
itself led to assign a positive share in activity to the human
agent, in the form of acquisition (Knsb). Yet this concession is
found upon closer scrutiny, to represent no real safeguard of
human freedom. In their attack on th/roughgoing ethical determinism
(whether impersonalistic fa talism or theistic predestinationisj?)
the Ash'arites remain metaphysically committed to a position of
qualified ethical determinism. It is the contention of this essay




Bod-man relationship, is irreconcilable with any theory of human
efficacy or human freedom. It is significant that thoroughgoing
determinism (Jabriyyah) does not seem to have been in great vogue
* I
in early Islam, because of the obvious extremeness of its claims. .
' |
Chahrastani, in fact, cites only one school of complete determinists
(Jabriyyah Khalisah), in his Book of Religious and Philosophic
(56)
facts- that of Jahmiyyah,, the followers of Xahm ben Safwan,
Respite its version of mitigated Jabriyyah and its theory of Kasb ,
the Ash'arite school took over the significant aspect of the
•labriyyah's teaching in what relates to God's fore-ordination and
the creation of man's deeds.
The doctrine of Kasb (Acquisition) can be described assan
attempt to find a verbal standpoipt from which the imperious
activity of the Almighty can be referred to the human agent. That
in this process of reference, efficacy is consistently reserved
to God is a fundamental tenet of Ash'arism and a necessarjry
corollary of their metaphysic of substance and the inertness of
(37)
celng, as we shall see more fully later. The genesis of this
nominal theory of freedom is to be found in the empirical
perception of a positive distinction between voluntary and involunt¬
ary motion. According to Shahrastani, this is how a leading Ash'arite
uoctor- Abu-Bakr al-B^qilani, explains this question, Man
perceives intuitively^ (min nafsihi)^ he argues, a necessary
distinction between voluntary and involuntary movement. This
distinction cannot be ascribed to any differentiae pertaining to
the two species of movement, since they are not generically
different,- but rather to a factor super-added thereto (Za.Tid) .
this superadded factor cannot he said to consist in mere I
ji
consciousness ('Ilm), because this would amount yto andabolition
of the distinction. It must therefore be referred to a faculty
which has regard to the predicates of Being, rather than to Being
! !•
per se. The latter, on the admission of the Mu'tazilah themselves,
is predicable of God alone, whose power has tegard to the universal
|j
category of Being per se (Wu jud), but not to the predicates of Being
fi
which inhere in non-Being according to them. Thus the power of the
human agent can be legitimately referred to one.- -aspect (Wajh) of
\
^ . rjl
the actj namely that whereby it is differentiated (tatamayyaz)
- —
from an involuntary act not fallingWithin its scope. This raode of
f
reference of the act to the will of the human agent is called
'Kasb'; and it is to it that reward of punishment attach where a
It! II
command of the law is involved. Thus, without prejudice to human
volition, a positive distinction is established betv/een the mode of
-by ' . ' : " / 'V.
'reference' (Ta'allugj) of divine power and that of human poweer.
The former by definition is referrable to 'Being per sef in a
♦
universal way, whereas the latter-is merely referrable to a specific
(38)
aspect of Being, in a particular way. This in the last analysis,
is the ground of the distinction between creation, as the predicate
(39)
of God and acquisition, as the predicate of .man,
We cannot relate here the whole tale of the Mu'tazilite-
Ash'arite controversy that raged over this question. Yet there is
one pertinent aspect of the problem which we cannot pass unnoticed
here; because it is of far-reaching consequence to all'Muslim ethicalj j
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thought. This is the problem of consciousness in its relation
to the phenomenon of self-determination. In criticizing the
Ash'arite doctrine of Kasb, the Mu'tazilah urged that the admission
of a faculty devoid of efficacy, in the manner already expounded,
(40)
involves a tacit self-contradiction. For unless we concede the
the reality of a human capacity entailing the power 'for production
(Ijad), we find ourselves thrown back on our initial position, and
therefore, t\ f> against the original difficulty from which our
investigation was first launched. But with the failure to concede
the reality of self-determination is bound up a grave issue; namely,
the issue of man's consciousness of self-determination. YJhoever,
in fact, gainsays the intuitive certainty that the agent has of the
positive role he plays in free activity: i.e.: activity issuing
(41)
forthefrom his self-determined will, gainsays the conclusive
certainty of intuitive knowledge. The infirmity of man's nature
and his inability to achieve a total coincidence between what he
designs and what he effects, in the world of concrete existence,
proves nothing against the intrinsic autonomy of his will and his
consciousness of self-determination. For the Ought is intelligible
(42)
only in the perspective of effective possibility.
The acuteness of the Mutazilite critique and the gravity of
the antinomy with which they are grappling here are obvious. Of
course, the Ash'arites, by reason of their contingent ethical
doctrine, are unable to perceive the law of necessary concomitance
of the Ought and the Can, jror them 0uSbt is not an irreducible
-71-
ethical principle, upon which the ethical theorist can base
conclusive metaphysical assumptions. Nor does the 'Can' subsist
on its own, so that the principles of its intrinsic impingement
upon the moral order can be rationally deduced. No wonder, they
nissed deplorably the peremptoriness and the urgency of the arnti-
nomy of the Ought and the manner in which moral postulates impinge
upon the ontological sphere. Their solution of this antinomy (if
solution it can be called): amounts to a counsel of despair, a
handing over to the Almighty of the problem and the solution alike.
And yet here, where the Mu'tazilites' ethical insight pierces to
the depths of the problem of moral autonomy, a most striking
difficulty is displayed to sight: their failure to discern the
chasm which separates the problem of 'moral autonomy' and the
problem of 'concrete freedom of activity(: This failure is
I
symptomatic of the failure of all Muslim Kalam to rise to the plane
|
of conceiving the problem of moral freedom in its proper perspective, i
There persists, in fact, throughout the whole controversial 1. .
literature on moral freedom in Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite circles
t
alike, a phenomenal confusion : the confusion between 'moral
autonomy' and moral activity; between freedom of the will and free¬
dom of activity. No wonder in the. maze of this far-reaching
/
confusion, no prospect of a settlement of the problem of moral free¬
dom was in sight> Indeed, when perusing this controversial
literature one is left at a loss to determine which it is really
that the Mb'tazilite-Ash'arite controversialists are pre-occupied
with. Is it the freedom of the will of the freedom of activity?-
-72-
1 ]
the-two of which seem to be woven into each other like the woof
and the warp of one garment.
Looking now at the controversy from the altitudes of critical
insight achieved through ages of ethical investigation, especially
by Kant and Hartmann - in our times, we are perhaps tempted to
judge those pioneers too severely. Yet here, at last, there
lurked in the horizon a streak of light which the Mu'tazilah failed
to pursue to the end. Like Kant, they had perceived the impossibility
of divorcing the Ought from the Can, Nevertheless they continued
to treat the Ought and the Can as thought they belonged to the same
order of discourse. The outcome was that their perception of the
notion of consciousness of self-determination contributed little
to the solution of the problem of actual self-determination and
the consequent problem of freedom of activity, with which it was
(45)
so hopelessly confused.
A'r At- A'r -if-
With this we migjit turn to Al-Ghazali to see how far he concurs
in this theory of nominal self-determination, and how much of the
efficacy of the human agent he succeeds in retaining, in hie own
version of this doctrine of Kasb. The vindication of God's
absolute power and fore-ordination, which as we have seen is a
concomitant of faith in the uniqueness ofGod, involves necessarily
the pre-supposition that God is the sole agent in all the operations
of nature,' Whatever comes to pass in the domain of concrete\ x
esistence must therefore be referred to His will and fore-
ordination, Yet the very notion of obligation, underlying the
Predication of the law (Shar'), rests on a tacit admission of man's
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(44)
responsibility and, therfore, of his freedom. How is the moral
theorist, then, in the face of these antithetic conflicts between
j
husan freedom and divine fore-ordination - to achieve an. ethical
settlement of the problem in a manner which promised to safeguard
the rights of the creature and the rights of the Creator, wherever
their respective activities impinge one upon the other?
Pure determinism, he argues, inasmuch as it imputes all a ctivity
I
to God - cannot be entertained because it threatens to sap the
foundations of moral duty by nullifying the notion of moral
responsibility altogether, and fails to account for the distinction
(45)
between voluntary and invqluntary movement in a satisfactory manner.
Any unqualified theory of self-determination which attributes to
n*n the creation of his deeds,in the manner of the Mu'tazilah, ought
to be rejected too, because it infringes the prerogative of God, as
the sole Creator of everything that is. In fact, when the notion of
creation is exposed to critical scrutiny It is found that the
predication of creativity to the agent involves a gross error.
Any adequate conception of creation must concede the relation of
(46)
concomitance between creation and consciousness. "For how can
the creature be the creator (of his deeds) when he is totally
unconscious of the minutes ana numbers of the movements" he is
(47)
said to effect? If these two erroneous positions are discounted,
there remains one valid alternative; namely, a'media via' between
(48)
determinism and voluntarism, as in the doctrine of Kasb.
Like his Ash'arite masters Al-Ghazali has, in this 'via media]




haunted by the vision of the exclusive divine prerogative of
creative might. It is true he persists in maintaining that no
contradiction inheres in the dual affirmation of divine power and
human responsibility, even when it is asserted that choice itself
is created by God. It is true too that he is fully alive to the
ethical antinomy which threatens to cleave ethics and theology in
twain>t}y creating a1 yawning chasm between God and man which ethics
i
cannot bridge. With him as with the Ash'arites, moral responsibility ;
ie reduced to a mere mode of reference (ta'alluq) of divine activity
to the human subject. There are in activity,he explains, two distinct1
'
. ' — * (
series of determinational conditions: 1, a series pertaining to
the inward movement of consciousness, and 2, a series pertaining
to the outward movement of mechanistic activity. In neither of
these series is the alleged reality of spontaneous self-determin¬
ation theoretically warranted. The first series has its terminal
I
issue in the verdict of the intellect (hukmul-'aql) which is
, ' (50)
determined by the finalistic necessity of the Good, as morally
imperative. There are, in fact, here four links in the chain of
conditions leading to resolve: Judgment, Volition, Power, Movement T
which stand one. to another in a position of necessary, conditional
relatedness. The absence of any term in this series holds the
process of outward activity in abeyance. Inasmuch as the first




the finalistic determinant of the will, it is seen how inexorable If
(51)
is the cycle of ethical determinism. The human agent, therefore,
is even determined in choosing (majbur 'al&l-Iktiyar). The only
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role he plays in this whole drama is that of 'nodal center', the
i »
supposition! of a process enacted• through him, without his particip-
(52)
ation in it or his consciousness of its unfoldment within him.
.With regard to the outward movement of activity (fi'l), too,
sun2s freedom is inextricably woven into a texture" of conditions
culminating in the spontaneity of the divine will. When the concept
of activity (fi'^l) is critically examined, it is found to be
preclicable of man only figuratively. "Activity, as regards man" -
Al-Ghazali writes, "has a threefold connotation, as when it is said:
pan writes with his fingers, breathes through his lungs ana pierces
the surface of water when standing on it... These three acts are, in
fact, synonymous with compulsion; except that they differ,among
themselves in certain respects... Thus they can be called; natural,
(55)
autonomous and voluntary acts", Now constraint (Jabr) is
patent in natural and autonomous activity, but not in voluntary
activity. Yet upon close scrutiny it Is seen th^t in this mode
of activity there inheres a necessary finalistic determinism
having its seat in consciousness. The series of conditions involved
in resolve, as we have seen, are conditionally related so that
"movement is posited necessarily when power is posited, power?'
when resolve is posited and resolve transpires necessarily in the
(54)
heart'.'.
If we consider human self-determination from another stand¬
point, we find that the pre-supposition of the spontaneity of man as
the ultimate determinational ground of his moral activity would
involve us m an acute difficulty: the determination of the will
volitionally must needs have a determinant which must needs have
(55)
an anterior determinant, and so on ad infinitum. We have
already seen how inexorable is the determinational cycle in which
human activity is caught a cycle wholly subordinate to the
night and fore-ordination of God, Whose providence embraces the
(56)
boundless sphere of possibility to itw outermost limits. In
his volitions and in his executions, therefore, the human agent
is subject to the imperious determinism -of the Almighty.
And yet despite the vindication of this imperious determinism,
argues Al-Ghazali
} the ethical thinker can save the reality of
human self-determination. If it is objected that in this salvation,
nothing is gained with regard to the efficacy of the human agent,
it might be retorted that such an objection rests on a misconception.
The doctrine of acquisition or'Kasb', "it is true, concedes no
efficacy to the creature, but only reference (ta'alluq) of the act
to him. But this is not the sole instance.of a mode'of reference
of an agent to a patient which carries with it no efficacy,
as the opponent claims. Consider, for instance, power in its
anticipatory reference to a protracted deed. Clearly the deed
does not come about in and through this power, despite its necessary
, . (57)logical reference to it. If it is further objected that such
power is identical to powerlessness (»ajz);it would be urged that
this claim is irreconcilable Mth the consciousness of power, as
distinct from the consciousness of powerlessness, which accompanies
voluntary activity - and is, in effect, a negation of intuitive
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ccrtainty, (munalcarah lidh-dharurah) .
I will pass without censure the verbal quibbling in which this
dialectical subtelty involves Al-Ghazali. The precarious ground
J
on which he is treading is obvious. No sooner has he put forth this
ingeniously plausible argument than he hastens to explain that
"the identity of such a power of the human agent with powerlessness,
inasmuch a s the effect is not produced through it " can be conceded,
(58)
provided it is not called powerlessness, since "this is incorrect"
Having thus emerged out of the arena of controversy with no visible
1
gain, he relaxes into arm-chair dogmatism, as the way out of this
inextricable dilemna. "In sum", he concludes, "there is no other
V I
recourse than the affirmation of two dissimilar powers (quaratayn
*
nutafawitatayn): one ofwhich is superior, whereas the other is more
like unto powerlessness whenever it is compared to the former.
Now it is up to you to choose whether to attribute a power which
gives the illusion of impotency in one respect to the agent (al-'abd);i
or to God...You could not doubt, however, with any fairness, that
powerlessness and imperfection are more appropriately predicated
of the creature. Nay it ought not to be said 'more* because this
(59)
is inconceivable with regard to God"
Once more, before the terrifying presence of the Almighty,
the human agent must be allowed to wither away,
IV
The Inertness of Substance and the Intransmittability
of Accidents.
The Ash'arites' nullification of the reality of human self-
-77-
Aiterrainatmon is one instance of their total nullification of cosmic
dynamism, in the interest of the exclusive, creative dynamism
of the Almighty. The second instance is their parallel repudiation
of the dynamism of substance as a center of efficient causality.'
The metaphysical groundwork upon which the Ash'arite doctrine of
inertness of substance is built rests on two bases: Occasionalist
Atomism and the intransmittability of accidents.
The extraordinaty metaphysic of substaDce whichnthe Ash'arite
theologicans elaborated with a view toaffording a plausible
rational groundwork upon which the absolute omnipotence of God t
(60) I
can be erected is not without parallel in the history of philosophy,
let very early in the history of Medieval thought, this curious
metaphysical structure roused the suspicion of Aristotelian
Philosophers, who set out to expose its inconsequences with
unsparing ruthlessness. We have already touched upon the Averroist
critique of the Ghazalian version of this occasionalist metaphysics, j
r
But Averroes's critique has neither the bitterness nor the sarcasm
of his disciple Maimonedes, who derides the teaching of the
Ash'arite Mutakallims^ with singular scorn. In the history of this
Aristotelian polemic against the Ashlarites, Maimonedes assumes a
unique position; because it wqs through his'guide'that Thomas
Aquinas became acquainted with the teaching of the 'Loquentes'
of Islam. The Thomist Critique, which will be taken up at full
length later, has the great merit of affording a final refutation
°f the metaphysics of occasionalist atomism, without any prejudice
to the metaphysical and theological interests underlying its
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formulation. Thus it stands out as the only positive and thorough
critique, because it does complete justice to the acute metaphysical
problem with which the Ash'arites were grappling.
Despite Schmolders's admonition, that-Maimonedes's a-^ccount of
the teachings of the Muslim Mutakallimin (or Medebberim, as he calls
(61)
them) should not be taken as authoritative, the latter's brief
but thorough exposition of the fundamental tenets of Islamic
Kalam is wotthy of credence in its main lines. We shall leave
aside Maimonedes's bitter critique of the Mutakallims' pseudo-
proofs of the existence of God from the notion of a created universe.
'■hat interests us most in his exposition is his account of the
Mutakallims' doctrine of causality and their metaphysics of atoms
and:.accidents. The historic significance of Maimonedes,' as we have
seen, derives from the circumstance that he seems to b& the only
medium through which Ash'arite occasionalism reached the 13th,
Century doctors in the West, and notably:Thomas Aquinas, It is
our purpose in this brief survey to see Ash'arite occasionalism
through Maimomedes's 'Guide of the Perplexed', and thence to retrace
the history of this doctrine backward from Aquinas, through
Maimonedes to the Ash'arite doctors.
Maimonedes sums up the teachings of the Mutakallims under
twelve propositions, of which props. I,III,IV,V,VIII and IX dea 1
directly with the Ash'arite meraphysics of atoms and accidents with
(62)
wnich we are here concerned. in the first proposition, he
expounds the atomic theory of the Ash'arites. The universe, the
;,fatakallims taught,consists of indivisible, homogeneous particles,
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devoid of magnitude called 'atoms'. These atoms are continually-
created by God with whom rests the decree to annihilate them at
pleasure. In these two respects these atoms differ from the
'eternal atoms' of Epicurius and the Greek Atomists, As to time
(Prop,3), the Mutakallims held, in oonsequence with their theory
of substance, that it too consists of indivisible particles called
tine-atoms. Locomotion was explained, therefore, as the trans¬
lation of each atom of the body from one point to the other. That
is why the Mutakallims had to affirm the.existence of vacuum (Prop.
?.). For it is a tenbt of their teaching that no atom can
penetrate into another. Similarly, the theory of succession of
atoms in a discontinuous time made it impossible for the
liutakallims to accept the reality of relative velocities. They,
therefore,held that a greater velocity meant simply the inter-
(65)
vention of fewer moments of rest.
It is characteristic of each atom (Prop,5) that it is endowed
with a set of positive or negative accidents which are described as
nexements superadded to the substance"(Prop,4), No material body
can be altogether shorn of either positive or negative accidents.
Of these accidents some are predicable of all material bodies,
others are characteristic of certain genera only, ^'or instance the
accident of life inheres only in animate bodies; but in such wise
that its existence Cntails necessarily a series of other accidents,
such as wisdom, free will, power, perception or their oppositesp^p^
According to this theory of accidents, categories which are
predicable of substance inhere, in fact, in the constituent atoms
-80-
,T<i not, as Aristotle taught, in the individual substance. Life,
(65)
sensation, intellect and wisdom are reckoned among the accidents,
irhich inhere either in a distinct atom of the body or in every atom
thereof. (Prop. 5)
In consonance with their theory of time, the Mutakallims taught
that accidents do not endure for two moments of time (Prop.6),
\
Then Goa creates a substance, they argued, he creates therewith t ie
the whole series of accidents characteristic of its genusj for it is
impossible for God to create a substance' devoid of accidents
altogether. But since these accidents cannot endure for two time^
atone, God is said to be continually creating a stream of identical
accidents through which the substance in question preserves_its
(66)
identity. God, however, can create in the body a different
accident, in the second instant,- thus transmuting the body at
will -, oi/even withold from it all accidents, and thus, depriving
it of existence. The process of annihilating a body is said by some
Mutakallims to consist in God discontinuing the creation of its
accidents; by others, to consist in God creating the accident of
destruction in no substratum, thereby annihilating the whole world,
(S7)
(Prop.6)
The Mutakallims, Maimonedes here remarks, in repudiating the
curat ion of accidents, seek to refer the efficacy of bodies to God
alone. That is why they are opposed to the theory that there exists
a natural form from which eachhbody derives its peculiar properties.
They prefer to assume that God Himself creates these properties
(68)
without the intervention of a natural force or of any other agency"
Lko his Perpatetic master, Averroes, Maimonedes here exposes
\sceptical consequences of this theory. The negation of the
specific properties of things amounts to a negation of the possibil-
. . - II
i:y of knowledge. The alarming consequence of this abolition of
ij j
the properties of things is that it militates against the very
rotive itis designed by the Llutakallims to serve:' viz.- the
demonstration of the existence and unity of God. For neither from
the subsistent reality of created things, norfrom the intellect's
||
intrinsic faculty to form utt u rjudgments about reality, would
the prospect of such a demonstration be forthcoming. The contingence
of the properties and quiddities of things entails necessarily the I
arbitrariness of knowledge founded upon them. "For the Mutakallimsy
-aimonedes writes, "do not hold that the universe has any li . '!
defined properties, on which a true proof (of God's existence) could
be founded, or that man's intellect is endowed with any such
(69)
faculty as would enable him to form correct conclusions,"
Their arbitrary procedure in proving the existence of God is re¬
vealed in thlfgratuitous argument from creation ex nihilo. Without
advancing any cogent proof for the non-eternity of the world they
(70)
argue: "If the universe were created God exists; if it were
eternal God does not exist; the existence of God would thus remain
dubious, unless we presume to have proved the creation of the world
in time and proceed to compel others to believe it through sheer
force, (lit. by the strength of the sword.) "
A further corollary of the Mutakallims' metaphysics of atoms
and accidents, Mairaonedes procees, is the negation of any causal
efficacy inhering in things. Causality, on the assumptions of the
-82-
"utakallims,is neither predicable of:.animate nor of inanimate
agents. With respect to the former, (i.e.man), activity cannot
be predicated of his soul, since the soul, as the Ash'arites teach,
(72)
is an accident which is continually created by God, Whenever
s&n executes a dedd, therefore, it is in effect God who is acting
through him, by bringing about four successive accidents corres¬
ponding to the four phases in activity:"The first accident is
nan's will to move ( the pen), the second is man's power to do so,
the third is the bodily motion itself,i.e., the motion of the hand,
and the fourth is the motion of the pen." Yet none' of these four
accidents is causally related to the other; the sole mode of
relationship in which they stand one to the other is that of
(73)
simultaneity or succession. With respect to the la tter (viz.
the inanimate agent), its operation is likewise referrable exclusively
to God, In fact any becoming which supervenes upon it must be
attributed to God, since the transition of one accident from one
substance alleged to operate upon another, as well as the duration
(74;
of that accident throughout the process of becoming are untenable.
Accordingly, when a cloth is seen to change colour upon dying;it is
inaccurate to.say that the red pigment peneteated the cloth; because
an accident cannot pass from one object to another. The truth of
the matter is that God created that colour in the cloth when it
came into contact with the red pigment." To assume a necessary
causal sequence in the process of pigmentation is therefore
H
unwarranted. "God", it is true."generally acts in such a way
that,e.g., jfche black colour is not created unless the cloth is
brought into contact with,, indigo; but this blackness which God
is
II
creates in the instant when the cloth touches the :black pigment
is of no duration, and another creation of blackness then ta kes
(75)
ilace." The final consequence of this thtory, Haimoneaes writes,
is that,"there does not exist any thing to which an action could
te ascribed; the real 'agens' is God...In short, most of the
Yutakalleroim believe that it must neber be said that one thing is
the cause of another; some of them who assumed causality were
(76)
blamed for doing so."
Whatever continuity of identity is found to pertain to
existing things must therefore be ascribed to the relative constancy
of God's ways. Yet this 'constancy' is far from being identical with
absolute necessity. It belongs to the spontaneity of the divine
will alone to determine whether an event shall follow the course *
normally assigned to it or to depart from "that direction of habit".
The possibility of such departure from the habitual course of
If
nature cannot be discounted by the intellect on any decisive grounds;
" pil
since the intellect does not perceive the reason for the specific
determinations pertaining to any individual object. Thus it is
"logically not impossible that a deviation from this habit should
occur;" Maimonedes puts it in the mouth of the Mutakallims,^namely,
that fire should cause cold, move downward and still be fire: that
(77)
tne water should cause heat, move upward and still be water." f.S
In the sphere of logical concepts, however, reason concedes a mode
of necessary relationality between terms whose disjunfction or
conjunction violate the principle of Contradiction, Thus reason,
-84-
;';r instance, "admits the impossibility of two opposite properties
ce-cxisting at the same time in one substance." AgaiD, reason
adsits the impossibility of a "substance existing without an
accident, or an accident existing without a substance... that a
substance should become an accident, that an acciaeit should become
(78)
substance or that one substance should penetrate another."
I will content myself hefe with noting the ridicule which
I'ainonedes heaps on the Mutakallims over this theory'of "admissibility
a theory born of a phenomenal confusion of the intellect with
the imagination. Yftiatever their imaginative fancy pronounces as
admissible, these Mutakalliks acclaim as logically possible,
failing thereby to discern that the categories of necessity a nd
possibility inhere in the generic natures of things rather than in \
the fanciful representations of the imagination. They fail thus
to perceive th4 the intellect, through analysis and division, a rrives
at the knowledge of the genera of things upon which all genuine
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Not-one who reads Iiaimonedes's account of the fundamental
teachings of Islamic Ka lam; can fail to perceive the sting of
bitterness which runs through it. Nevertheless, his keenness in
discerning the basic principles underlying these teachings and
tne subtlety of his irony lend his account a-dramatic flavour.
Inasmuch as his doctrinal position is so markedly different from
that of the Llutakallims, both in the religious and philosophic
-85- !
principles it enshrines, he finds himself under hos necessity
to distort the theses of the opponent. He has at least the
fairness of reporting the facts of the case as adequately as ca n
be expected in a brief exposition like his own. Let us now cast
a backward glance on historical Kalam in general, and Ash'arism in
particular, to see to what extent it tallies with the exposition
of Maimonedes and, therefore, to what extentv/ms Thomas Aquinas's
picture of the 'Loquentes' and authentic picture.
By the second half ofthe eleventh century Atomism had become
part of the Orthodox creed of Islam, notably in Ash'a rite circles,
(80)
In 'Al-Farq baynal-Firaq', Al-Baghdadi sums up the main theses
on which the Orthodox are agreed. The Orthodox are agreed, he
writes,"that the component parts of the unigerse fall into two
divisions: substances and accidents...and that every substance
(81)
consists of an indivisible atom." It was on this account, he
relates that an-Nazzam and the Philosophers were declared blasphemous;
(Kafirs); because the thesis of the divisibility of tip© atom ad
infinitum entails' the blasphemous consequence that God's knowledge
of the number of existing atoms is not exhaustive - since it is an
axiom that the infinite cannot be circumscribed. Even in Ash'ari's
(82)
time the atomic theory was in great vogue, as can be gathered
from his discussion of the theories of 'substance' (or Jawhar),
(85)
prevalent in his days. He actually relates that the atomic
theory (Al-^awl bil-juz'il-ladhi la yatajazza') was definitely
upheld by Abul-Hudhail, Al-Jubba'i, Hi sham al-^Fuwati, Salih
• • •
Qubbah-. Abul-Husain as-Salihi, Mu'ammar, Hisham and 'Abbad, whose
-86-
names occur in the course of the discussion, can be inferred to
(84)
have held this theory. Philosophic speculation had apparantly
achieved an elaborate metaphysics of 'substance' by this time.
Substance (al-jawhar) was defined as "that which subsists in itself
and is susceptible of becoming the substratum of opposites"(P1307),
or th..t "which is the substratum of accidents"; The latter being
the view of Al-Juba'ij who apparently held a Platonic theory
according to which "Substances are such in themselves, and can be
conceived as substances prior to their existence." (ibid.) The
same Juba'i taught that substances are of the same genus; and
although they are like or unlike in themselves, they are not
different in reality (P.308). This position might be construed to
mean that, though generically identical, substances belong->like „
Plato's Ideas - to different species. Similarly a measure of
doctrinal agreement seems to have been achieved respecting the
distinction between 'Body' (Jism) and 'Accident'. Although some
authors are reported by Ash'ari to have identified 'body' and
'substance' (P.307 and 301), the common teaching was "that what
is predicable of substance (al-Jawhar al-wahid, lit. atom) is
not predicable of bodies" (P.311). Here we have, without doubt,
the genesis of atomism. The upholders of this theory, Ash'ari
relates, held that motion and rest, life and death, colours and
(85)
tastes, are impredicable of the atom but .only of bodies.(Ibid)
A further refinement on this theory is afforded by the position of
Hisham al-Fuwati who held that the atom was indistinguishable (or
'(86) (87)
indiscernible) , untouchable and invisible. Vie have here
■87-
dt last a profound discernment of the implications of atomism as
taught by the Greek masters. For here, at least, Muslim
speculation had risen to the plane of genuine abstraction and
established the rational distinction between substance and body,
i.e.:between an. entity which reason posits as distinct.'.from the
perceptible accidents which inhere in it}, and an entity which is
intelligible only in terms of the 'principle'supporting' conjoined
to 'what it supports'. Short of this achievement, Islamic
speculation would have remained on the -primitive plane of empirical
knowledge, ~ ■
This distinction between'accident' and 'substance' which is
indispensable to any understanding of the rational ireality of
physical objects seems to have become conclusively enshrined in
Islamic philosophic circles by rthe eleventh century. This is
Bhghdadi's account of the matter. The world which, according to
the Orthodox (Ashabuna), he explains, "is everything other than
(88)
God" —, is divisible into two categories;, substances and accidents.
By substance is meant "everything endowed with colour" (kulldhi
(89)
laovm) ; by accident "the qualities inhering in substances, such
(90)
as motion, rest, taste, smell, heat, etc." Now substance and
accident have this in common: that in themselves they are indivisible
the one subsisting in itself as the constituent atom of all bodies,
the other inhering in a substratum (mahall)5. It is a tenet of
Orthodoxy, as we have seen, that substances are homogeneous (jins
wahid), whereas every accident represents a specific genus (jins
(91)
Hakhsus) The divisibility of every physical object into an
-88-
indivisible atom (juz' la yatajazza') can be demonstrated by an
process of 'reductio ad absurdum' of the thesis of infinite
divisibility. For this thesis entails two absurd corollaries;
that God can have no exhaustive knowledge of the number of such
infinite atoms, as we have seen; and second, that the magnitudes
of all bodies are equal since the infinite is not greater thai the in-
(918)
finite. , •
The homogeneity of substances raises an important question;
what is it that determines the diversity.and differences of things?
Such, according to the Orthodox Baghdadi explains, can neither be
due to any generic differences inhering in them nor to the
differences of the elements composing them (as the Philosophers hold) jf
• .... * " I
but rather to the diversity of the accidents which supervene
(92) ' (93)
upon them. Againstthose who deny the reality of accidents
and "claim that bodies move without a superadded accident of motion
And are black without a superadded accident of blackness, it can
be urged tht the motion of a body subsequently to rest can be due
either to its substance ('aynuhu) or to another factor (ma'na)
distinct from its substances. But motion cannot be ascribed to the
substance, since this is identical in the two successive sta tes
of rest and motioni it must, therefore, be ascribable to something
(94)
else which we call,^accident)
As to the characteristics of these accidents, like the atoms,
as we have already seen, they are indivisible. It follows, there¬
fore, that neither composition, nor contact not transmittability
(85)
are predicable of them. Likewise durability, as we shall see,
cannot be predicated of accidents. The broadest divieion into which
accidents can fall is that of 'essential' and 'secondary' accidents.
Essential ac cidents can be described as the necessary concomitants
of substance - so that the existence of a substa nee devoid of these
accidents is inconceivable. To this class belong the 'modi' (or
states - kauwn^pl.akwan), such as the modus of motion, if the body
is in motion of of rest, if it is at rest: colours, smells, tastes,
(97)
etc. becondary accidents, on the other hand, are not so
indissolubly bound to substance as essential accidents. Of this
class of accidents there is a great multitude, each of which
belonging to one genus. It is noteworthy, here, that the hetero¬
geneity of accidents was not left uncontested by Muslim theologians,
An-Nazzam, for instance, held that all accidents are reducible in
the last analysis to the accident of motion: so that whatever i§
The motive of an-ilhzzan in upholding this theory of
hot motion is a body (jisa)V a Kinetic materialism seems to have
• been his desire to safeguard thecontinuity and identity of substances
and their causal efficacy, as is shown by his doctrine of Immanence
(99)
(Kumun) and Nature (tab').
We have already had occasion to touch upon the Islamicc
doctrine of duration and annihilation in the course of discussing
Uaimonedes's account of the Mutakallims' metaphysic of accidents.
Having vindicated the intransmittability of accidents, the Ash'arite
are
theologians in particular, ana the Mutakallims in general, confronted
with the problem of the relative subsistence of things and the
continuity of their life. The admission of the absolute self-
subsistence of concrete things, as we have seen, would amount to
an investiture of the creature with the predicates of essential
-90
being, or of 'per se'being, Obsessed as they were with the
omnipotence of God and His all-embracing providence, they found
such a prospect unthinkable. But even when bodies have been
denuded of all the predicates of absolute self-subsistence, it
remains that they enjoy a relative degree of subsistence, as
sense-experience itself testifies. "Whence do accidents derive
this relative subsistence" is therefore a pertinent metaphysical
question^which cannot be left out of account altogether. It wfould
seem at first sight that the reality of -such a relative subsistence
for-
is rationally accountea when it is described as the predicate of
the substrata in which the accidents inhere; I mean,the atoms
constituting the body. But the paradoxical aspect of the matter
is that these atoms themselves have no self-subsistence either.
Witness here the acute antinomy in which the Ash'arites have
/
involved themselves. They define accidents as "the qualities in¬
hering in substance" - such substances being, on their showing,
the indivisible particles or atoms. When they are called upon to
account for the subsistence of these atoms, in turn, they declare
that they subsist by virtue of the accident of subsistence (baqa')
supervening upon them. No sooner have they asserted this than they
hasten to repudiate their very thesis by maintaining that accidents
nave no subsistence either. It is indeed patent that the ground
ofof the duration'accidents is ultimately what we have described
as the 'constancy of God's ways', but this amounts,once more, to
a surrendering of the problem of subsistence altogether and a
misconception of the already established distinction between
(100)
••jbstance and accident. Can it be said, in this perspective
'.hen, that the Ash'arite theologians had achieved a genuine concept¬
ion of substance: Is it not rather that they have reduced all
things to the status of an unintelligible flux of accidents?
Discussing the question of duration of accidents (ba<pO,
Eaghdadi declares that, despite .the controversy which raged
(101)
uround it, the Orthodox (ashabuna) have declared it impossible.
The demonstration of this thesis involves the admission of this
logical postulatervis., the impossibility of any sufficient
reason for the extinction of an accident once its existence has
been posited. "The affirmation of durability (bat^a ') of accident ",
%
he writes, "entails the impossibility of their annihilation. For
if (the thesis of the Orthodox),—that an accident endures by reason
of the supervention of 'duration1 upon it, so that it ceases to
exist once this 'duration' is withheld from it - is negated, it
would follow that (an accident) would endure till an*.opposite
should emerge iecessitating thereby its annihilation. But in this
manner, there would be no sufficient reason why the necessity of
its annihilation through the emergence of it s opposite should
prevail on the tendency of its Being to resist the emergence of
its opposite1; - a consequence which militates against the theory
of the possibility of accidents and their destructibility and
Vilftt (Au-Ur\
conduces to the impossibility of their creation (Huduth) and there-
fore thenecessity of their eternal subsistence.
(103)
At this stage, the account of Mairaonedes that atoms do
rot endure except through God's pleasure can be verified.
-92-
Duration, as we have seen, is said to be an accident inhering ir^4
substance, or atom. Inasmuch as substances endure by reason of the
accident of duration, and inasmuch as this accident itself - like
all other accidents - it incapable of enduring for two instants,
it follows that the atoms out of which bodies are constituted can
have no durability either. This is how Al-Ash'ari, according to
Eaghdadi's authority, argues: "It is imperative that in every
substance (jawhar : atom) / the positive accidents_/ of colour,
codus (kaown), smell, etc... should inhere or their opposites.
If / a substance_7 endures throughout two states, it is imperative
that durability should exist in it at every successive phase
(104)
subsequent to its coming-to-be."
Perhaps the most fantastic teaching of Islamic Kalam is the
theory of extinction or annihilation (fana'). Al-<$*alanisi is
reported to have described extinction as an accident supervening
upon the annihilated body, whereby it ceases to exist in the
(105)
"second instant ", The Ash'ari, on the other hand, seemsto
have held a more sober position; namely, "that the extinction of
a body comes about through God's refraining from recreating
duration in it; whereupon the accident ceases-to-be instnataneously,
(106)
owing to the impossibility of it s duration." " Despite its
inconsistency with the Ashlarite claim that extinction and death
(107)
are to be reckoned among the accidents, this theory has the
nerit of perceiving at least on this point that Not-Being is a mere
privation, rather than a positive entity. We must finally note
here the thesis of the Jubaii and abu-Hashim on the question of
extinction. These two Mu'tazilite doctors are reported to have
taught that extinction is an accident which God creates in no
substratum, and thereby destroys all things. In consequence of
this position, they held that God cannot destroy certain things
(108)
and leave the rest undestroyed. This theory was dismissed by
the Ashlarite doctors as blasphemous precisely on the latter score,
(109)
since it amounted in fact to a limitation on God's powefc.
-* -X- •«• -* % -5S- -* -x- -x- -*
• The Metaphysics of accidents outlined above was thus accepted
by the two major sects of Islamic speculative theology: the
Ash'ariyyah and the Mu'tazilah. The ethical pre-suppositions of
ilu'tazilism and its desire to safeguard the reality of human self-
determination led the Mu'tazailite doctors to formulate a theory
which promised to restore to the cosmic order its continuity and
integrity. And this theory took the form of a doctrine of causal
efficacy, according to which an agent can be said to 'generate' an
effect capable of transmission beyond him. This is known as the
doctrine of Tawallud(generation or production) - designed to
safeguard the imputabilitynto the human agent of his deeds and
transgressions. Otherwise, they held, there would be no sense in the
affirmation of human freedom or of divine justice.. Baghdad!'s
account of generation brings out this aspect of the problem quite *
(no)
vividly. "The Qadarites", he writes, "held that man might
effect a deed in himself upon which might ensue (yatawalladu 'anhu)
a deed in another of which he would be the doer, as he is of its
cause in" himself." Al-Ash'ari gives a lengthy account of this
teaching ana the problems it raised in theological circles. He
attributes it in its diverse aspects to Bishr b. al-Mu'tamiw,
-94- I
(111)
'lu'ammar, an-Nazzam, Jahiz, Salih Qubbah, Abul-Hudhail, etc.
The latter is reported to have «.dded to the theory the significant
(112)
notion of 'accompanying consciousness' In consonance with this
notion, Abul-Hudhail urged against Bishr that the accidents produced
in another by an agent are not of his own doing, but of God's, since
(113)
he is unconscious of their consequence in the patient. Only
inward activity is imputable of the agent, its consequences fall
outside the sphere of his consciousness and, therefore, of his fore-
ordination. It is difficult to reconcile this theory with Abul-
Hudhail's avowed admission of freedom and responsibility; but here
is an instance of false metaphysical presuppositions vitiating
genuine ethical considerations. In this as in the teaching of Salih
• •
Qubbah we have, anyway^ a compromise between human and divine activity
The paradoxical aspect of the matter is that Salih, having admitted
generation in principles, surrenders it readily on behalf of divine
activity. For it sis not necessary according to him that a natural
agent should produce its determinate effect or that conditions be
related to each other in accordance with any necessary logical pattern.
God might, on this hypothesis, create in man the consciousness of
pleasure while in the throes of the acutest misery, and enable him
(114)
to experience any sensation without its accompanying circumstances.
Mu' aramar is reported to have held a theory, not altogether
different from that of an-Nazzam, according to which all extrinsic
activity (like motion or rest) is impredicable of man; so that man
(115)
is incapable of effecting any movement or deed in external bodies.
Generation, therefore, is the mode of the body's own manifestation
(116)
of its immanent qualities, An-Nazzam1s own teaching on this
-95-
question is of extreme historical interest. His doctrine of
immanence (Kumun) rested on a metaphysic of Kinetic Materialism.
Like Epicurus, Demonitus and Hobbes he taught that everything is
reducible in the end into matter in motion. Whatever is not body
(117)
is motion. Accidents, like tastes, sounds, smells, etc, are
(118)
"minute bodies" (ajsam latifah); the only real accident being
motion. To the latter class belong all modes of change. Volition,
(119)
consciousness and activity are generically reducible to motioD.
Even man's soul (ai»-Ruh) is a "minute particle" commixed with his
(120)
body," This 'ruh' is the 'real man' and is alone endowed with
•
_
life, power and volition. Yet, and here he joins hands with
Hu'.amraar, this ruh cannot effect anything in the external world,
(121)
since it is an axiom that man cannot create bodies, 1 Whatever v
comes to pass outside the inward sphere of human volition) is,
therefore, of God's own doing, glbeit not in the occasionalist
manner proposed later by the Ash'arites. Here the issue between
immanence and occasionalism is brought out' with striking vividness.
In contradistinction to the Ash'arite Theistic Occasionalism, an-
^azzam's position might be described as Deistic Determinism. The
emergence of an event in nature is neither the direct outcome of
human not of divine intervention. Man, as we have seen, acts
only in the inward world of consciousness and will. That emerg¬
ence is the unfolding of the hidden powers of the natural body,
unleashing themselves in accordance with the lav/ which Goa has
(122)
implanted in it^— • Here, without doubt, we have the absolute
antithesis (taba'a) of Ash'arite Occasionalism; God effects nothing
-96- !
in the cosmic sphere outside the determined order he has fore¬
ordained since all eternity.
As is natural for a theory which was proposed precisely with
u view to safeguarding the natural efficacy of things, causa lity
went hand in hand with the Mu'tazilite theoiy of generation.
According to Ash'aii, the majority of the Mu'tazilaft who admitted
(123)
^oneration held that "causes posit their effects necessarily."
Only Al-Jubai, Ash'ari adds, departs from the generality of Mu'-
tazilite doctors teaching that a cause cannot posit its effect
necessarily, since this is the prerogative of its a uthor or
(124)
producer. Neither 'generation' nor causality, however, could
be reconciled with the ultimate presuppositions of the Ash'arite
metaphysics. Both the ethical principles they were designed to
safeguard, and the metaphysical status of inexorable necessity
with which they were endowed, were bound to rouse the staunchest
opposition in Ash'arite ranks. Mu'tazilism, therefore, notwith¬
standing its acceptance of the atomic^theory, which it shared with
Ash'arism, sought to interpret it in a manner which would avoid
the thoroughgoing occasionalism of the Ash'arites, - and that in
the interest of its ethical conception of the nature of moral
freedom and responsibility.
Yet it must be noted in all fairness, that the success of
the Mu'tazilah in this attempt was by no means complete. For the
notion of Hod's uniqueness made it difficult for them too to save
the integrity of the cosmic order and the reality of causal efficay
and delf-»determination. The historical interpretation of this
-97-
position is that Ash'arism, despite its antagonism to Mu'tazilism,
represents a continuation of a line of dialectical development
already discernible,in Mu'tazilism, and whose radical direction
is determined by the notion of divine uniqueness. Al-Baghdadi,
after surveying briefly the Qadarite theory of 'generation' and
its causal implications, sums up the ultimate retort of the
Ash*arites to this theory, in a masterly manner reminiscent of
Al-Ghazali's even to the letter, "The Qadarites contend," he
v;rites,in a memorable passage, "that man might neffeet in himself
a deed upon which there ensues a deed in another, of which he would
be the agent, as he is of the cause (effected in himself..)...
According to the Orthodox (ashabuna), however: whatever is called
'product' (mutawallid) by the Qadarites is of God's own doing;
since it is inadmissible th^t man should be said to act outside
the sphere of his (inward activity). It is conceivable, in fact,
that man might stretch the bow of his arch and send the arrow
X
from his hand, and yet God refrain from creating flight (in the
arrow)... It is likewise conceivable that the arrow might hit its
target without breaking or rending it ... that man bring fire info
contact with cotton, without its burning it contrary to habit; as
He has decreed habitually that the child should be born only after
the copulation of his parents, obesity only after feeding. Yet
Were it His will to create this (sc.the effect) from nothing, He
♦(185)
"ould be able to achieve it.
We have here, in its embryonic state, the repudiation of
causality as elaborated later by Al-Ghazali with the dialectical
-98-
ucuraen which he alone could wield,
V
Conditional Relationality and the Causal Nexus,
We have traced in the preceeding sections the historical
origins of Al-Ghazali's doctrine of divine sovereignty and that of
the inertness of being. There remains finally the notion of
'conditional relationality', the origins of which can be traced
back to traditional Ash'arism.
The significance of this notion in Ash'arite Halam is that,
despite their subsumption of everything and every phenomenon in the
uniyerse to divine might, the Ash'arite doctors nevertheless
conceded a sphere in which a necessary determinism holds sway. It
is true that this concession was not admitted by all Ash'arite and \
I . .
Mu'tazilite doctors because of the limitations it was bound to
impose on the power of God, We have already seen how an advocate
of 'generation', Salih Qabbah, rejects any such limitation on the
• • 0
divine power. In the vindication of the absoluteness of His power,
as will be seen presently, he refuses to concede any peremptoriness
about the laws of logic. The case of Salih.is worth examining
because of its uniqueness. This curious thinker who carried the
Ash'arite premisses to their extreme logical consequences in quite
an honest fashion, held that the properties of things and the courses J
of phenomena are utterly contingent; so that "God might create
(in man) the capacity to see (idrak) together with blindness,
consciousness together with death.,.that He might cause him to burn
-99- ./\ I
(126) ;
in fire without any sensation of pain but rather of pleasure."
Here is an extraordinary account of his extravagance in adhering to
the principle of unqualified divine power. In view of his persistence
in referring everything to this power,..he was once asked: suppose you
-ere in Mecca, at this moment you are in Baghdad, dwelling in a
tent without any consciousness of it, however, because God did not
choose to create this consciousness in you - v/ould you be in Mecca?
He replied,Yes, and so was nicknamed Salih Qubbah (Tent) , He
also was asked ; supposed you were in Ba3Sora and had a vision that
you are in China, would you be in China? He replied: Yes. Pressed
further: 'What if your feet were tied up to a man in Iraq*, he
(127).
persisted :'Iwould still be in China". Al-Ash'ari speaks of
a whole party - 'Ashab abul-Ha&an as-Salihi', whose teaching on
• •
• • • •
this question came very close to the fantastic teaching of Salih.
In the controversy over the question: What can inhere in a substance
and what cannot, this party diverged from the generality of Ash'arite
doctors. They taught notably that the accidents of knowledge a
and power might coexist in a substance with death, without any
v/
contradiction. They disallowed, hoever, the coexistence of life
and death, because,they argued, death' contradicted life but not
(128)
power or knowledge. They also admitted the coexistence of
(idrale)
blindness with the capacity for vision/but not with sight (besar) ;
because according to them, blindness contradicts sight,but not
the capacity for vision. Perhaps their mostiraportant contention
U the claim that substances can be divested of accidents, or
even created without accidents altogether, - contrary to the
(129)
teaching of the generality of the Ash'arites, The only
-100-
liaitation of\ God's power that these followers of as-Salihi
conceded was the coexistence ofcontradictories or the creation of
(130)
iccidents in no substratum (makan) .
The teaching of Salihi represents, without doubt, an extreme
9 ■ •
otatement of the problem at issue. The generality of Islamic
theologians, Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite alike, acknowleged a very
lignificant limitation on diyine power; the limitation of His
power, namely, to the sphere'of logical consistency. Whatever
involved contradiction could not be qualified as possible even
for God. A law of necessary determinism holds sway,therefore,
whenever a mode of correlation is logically imperative. Such, for
instance, is the case in the instance of necessary conditional
relations. Consciousness, will ana power (Qudrah) cannot exist
without the necessary ground of life, for life is the indispensable
(131),
condition of these phenomena. Similarly the existence of a
substance altogether devoid of accidents was declared impossible,
(132)
because it violated the principle of contradiction. As to
the possibility of transmuting accidents into substances and vice
(133)
versa theoopinion of the Mutakallims was divided. Those who
admitted this possibility argued that things are what they are
by reason of God's creating tifrwin the manner ^e did; so that there
is nothing repugnant in assuming that God might transmute things
&t will. Those who rejected this thesis argued from the im¬
possibility ' of accidents subsisting in accidents. Transmutation,
they argued, is the process of annihilating a set of accidents and
substituting another set of accidents. But this presupposes a
substratum in which these accidents are made to inhere; otherwise
-101-
re are involved in the absurd predicament of holding that accidents
(131)
subsist in accidents.
He have already examined Al-Ghazali's own doctrine of condition¬
al relationality and the context in which it arose. In the contro¬
versy over the possibility of consciousness and will existing in
the inanimate he lines up with the generality of the Ash'arite
doctors. The inanimate is, by definition, that which is in¬
capable of consciousness (idrak). If,therefore, consciousness
should supervene on it, it can be called 'inanimate' <£jamad) only
(155)
equivocally. Similarly tha admission of the possibility of
converting genera (ajnas) into each other, as well as the
possibility of transmuting'accidents into substances, is absurd.
•or if blackness is converted into power, the question would arise:
Does blackness still subsist or does it not? If the latter, then
blackness has not been converted but rather annihilated and in its
stead another accident (power) Iras created. If the former, then
the new accident has been conjoined to the previous one. Finally,
since there is no'tertium quid' (maddah hnusbtarakah) between
denera as also between accidents and substances, their conversion
(1.36)
-nto each other is impossible.
It is,therefore, a grave illusion to hold that God is capable
of effecting the impossible. There is no/ question here about the
reference of 'power', human or divine, to what is impossible-in-
itself, VJ3jen the meaning of the possible (al-macjdur) and the in-
Possible (al-muhal) is apprehended, it is found to involve a glaring
contradiction to assume that the 'impossible is possible'.
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Hosever,absolute and infinite, power can have reference only to
that can be the object of power: and this is precisely what is
(137)
scant by the 'possible'.
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Chapter Three.
The Averroist Rehabilitation of Causality.
I.
Averroes and Maimonedes in their Polemic against Ash'arite
Occasionalism.
In the course of his polemic against Islamic KtfLam, Maimonedes
levels two major charges against Ash'arite Occasionalism, as the
previous chapter has shown -, the one epistemological, the other
metaphysical. Ash'arite Occasionalism threatens, in the first
place, to denude things of their specific properties and powers
and to abolish their fixed reality, inasmuch as it teaches that
the relative fixity of this reality is grounded in the arbitrary
fiat of God. And, in the second place, it threatens to repudiate
the possibility of any conclusive knowledge about things, whether
inductive or deductive; inasmuch as it repudiates the trust¬
worthiness of sense-experience and the stringency of deductive
(1)
reasoning from the proper quiddities and genera of things.
The debt of Mairaonedes to Averroes in the formulation of his
critique of Ash'arite Occasionalism can be readily perceived by
whoever peruses their respective anti-Ash'arite writings, however
cursorily. This debt would not arouse any surprise when it is
recalled that both master and pupil were engaged in this anti-
Ash'arite polemic for identical philosophic motives which resolve
t
themselves, in the last analysis, into the vindication of the
Aristotelian insight into the nature of knowledge as a necessary
(2)
concomitant of the causal structure of things.
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Throughout the whole of Tahafut-aidTahafut, Averroes
re-iterates the charge of scepticism against the Ash'arites, on
account of their repudiation of causality and the consequent
(3)
occasionalitt metaphysics they profess. The full development
of the Averroist thesis, however, is to be found in Question 17,
where Averroes undertakes a thorough exposition of the nature of
knowledge in terms of causality, in the course of bis refutation
of Al-Ghazali's causal doctrine. The two- thesis around which the
Averroist account of the matter revolves are the empirical
perception of the reality of causal operations, as a datum of
sense-experience, and the rational discernment of a law of necessary
concomitance between knowledge and causality. That the fate of
knowledge is bound up with the fate of causality, he argues, is
evident from the fact that the ultimate distinction between entities
which are knowable-in-themselves ana entities* which are unknowable-
in-themselves resolves itself, in the last analysis, into the
distinction between entities whose causes can be assigned and
(4)
entities whose causes cannot. If we were to strip things of their
ever/5
specific powers we would dissoivevinto utter and undifferentiated
identity and repudiate the notion of widdom and design underlying
the providential disposition of things in the universe.
"But what, in effect, is the justification of the alleged
correlation between the ibeing'of things and their 'activeppowers',"
one might candidly ask, at the outset. "Vftiat metaphysical principle
that is to:, say, can be adduced in the substantiation of the claim
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that the activity of an entity is even relevant to its being ?"
Ash'arism claims that a thing is what it is by reason of God's
decree, at every instant of its life, that it should be such.
Similarly, whatever active powers are seen to emanate from it
are the manifestation of God's own direct active intervention,
rather than of any potency, intrinsic to it. Consequently, there
is no 'internal relationship' between the being of an entity and
its active operations ; the only relationship in which these two
(5)
terms stand to each other is that of contt^gi-fcity or succession.
It is not the natural entity which acts when it is seen to act;
it is rather God who acts through it ; so that the notion of activity
is totally irrelevant to the notion of a thing's 'being' or quiddity.
The question is, of course, a very serious metaphysical question,
of which neither scepticism nor dogmatism can proffer an adequate
answer. For both dogmatism and scepticism the question remains a
metaphysical riddle ; because neither a ready dogmatic, unreasoned I
answer nor the ready rejection of the possibility of a positive /
answer can solve this riddle. The problem of causality is, in the/
last analysis, no less and no more than this problem; for what,
indeed, is the ground of the assumption that activity is grounded
in the ontological structure of the real ? And what metaphysical
principle presides upon the allegedly necessary relationship between
Being and Act ??
The Peripatetic-Ash'arite controversy can be interpreted as
an attempt to wrestle with this problem from two antithetically
opposed metaphysical standpoints. If Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite
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tneologians were unaware of this broad metaphysical formula of
the problem, Maimonedes and Averroes were certainly alive to its
centrality in Aristotelian metaphysics. The summary, negative
solution which Al-Ghazali gives to this problem represents a very
raive reading of the causal problem, in its relation to the more
general problem of being and knowing. The affirmation of a necessary
law of reciprocity between Being and Activity is grounded in the
insight into the nature of Being itself,.Such a nature would remain
hidden and mysterious unless Being were to utter itself, as it were,
in outward activity. Now such an utterance, such a self-revelation,
is not indifferent to the inward structure of Being \ otherwise it
would not be self-revelatory, because it would be identical in every
case of outward activity. But this is contradicted by the testimony
of sense-experience and is, in any case, incompatible with the
t.
irreducible diversity of things.
We cannot, of course, pursue at length this abstract speculation
about the problem of Being and Act in its general, metaphysical
aspect. What the most elementary analysis of this problem shows is
that Being and Act are somehow related to each other. The mode of
this relationship, however, is here left unsettled. Now neither a
negative nor an empirical account of this relationship, it can be
shown a priori, is acceptable : because the Act clearly does not
bespeak the Being in which it is rooted purely outv/ardly and, as it
"'ere, superficially ; otherwise no qualitative distinction (i.e.
distinction in point of depth) can be posited between beings out¬
wardly similar or identical. A negative account is discounted, as
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we have seen, on the ground that Activity somehow bespeaks Being
and utters it ; otherwise no generic distinction (i.e. distinction
in point of selfhood or identity) can be posited between any two
beings ; however much their respective activities might differ, since
such activities are said to be irrelevant to the being in which they
are rooted. But if neither a negative nor an empirical answer to
the question at issue is acceptable, then we have demonstrated the
reality of causality, as a positive principle of ontology -, as a
pinciple, that is to say, whose extraction is not Empirical and whose
scope is not purely physical, but extends even to the metaphysical
realm.
We shall examine at length later the exact meaning which can
be assigned to causality in an Act-Potency metaphysics, both in
Averroes and in Aquinas. Yet even at this stage of the argument,
the centrality of the Aristotelian notion of the Act is displayed
to sight. For Averroes as for Aristotle, the Being of an entity
is inextricably bound up with the Act through which it is constituted
(6)
that is, is posited in being. If the notion of Act here
envisaged were a univocal notion, as monistic pantheism holds, then
the dialectic of oneness would be absolutely inexorable. Diversity
and multiplicity would have no pcftpt in the ontological structure of
the real ; and the deceptive panorama of manifoldness, as the
gleatics taught, would be a fleeting mirage of absolute and abiding
(7);identity. or) -the other hand, the Act is reduced to the status
of contingency, then chaotic formlessness would reign in a 'cosmic'
order wherein no rationality would inhere. What clue, indeed, can
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reason have lr) this 'chaotic' order to the natures and definitions
!
of things ? Philosophy posits it as a self-evident axiom that
M
things are what they are by reason of their specific quiddities and
&
that these specific quiddities are revealed in the specific, causal
(8)
operations pertaining to things. And it is with this axiom that
the possibility of definitions and demonstrations is bound up. This
is tacitly admitted even by the Mutakallims themselves, who concede
the existence of conditions which are necessary correlatives of the
conditioned ; such as life in its correlation to knowledge, as the
(9)
condition to the conditioned. They, likewise, concede that
things have, necessary definitions and natures which can be employed
as premisses in valid demonstrations ; such as the premiss that
aesign implies an intelligent designer, and teleology in nature
(10)
implies consciousness on the part of its Author. But the
admission of the possibility of necessary demonstrations entails the
possibility of necessary knowledge. And when the nature of rational
knowledge is explored it is found to be reducible to knowledge of
the causes underlying things. The very notion of reason or intellect,
whereby it differs from other noetic facut"t*»eS / (p^u/^x. mudri
• Ka A )
is reducible to the notion of cogitating (idrajfi) things through
their causes. "Thus to repudiate causes is to repudiate reason" and
with it all science ; since adequate knowledge of things Cons/ifs
in the knowledge of their causes. In this repudiation of reason
i
and science, nothing can hold its own as necessary or final, not




The abolition of knowledge in this nihilistic way involves
» further corollary of far-reaching consequence to Ash'arite
•.neology itself. The negation of the determinate and fixed
roperties of things, as we have seen in Maimonedes, militates
-jainst the cardinal theological interests of the Ash'arites :
'
namely, the demonstration of the existence of God and the
.ctermination of His sovereign attributes. The contingent,
ccasionalist metaphysics propounded by the Ash'arite doctors
.espoils the natural order of any fixity that might be ascribed to
it. All natural processes are reduced to the status' of contingent
(12)
acts (af'al Ja»izah) of a capricious despot who disposes things
(15)
in accordance with the sole decree of his capricious will.
It is apparent how in the perspective of this metaphysical theory,
no positive verdict about reality can be pronounced, neither from
the standpoint of the creator nor from the standpoint of the
creature. For in the latter case, such a verdict would have no
oeterminate and fixed object to which to correspond ; since neither
the identity of the object with itself nor its distinction from
(14)
other things are safeguarded. And in the former case, the
capricious will of the creator, which represents the sole norm of the
ontological determinations pertaining to things, would be totally




Note here the disturbing consequence of this radical scepticism
for Ash'arite theology itself. If the causal principle is devoid
stringency altogether, then the'process of transition from the
effect to the cause would be utterly unwarranted.. The question
-110-
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trould then arise : "What, indeed, is the ground of the presumption
that there exists a Sovereign Being Who stands to the universe in
a position of causal relationship ? What is the justification,
that is to say, of the process of ascent from the creature to the
creator, unless the causal nexus is presupposed and its absolute
validity in this dual relationship between the creator and the
creature is conceded ?" This is the most striking dilemna in
which the Ash'arite dialectic is caught up. The Ash'arites begin
by distinguishing two modes of activity : volitional and natural
(ir n, dt y y a h um yaky-From this they proceed to argue that all
activity is ultimately referrable to a free, living, knowing,
powerful Agent, of whose hidden presence all effects in nature are
the outward manifestation. For on the premisses of the Ash'arites,
it is absurd to ascribe activity either to the animate or the








the Ash'arite doctrine of the inertness of substances and the
(16)
negation of human freedom. But if activity is predicable neither
of the animate nor of the inanimate agents, whence indeed do the
Ash'arites deduce the notion of such an Invisible Agent, as the
Sole Efficient Cause in all activity, natural and voluntary alike ?
••hence, that is to say, does the cosmological argument here employed,
cerive its stringency when the validity of the causal principle is
(17)
repudiated with such dispatch ?
But this is not the only disturbing consequence of Ash'arite
occasionalism to their theological presuppositions. The repudiation
the causal principle leaves without the possibility of settlement






demonstration of His existence. xhe attributes of life and
ana activity, contrary to'the expectations of the Ash'arites,
ttre as impredicable of the Divine, as of the human, agents. For
the former attribute is deducible from the latter, as its condition
and ground. But the Ash'arites gainsay this very conditional
relationship between activity and life' in the visible agent; so
that the presumption that life inheres in the Invisible Agent is
(18)
wholly unwarranted.
The charge which the Ash'arites and Al-Ghazali, therefore,
level against the Peripatetics on the ground that the Peripatetic
notion of activity, when predicated of God, is employed in a
(19)
□etaphorical sense (majazun) can now be attended to. The
notion of activity in. a genuine sense, the Ash'arites and Al-
Ghazali argue, is inseparable from the notion of will and conscious¬
ness. When activity is predicated of inanimate and unconscious
ageits in nature, on account of their transitive operations, it
is then to be understood in a purely metaphorical or figurative
sense ('ala sabil al majaz) . The very distinction between
voluntary and natural activity is in fact, purely arbitrary.
(20)
Only a willing conscious agent can be said to act. But the
Peripatetics repudiate th notion of will and freedom in G6d, so
that their pretence of adhering to the doctrine of a volitional
creative act on the part of God can only be interpreted as sheer
(21)
duplicity and hypocrisy.
?his charge, Averroes retorts with singular resolution, rests
upon a misconception of the Peripatetic notion of activity. The




after it had stripped man of his positive ontological predicates
and allowed him to vaporize in mid-air -, thus dissolving God and
(22)
man, the analogue and the analogate, into sheer non-entities.
The root of the fallacy upon which the Ash'arites' accusation
rests is their failure to fathom the Peripatetic notion of activity,
when predicated of God, and the transcendant mode of this
predicability. The reality of divine activity ought to be retained,
but not at the cost of cosmic activity and the integrity of its
autonomous -life, lest this procedure should threaten to destroy
the very reality of divine activity itself# Nor otight the e' : :
distinction between natural and voluntary act, in the cosmic
sphere, to be abandoned} for it is self-evident that activity is
animate and inanimate, of the predicates of activity and power,
in the interest of absolute divine power and fore-ordination. In
this manner, they believe, they can save the purity and transcendence
of activity as the exclusive attribute of the Almighty, But instead
, of saving the teality of divine activity and divine transcendance
they naively succumb tothe temptation of anthropomorphic dialectic.
No sooner the concept of activity has been banished from the cosmic
sphere than it creeps surreptitiously into the sphere of trans¬
cendent, divine life. Yet neither in the cosmic sphere nor in the
divine sphere id the legitimacy of this concept safeguarded, on
the premibs'es of the Ash'arites, The negation of its validity in
the former casts the sinister shadow of suspicion on the genuineness
of its claims in the latter. The ultimate issue of Ash'arite
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aivisible into natural and voluntary, ytnlumi'fi-a. & ^i" r-w, n r
t
The mode of operation ofthef'or/ndrugents is such that they always
act: in a uniform way; as in the case of heat which always generates
heat, humidity which always generates humidity.-\/d\tCn'taipy agents,
on the other hand, are such that they act in diverse ways at
(24)
diverse times, because their nature has regard to contraries.
Now the Peripatetics refrain from ascribing either voluntary of
natural activity to God; and that is what gives occasion to the
Ash'arite accusation. Natural activity, according to ;fche
Peripatetics, is impredicable of God on two accounts; First.
because natural activity is posited through a necessity in the
essence of the natural agent rather than through a necessity in
the essence of the voluntary agent from whose will it emanates and -
(25)
ofwhom it is the fulfillment. But this would imply that divine
activity is determined through the necessity of the divine essence
and is independant of the divine will. Second, such activity would
not be accompanied by consciousness; and it is a tenet of Peripatetic ||
metaphysics that God's activity emanates consciously from Him.
Voluntary activity^- on the other hand, is impredicable of God
because the movement of volition entails anmovement of dmsite in
an imperfect agent who seeks the good as the term of his desire
and wherein his will comes to rest. But this would posit 'passivity
h (2u)vinfi'al)'and change in God, a nd this is absolutely inadmissible.
Consequently knowledge and will ought to be predicated of God in a
ffapner dissimilat (la tushbih) to Mman of natural activity. The
BLftde of this will and knowledge, however, remains totally
H i
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•ncomprehensible because it transcends all modes of activity which
(27)
ve encounter in the domain of concrete existence.
The negation of the law of necessary concomitance between
life and activity would thus invalidate the predicability of life
< to the Creator, inasmuch as no logical transition from the latter
to the former concept, as its ground or condition, can be effected.
lior can any such transition from the concept of activity to the
concept of wisdom be effected either; so that neither the
theological nor the cosmological arguments for the existence of
uoci would be valid, because the middle term is wanting in both
(28)
cases. An order of being which is shorn of all necessary,
ontological determinations can scarcely be said to bespeak the
wisdom and perfection of its Designer. If things could be otherwise
than what they actua lly are, then no Reason1 can be assigned to
the specific determinations with which they are endued. But this is
to affirm that no order of design'inheres in the created order, and
(29$
consequently that no wisdom can be ascribed to its Author.
"Thus to abolish the necessity which inheres in the quantities,
qualities and substrata of created things, as the Ash'arites contend
with regard to creatures in their relation to the Creator, is to
abolish the wisdom which is found in the creator ana the creature,
alike; so that etoery agent would be an author and every determinant
„ (30)
a creator. < And this is to abolish reason and wisdom.
Thus the necessity inhering in the ontological determinations
of things has two parallel grounds, Condidered from the standpoint




necessity of divine widdom - and providence. Considered from the
standpoint of its own, intrinsic structure, it is seen to be
necessary through the necessity of logical determinations invoiced
- |
in the generic natures and definitions of the entities constituting
(31)
it . To call this necessity into question or to presume that the
specific properties of substances could have been otherwise,would
1
amount to the abolition af all wisdom and knowledge about these
substances, since the irreducibility of their specific determinations j
is thereby exposed to suspicion.
It will be noticed here that both lines of reasoning converge
at one point : the notion of an absolute wisdom inhering in the
creator tiS the 'formal pattern' of His providential ordering of
things and in the creature as the 'logos' of its natural self-
development. The coincidence of these two modes of wisdom is a
metaphysical postulate without which reason can neither unravel the
riddles of nature nor rise to the contemplation of its Author
from the signs of visible things, because it would find itself
revolving in the orbit of a chaotic universe wherein no secure
(52)
footpath can be found.
*
- • ! . . • - I h
ii.
The Justification of the Causal Principle
■ and the Critique of Contingency.
The affirmation of a necessary quantitative and qualitative
determinism in the cosmic order here advocated would seem to run
counter to the phenomena of becoming and development in the
-116-
universe and involve us thus in the Eleatic dilerana^ Yet the
I Eieatic dilemna rests upon an elaborate metaphysic of being and
J becoming which contradicts the testimony of sense-experience and
is, in any case, incapable of giving a satisfactory account of
the glaring reality of becoming in the universe. But the claims
I.
of Eleatic ontology can be entertained only once it has succeeded
in explaining becoming away ; and this would call for an elaborate
netaphysic of becoming, a metaphysic,that is, which ought at least
to reckon with becoming as a fact.
Viewed in its metaphysical perspective, the problem of activity
is only one instance of the problem of becoming. A distinction,
however, is here imperative, the distinction namely between the two
codes of voluntary and involuntary activity referred to above. In
the latter case the becoming involved in natural activity is
intrinsic and immanent ; that is, is posited through the immanent
necessity inhering in the essence of the agent and the laws of its
becoming. .In the former case, this becoming is extrinsic, that is,
is posited through the necessity of an extraneous free determinant
whose determinism is grounded in the spontaneity of his will. But
in both species of activity there is a transition from one phase of
being to another, a movement towards the perfection of being-in-act ;
and this is the definition of becoming. In this movement or
i
transition whatever plays the role of 'energising principle', either
m a free or a necessary manner, is cause in the strict sense. Thus
the notion of activity is seen, upon analysis, to be no more and no
(SS)
less than the notion of this development from potency to Act ;
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from relative imperfection to relative perfection. In their quest
(34)
for knowledge about things, Averroes explains, the Philosophers
observed that perceptible things, whether animate or inanimate, are
composed of matter aha form; the latter being "the principle (ma'na)
whereby an object comes to be after it was not1.', the former being
•that out of which' the object comes to be. They observed likewise
that an object comes to be through something ('an shay),,which they
called the "efficient cause" and 'for the sake of something' which tri
(85)
they called the'final cause J With this distinction in
composite beings between matter and form securely established, they
proceeded to show that the Form constitutes the principle of Being
as well as the principle of Activity in these composite things.
For in the first place, it is to the Form that the name and
definition of a thing pointed through it that it acquires its
(36)
specific determinations. In the second place, inasmuch as such :
a composite object becomes what it is through!the perfection
(kamal) 'which supervenes upon the matter from the side of the Form,
Form is avowedly the 'energising principle', the ground of ^
actualization in this process of becoming. This can further be
demonstrated from the metaphysical axiom that a being "acts
(57)
inasmuch as it is in Being," since whatever is in potency can
be actualized only through the agency of that which is in act.
The anthropomorphic view of activity and causality, which
Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites cherish, ought therefore to yield to
this metpphysical interpretation of the matter, if the mis¬
conceptions born of this view are to be expunged from the sphere
-118-
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of speculative theology and metaphysics. The anthropomorphic
conception of activity is, in fact, a naive and primitive
t'll.
Conception which cannot, as we have seen, even serve the purpose
for which it was contrived; namely, the specification of the mode
of divine activity, because it reduces divine activity to the status
of human activity with all the passivity and imperfection such a
reduction involves. No wonder the .Ash'arites were incapable of
arriving at an adequate conception of the Deity and His relationship
to the cosmic order in a manner which leaves His transcendance
unimpaired. Al-Ghazali typifies their misconception of the nature
of this relationship in his attack on the Peripatetic notion of
God as pure Act, or Thought thinking itself. Here he accuses the
» > !j |
Philosophers with despoiling God of His attributes ana reducing
Him into an inert and lifeless being whose consciousness does not
(38)
extend beyond the limits of consciousness of self. But it is
ij * 5








the Philosophers postulate God as Pure Act, from which all Being a nd
Activity in the universe emanate. The examination of the order of
being and its progression fAom composite things in the world of
generation and corruption, to simple and incomposite beings in the
heavenly sphere (viz. the separate Intelligences), led them to posit
a 'First Intellect/ who is free from all composition and whose
and whose consciousness embraces all things and determines the order
anu disposition of the universe in the most eminent way, and who
(39) V
aepenue, in turn, on a 'First separate Principle' who is God.
-119-
It is thus that God, as First Cause, is said to be conscious of the
universe and the order presiding upon it as the cause and principle
(40)
of this order rather than as its effect or consequent.




consciousness restores to divine activity the character of
i
transcendance which Ash'arite theology threatened to abolish. £od,
(41)
as pure Intellect, is also seen to be Pure Act , so that in the
same inward movement of self-consciousness He generates the same
current of Being and Movement through which the Being and order
of the universe are constituted. And it is in this way that He
is said to preserve the universe in being and order; that is to be
I ,
its Author and Designer, Ash'arite theology, as we have seen,
cannot break through the circle of anthropomorphism, in its
.
conception of activity, because it fails to attain to the pure
<
notion of an immanent activity, the highest manifestation of which
in the cosmic order is the act of consciousness. No wonder
Ash'a rism has not succeeded in freeing God from the conditions of
movement ana passivity. Nor has it, in fact, succeeded in giving
any intelligible account of becoming and activity in general. In
a metaphysic ofAct-Potency such activity and becoming are found to
be rooted in the cosmic discrepancy between the plenitude of the
i ■
Act and the penury of'potency; between the perfection of the Form?
and the Imperfection of the Matter. Therefore becoming is conceived
(42)
as desite and quest and the teleology of its movement as rationality.
But inasmuch as such a teleology must have a terminal issue in a
;:inciple of absolute fulfillment wherein cosmic movement and
,?:ire find their rest, this principle can be said to act only if
:/ act is mea nt the inward movement ofself-consciousness revolving
upon itself. And inasmuch as in this movement is grounded the
icing of everything that is by virtue of the Act which stirs within
•he bosom of all things, becoming ,, activity and movement are seen
io be nothing but the otherness of the immanent movement of divine
;elf-consciousness. ' •
The aversion of Al-Ghazali to this doctrine of divine life
unci activity leads him, as we have seen, to found the Godhead of
the Divinity in a principle of volition and power, rather than in
a principle of consciousness and wisdom. This procedure is found,
u. on examination, to impair the transcendance of God and the
supereminence of His activity and wisdom. The Peripatetics,
whatever the defects of their doctrine of divine consciousness,
ire endeavouring,at least, to save the purity of divine conscious¬
ness and activity and to free it from the conditions of change and
movement. That is why they find the essence of God, as Pure Act,
in Pure Self-consciousness in "terms of which they specify the notion
of divine life as well as the mode of divine activity. For them,
in short, God remains the plyot of all cosmic activity and the
center towards which divine consciousness, like all consciousness
indeed, gravita tes. for Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites, divine
"isdom and consciousness, as well as divine- volition and activity,
nave their center outside the Divinity, that is,in the sphere of
cosmic becoming and movement. God manifests His sovereign will and
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i'
His sovereign wisdom in the purposeless and senseless act of
creating and cogitating a transient world of creatures who are
(43)
shorn of any positive or substantial being. In thus derogating
of the divinity of the Almighty, Al-Ghazali and the Ash'afcites
propose to defend His transcendance against the allegedly
blasphemous claims of the Peripatetics,
x x x x -x x x x x x x x x x x
With this digression on the metaphysical aspect of causality
and activity in their .bearing on divine activity, we turn to the
justification of the causal principle in its naturalistic setting.
i
It has been shown so far that a lav/ of necessary concomitance
between knowledge and causality ought to reign if the danger of
universal scepticism and nihilism are to be averted. But this
indirect procedure would remain futile unless the validation of
the causal principle is achieved in a positive way and the
metaphysic of contingency successfully refuted.
With respect to the validation of the causal principle,
Averroes argues,at the opening of his refutation of Al-Ghazali's
thesis, that the reality of causal operations is attested by sense-
experience . One can only contest this reality on the ground that
r
visible agents are not sufficient for the production of their
effects, and consequently cannot be said legitimately to be causes
II
in a genuine sense. Yet the question of the sufficiency of visiole j|
or secondary causes for the production of their effests is
irrelevant to the question regarding the validity of the causal
principle in general. The Peripatetics themselves admit the
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existence of a Transcendant Agent (Fa'il min Kkarij') who is the
condition of the being as well as of the operation of existing
(44)
things. But this admission, according to them, does not
warrant the contention that all activity is ascribable to this
Transcendant Agent; since it is an incontrovertible postulate that
(45)
accidents, at least, are generated by natural causes. The error
oTtheistic occasionalism, as propounded by Al-Ghazali and the
Ash'arites, consists precisely in their.contention that God, as
the Primary Agent, is the sole agent in all the operations of nature
because He is Agent par excellence. In these operations, they
argue, it is either the Creator or the creature who acts; there
is no middle term to the process of activity,-. But it is in this
false disjunction that the root of the difficulty lies, Al-
Ghazali argues that God must be a voluntary agent, since it is
impossible that He should be a natural agett; that is, an agent
who acts through a mode of absolute necessity. On this account,
he charges the Peripatetics with despoiling God ofthe attribute
of voluntary activity. But here too his argument is vitiated by
the incomplete disjunction upon which it rests. We ought,
therefore, to examine the exact manner in which activity is
predicable of the Creator and the creature, of the Primary and
Secondary agents, in 'the hope that the determination of the exact
mode of activity in the two instances might solve the dilemna in
which the Ash'arites-profess to involve the Peripatetics.
In the Act-Potency metaphysics which we have outlined a\?9.ye>
activity is interpreted as the supervention upon a substratum
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in potency of a specific 'form', which brings it forth from the
state of potentiality to the state of actuality. A n agent,
therefor^, it said to act inasmuch as it effects this transition
(46)
from potency to act in a given .substratum. And this applies
to all agents finite and infinite, primary and secondary, Whenever
there is activity, there is transition from potency to act. Yet
the mode of activity is not the same in the case of the primary
and the secondary agents. The That of activity, that is to say,
is identical in both cases; otherwise its predication of the
universal and particular agents would not be warranted,as the
Ash^arites erroneously hold. The How of this activity is different
in the two instances. The manner in which a particular agent acts
is to bring a substratum from a state of potency to a stateoof act
in a determinate way, by imparting to it a particular 'form'.
Once this has been effected, the process comes to rest and the
(47)
agent and patient drift apart, to stand each on its own. But
in the case of the Universal Agent the dependence does not terminate
with the production of the effect, since the effect depends upon
the First Cause for its subsistence,no less than for its genesis.
That is why it can legitimately be said that the Primary Agent is
the Author and the Preserver of the Universe, through the providence
(48)
of order wheteby He. governs all things.
This delineation of the respective spheres of activity of the
»
Primary and Secondary agents in natural operations affords us with
the clue to the false dilemna which Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites
propose. Inasmuch as a distinct province is assigned to each of
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these agents, no conflict or encroachment can come about; and,
therefore, the ousting of the secondary agent by the Primary
Agent can be described in no other terms than that of usurpation
and violence.
The appealtoi sense-experience, however, in the validation
of causality is no conclusive evidence,since the opponent can
a lways urge, in the manner of Al-Ghazali, that sense-experience
attests merely that the effect occurs with (ma'ahu) the cause
(49)
rather than through it (bihi) . But this would leave undetermined
the question of any internal relationship between the cause and
the effect; since sense-experience cannot avowedly go beyond the
assertion of and external relationship of contiguity ot succession.
Such a relationship, however, is purely temporal.; so that am?
ontological relationship between cause and effect, in terms of
(50)
relative or absolute Being, remains to be demonstrated.
Otherwise, the thesis of Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites would be
incontrovertible.
In order to demonstrate the validity of causality, as a first
principle of ontology, causality ought tb be logically deducible
from the concept of Being, The most elemental principle of Being
is the law of its identity.with itself. Any assertion which
violates this principle can be ruled out as irrational and absurd.
But the negation of the causal principle violates this very law
t
of identity inasmuch as it tuns counter to the lav/ of necessary
concomitance between the knowledge of Being and its causal
(51)
operations.. Being as we have seen, utters itself in causality;
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otherwise its nature would remain hidden; that is, it would
remain utterly unknowable and impervious to human consciousness.
The positive reality of knowledge is not here in question, since
scepticism cannot escape this reality without loading itself with
the'burden of the proof' and thus surrendering its attitude of
arm-chair nihilism. Nor can scepticism fly in the face of the
evidence according to which things are known in'their identity
with themselves and their distinction from other things, no matter
what metaphysical account is given of this knowledge, its
(54)
conditions or its limits. Now the law of identity states that 1
things are what they are by reason of the specific quiddities of
. . j
definitions pertaining to them. Thesfe quiddities or definitions
h \ I
cannot be deduced 'a priori' from the abstract concept of the
■
thing-in-itself, as Platonic idealism teaches. The differentiae,
without which such definitions would be impossible, cannot be
determined a priori either. Instead they must be determined
through a process of empirical induction. And although the
differentiae themselves are evidently not data of sense-experience,
their determination is possible only through inference from the
empirical effects which are the outward signs of these differentiae,
as it were. The negation of the causal correlation between an
entity and the effects emanating from it would, therefore, militate
(55)
Against the possibility of knowledge itself. It is here
t
visible how the abolition of knowledge amounts to a negation of
(56)
the identity of Being, and likewise, of the very nature of being.
At this point we can turn to the question of the necessity of
the causal nexus. But an important remark ought to be made at the
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I
outset. The validity of the causal principle is independant of
its necessity. That is, the validity of the causal principle
might be retained even if the necessity of the causal nexus were ! j
| I;
to be exposed to suspicion. We have a Iready examined the manner
I II
in which the sufficiency of the secondary, natural cause is
I |J
conditional upon the co-operation of the Primary Cause, who
represents the condition of its being as well as its operation in
jij
the natural sphere. This Primary Cause is qvowedly a condition in
'
• !'l
the necessary operation of the natural cause, so hhat if it were
to be supposed, ad absurdum, to withhold its cooperation, the
necessary operation of the secondary cause would be withheld. But
in addition to this transcendant condition there exists a whole
series of conditions which are indispensable for the necessary
operation of the secondary cause in question. Production has
i
regard to two terms: passivity and activity (fi'l wan fi'al).
But even when the agent impinges upon the patient the effect does
I * 1st !!
.
not necessarily follow upon the cause unless the series of Con A
conditions (idha£at) is infinite, the possibility of th£-super^'**'
'
vention of an impe/ding condition cannot be discounted a priori.
A body, for instance, might be endowed with a property whereby it
in
can withstand the active operation of an agent (e.g.fire), but
111]
this would not justify the contention th^t the agent is shorn of
(57)
the active property peculiar to it (Sc. combustion.)
II!
The demonstration of the validity ana necessity of the
causal principle, which we have been attempting, cannot go beyond
the explicitation of its contents and the determination of its
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metap&ysical grounds. But once this has been achieved, the critic
would have frankly to admit that positive deductions can do nothing
to convert the sceptic. The negative procedure, however, might
prove of some help here. Like all elemental,indemonstrable
principles, the causal principle can be defended against the attache
of scepticism/ Once these attacks have been repulsed the integrity
i |
of the principle in .question would emerge intact and its validity,
if not conclusively demonstrated, would in any case have been
strengthened. With this in mind we can now turn to the second
'
stage of the Averroist argument; jnamelys. the critique of the
contingent metaphysic of occasionalism, - -
• ' ' ' \
, ' . • : - 1
In repudiating the necessity of the causal principle, A 1-
. . . |:
Ghazali followingfthe Ash'arite doctors, declares that the
!l
correlation between causes and effects, far from being; necessary,
is rather a contingent sequence following the 'direction of Habit I
I
But this notion of (habit', Averroes argues, is found upon
examination to be a meaningless notion. Al-Ghazali and the
Ash'arites might mean by this 'habit' one of three things: the
habit of God in determining the normal course of things; the habit
of things themselves in following this normal course; or our own
habit in passing Judgments upon things. Now it is impossible that
this habit should be God's, since habit is defined as a"trait
(isalakah) acquired by the agent and necessitating the recurrence
(58)
of his activity in the generality of cases"; and this runs
counter to the doctrine of the immutable ways of God as set forth
in the Koran itself where it is written:"Thou shalt never find rvnc
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(59)
alteration of the Ways of God.' Nor can it be the habit of
things, whereby they normally act in a uniform way; since a habit
thus implanted in things is more appropriately called 'nature'.
And the notion of a nature, which is necessary at one time and
contingent at another, is absurd. There remains the third and
final alternative; namely, the habit in question refers to our
own mode, of passing judgments about things. This is admissible,
if by this habit is meant the mode of the intellect's procedure in
passing judgments upon things, as necessitated by its own nature.
But inasmuch as the notion of habit is contingent add conventional
\ i
(Wadh'i), to speak of the 'habit' of the intellect would be i
incompatible with the notion of the necessity of the intellect's
procedure in accordance with the necessary laws of logic, unless we
hold with some of the Mutakallims that the nature of the intellect
(60)
is itself contingent. If the nature of the intellect , like
the nature of everything else is alleged to be contingent and
inconstant, then no wisdom can be attributed to the Creator in
(61)
their production; and this is clearly contrary to the theological
4 |
presuppositions of the Ash'arites themselves.
The most decisive argument which Al-Ghazali adduces in his
demonstration of the ratiohal possibility of miracle is the
argument from God's infinite power and resourcefulness. Even if
the specific determinations of things are conceded, Al-Ghazali
argues as we havw seen, and even if th e fixity of the cosmic order
is conceded too, it can still be urged that God can cause a body
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to withstana the effect of combustion, for example, upon contact
with fire, by transmuting £he nature of fire or the nature of
that bouy and thus withholding from fire its specific effect which
(62)
is combustion. Similarly God can relax the causal series or
abolish it altogether, without violence to the rationality of the
causal process, and thus bring about a miraculous deed capable of
insertion into the natural order. Thus the rescussitation of the
dead can be explained in the following manndr: It is admitted by
the Peripatetics themselves that matter is susceptible of every
determination: earth and the other elements become vegetation,
vegetation is consumed by the animal and thus it is transmuted into
blood, blood in turn becomes semen, and semen generates the embryo.
This process is normally wrought throughout a determinate lapse of
time; yet there is nothing rationally repugnant in the assumption
that the Almighty can bring about the generation of the animal from
earth in a very brief lapse of time, by relaxing the time-process
through which the successive phases of generation described above
(65)
normally ensue one upon the other. Thus the integrity of the
causal principle would be safeguarded at least ideally, ana the
rationality of miracle vindicated in stringent, philosophic terms.
But such a contention, retorts Averroes, is philosophically
indefensible, however much it might commend itself to the advocates
of theistic occasionalism. The Peripatetics would go the length
of admitting the possibility of an agent impinging upon a patient
in such a manner as to leaye it totally unaffected, owing to the
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supervention of an extraneous condition which impedes the efficacy .!
(64)
of the agent in question. They would also go the length of
admittinggthat bodies which have a "common matter" are reciprocally
convertible one into the other; as is the case, on the teaching of
the Peripatetics, with the four simple elements: air, water, earth
and fire. But it is with respect to bodies which have no 'common
(65)
matter' or whose'material substrata' are diverse that the
difficulty arises. Can it be dqid that' such bodies are susceptible
of receiving identical 'forms' or are convertible one into the
other ? If, for instance, a body is not susceptible of a specific
form without passing through a series of intermediate phases, is
it possible for it to receive the form in question directly, as
Al-Ghazali alleges in the case of the generation of the animal out
of earth ? But if this were possible, as the Mutakallims and
Al-Ghasali hold, and if the Form-Man could supervene upon 'earth'
without any intermediate dispositions, then wisdom would have
enjoined that man should have been created without the roundabout
process which the generation of man normally follows, unless God's
(66)
wisdom were incomplete and His power ineffective.
It is thus evident how the negation of the causal principle,
'
1
considered from the standpoint of divine wisdom and craftsmanship,
threatensto impair this wisdom and the rationality inhering in the
execution of God's creative designs. The validity ofcausality is ,
therefore, grounded ultimately in three major metaphysical
postulates:
|
L. The necessary determinism inhering in divine wisdom,
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as the principle presiding over divine activity and divine
providence.
2. The irreducible identity of substances, as grounded in theia
specific, ontological structure.
3. The necessary Concomitance involved in the correlation
between Being and Knowledge, in their dependance upon the causal
principle as the middle term of this correlation,
III
The limitations of the Averroist Critique
of Occasionalism.
The three metaphysical postulates ennunciated above
represent the clue to the Averroist critique of Ash'arite
occasionalism and the dialectical foundations of his procedure.in
the rehabilitation of causality. Yet Averroes, as we have hinted
(67)
previously, has in this manner solved only one half of the
problem out of which the occasionalism of Al-Ghazali and the A
Ash'arites has grown. The motive of Al-Ghazali in repudiating
causality is his desire to give"~a rational account of miracle as
a phenomenon capable of insertion into the natural order, without
violence to its rational integrity. That is why be reduces this
natural order into a Pfcasic order whose being and whose subsistence
depend, at every instant of it s life, upon the direct intervention
of the Deity. This metaphysic of 'cosmic malleability ', Averroes
maintains in refuting :the Ghazalian thesis, is not only absurd
and indefensible; what is more, it is ? inimical to the very thesi:
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it is designed to vindicate: namely, the sovereignty and the
omnipotence of God,- because it reduces God pfito a capricious
and senseless despot whose creative designs are shorn of all
rationality and the cousel of whose providence is a counsel of
folly.
\
Now if the metaphysical drapefcy of theistic occasionalism
is allowed to drop, on account of its naiveness ana its inner
inconsistency, what would be the fate of the miraculous a nd the
extraordinary in the cosmic order ? What rational account can
be proffered, that is to say, in the justification of God's
heterogeneous incursion into; the domain of the real ? - The
(68)
legitimacy of the problem, as we have hinted previously,
is not here in question; since, in any case, such legitimacy can
be affirmed or denied only once the case for miracle has been
fully investigated. If so, then what can philosophy say about
miracle and the rationality of its extraordinary emergence in
nature ?
7It is/Averroes's a nswer to this question that his failure
to fathom the problem of miracle to its depths is displayed to
sight. Philosophy, he maintains, has nothing at all to say about
the problem, because it is a problem which falls wholly outside
the pale of philosophic speculation. We shall see shortly that
this answer is not incongruous with the intellectualistic and
deterministic presuppositions of Averroes's'metaphysics.' But before
examining these presuppositions might it not be said, at the
outset, in the defence of Averroes, that his thesis is not alto-
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gether unjustifiable, at least in principle ?? For the credulous
as well as for the sceptic, miracle is, 'without philosophic rele¬
vance. Vilhether miracle is believed or disbelieved, the consequence
is the same ; miracle is no problem at all ; in the former case,
because it is accepted without question ; in the latter case,
because there is no question about accepting it. And Averroes, in
his procedure in dismissing miracle as irrelevant to philosophic
speculation, is endeavouring to do justice to the faith of the
credulous as well as to the unfaith of the sceptic.
On the surface of it such a position might seem altogether
harmless, The advocates of arm-chair, unquestioning religious
fiaeism and agnosticism might exclaim : "Blessed are they who have
not seen, but have believed." But those who believe without
seeing must have reasons for doing so ; otherwise their faith
would be blind a nd undiscriminating and their foremost duty to
the Truth would be forsaken. Belief and unbelief have meaning only
in the perspective of this Truth, in default of which belief and
unbelief, falsehood and truthfulness.would be identical. But this
counsel of identity is a counsel of falsbhood and the advocates of
unreasoned belief are advocates of obscurantism and darkness. Even
in the subjective psychology of belief, a world of difference exists
in the last analysis between belief and belief.
The apparent innocuousness of the Averroist position Can be
rejected on a more serious ground. Miracle might be accepted by
the credulous unquestioningly or rejected by the sceptic
uncompromisingly, Butif the credulous has the right to be c
enlightened, the sceptic has a weightier right: i.e., the right to
be converted. The enlightenment of the crddulous is not as
urgent a matter as the conversion of the sceptic. But what of
the sceptic who slumbers in every soul, in the soul of the
credulous no less than the soul of the sceptic ? This sceptic
must needs be silenced and therefore converted through the only
effective weapon; that is, the weapon of rational argument.
It might be suspected here that this emphatic insistence on
the efficacy of reason in the conversion of the unbeliever 'would
lead imperceptibly to a position of absolute intellectualism, not
unlike that of Averroes. But this is an illusion. What we are
endeavouring to do here is neither to abolish the sphere of belief
nor to confuse it with that of reason; we are advocating, that is
to say, neither absolute intellectualisn nor absolute fideXisra.
Much less are we endeavouring to plant the standard of reason in
the territory of faith, through a process of metaphysical violence.
We are here pre-occupied with the problem, of 'initial belief' - at
that point where a 'critical rationalism' can do a great deal to
convert the sceptic and enlighten the credulous. And it is our
contention that philosophy has something to say about such problems,
not with respect to the affirmation of the denial of the evidence
upon which their authenticity rests, however, but rather with respect
to their critical rationalization ana their incorporation into
the body of doctrine rationally valid, once their credentials had
been examined and the seal of genuiness affixed to them.
After reproducing Al-Ghazaldi's account of t'ne Peripatetic
(69)
naturalistic interpretation of miracle, Averroes writes: "As
regards miracle, the ancient philosophers had nothing to say about
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themn, because these things accdrding to them are to be reckoned
among matters which should not be critically investigated, or
scrutinized, because they pertain to the first principles of
religion (shar'). Whoever questions or criticizes them deserves
punishment according to them; as, indeed, whoever enquires into
tho other fundamentals of religion, such as the question whether
Q'' 0
God exists; Since the existence (of these things) is not doubtful,
although ,the mode of their existence is a 'divine thing' trans-
(70) .
cending thepowets of human reason". The justification of this
acquiescence is that virtue is grounded in these fundamentals of
religion. But speculative knowledge itself depends upon the
acquisition of virtue, so that lcnov/ledge would be impossible unless
virtue is pre-supposed as its anterior condition. Now if it is
indisputable that speculative disciplines rest upon certain
precepts (awda').which are transmitted to a teacher, much more
ought practical disciplines to be referrable to the authority of
(71)
a teacher. It is the duty of whoever delves into these
disciplines, therefore, to accept the first principles pertaining
to them without question; because this acceptance is indispensable
for religious virtue which in turn is indispensable for the
existence of man, as man. The repudiation of the first principles
of religion is therefore inimical to the very existence of man as
a social animal. All that can be positively asserted with respect
i .
to these principles is that they pertain to a domain which trans¬
cends human reason; so that their admission is incumbent on the
philosopher, despite his ignorance of the grounds of their
validity or their inner reasons (asbab). That is why we find the
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ancients silent on the Cjuestion of miracle which is the foundation
of the validity of religion and the ultimate guarantee of virtue,
(72)
according to them.
Avicenna's naturalistic interpretation of miracle,- Averroes
f(
, pursues the argument - can be admitted if the facts actully warrant
it (idha Sahhal T7vu jud), that is, if a body is actually shown to
• • •
change through the agenfcy of a non-corporeal power -or entity. This
admission however does not go beyond the admission of the possibility
©f such phenomena simnliciter . It does not warrant the contention
that these phenomena are possible for man« For a multitude of
things which are possible-in-themselves are, nevertheless,
impossible for man. And miracle ought to be reckoned among such
phenomena,. . The only limitation on this maxim is that things
impossible-in-reason are not possible at iall, not even for the
prophet who is avowedly capable of performing deeds not possible
(73)
for the generality of men. The most outstanding instance of
such miraculous deeds is theKoran whose miraculousness does not
hu ,N Ar¬
rest merely upon authority (as-sam1) as in the case of converting
the stick into,snake; but rests rather on the evidence of perception
and reflection alike. Its unique miraculousness; is,,therefore,
so glaringly perceptible that it can be verified by all men at all
(74)
times;
The special predilection 'of Muslim theologians for the status
of the Koran as miracle, in an absolute sense, is too well-known
to need repetition here. Throughout the centuries, these
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theologians, in their apologetic controversies, have always fallen
/ *
back on this greatest of miracles as the ultimate ground of their
belief in the genuinees of its supernatural origin and the
authenticity of J ~.e Prophet Muhammad's claims to be the vehicle
(7B)
through which, as the Word of God, it was revealed to men.
This is what is called 'I'jaz al-Qorhn', the miraculousness of
the Koran. We cannot of course undertake to examine this thesis
of 'I'jaz'here, or the validity of the claims embodied in this
thesis. It is, in fact, a problem which cannot be settled here
whether any miracle can authenticate itself in isolation1 its
historical context, or from the inevitable reference it must have
to the supernatural. It is doubtful whether any miracle has
probative force, in se; so as to be the absolute guarantee of the
authenticity of the supernatural claims with which it is loaded.
Ana although miracle must play a prominent role in the process of
authenticating these claims, its probative force is not absolute
because it is not the sole authenticating evidence of these claims.
For if excessive emphasis on this role is placed, the Sceptic
might always raise the inUvM problem:"What indeed is the ground
of the >Decessary correlation between miracle ana the claims with
which it is loaded, as authenticating evidence?" A miracle is
alleged to prove the genuinesscof a prophet's supernatural claims;
4rW t— Or\ Ly
but this.-is'on the assumption that miracle does prove this
genuiness. A miracle is alleged to prove that a prophet is a
prophet, that is .because he can perform miracles; that he can L
perform miracles,on the other hand, because be is a prophet. Thus




That a miracle cannot authenticate itself in isolation from the
the complex of conditions into which it is interwoven flows from
a further circumstance: the circumstance, namely that a miracle
once it is historically authenticated must answer, when considered
per se, to a series of conditions without which no possibility of
distinction between the magical, the fraudulent and the miraculous
would remain. This would naturally raise the fundamental question
as to what itisiwhich constitutes miracle in the genuine sense;
and whatever our answer to this question, the argument from
'stylistic perfection'(77) is too naive to be seriously entertained,
as a philosophic solution of the problem of miracle, in its bearing
on the alleged supernatural origin of divinely revealed scripture.'
Yet the grounds of the Averroist special concession in
behalf of the miraculousness of the Koran are not to be sought in ti
the special validity of it s claims to be miracle in an absolute
sense. Rather must they be sought in the Averroist desire to give
a plausible naturalistic justification of the validity of miracle. •
His distinction between phenomena possible-in-themselves, although
not possible for the generality of men and phenomena impossible
absolutely, as well as the special and unique instance of the
Koran in its profession to be genuine miracle, lend a striking
verisimilitude to his position. We are, of course, far from .. .. ;.
holding with the extreme advocates of divine omnipotence that the
Almighty G&» e^QGt His miraculous designs in defiance of the very
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laws of reason. Because, as Al-Ghazali and Aquinas both teach
with Averroes, the irrational is simply impossible, even for the
(78)
Almighty Himself. Yet it is a grave illusion to confuse the
supernatural with the irrational or the self-contradictory; that is,
with that which is impossible- in-itself because impossible-in-
reason. And miracle ought to have a supernatural content to
justify the special role it plays in the complex of revelation, If
we empty miracle of this supernatural content with which it is
normally loaded, we are left with nothing but an extraordinary
phenomenon which is incapable of insertion into the natural process
and, at the same time,is without special theological relevance. But
this is the very definition of magic and sorcery , if such can be
historically shown to exist. And although the evidence for such
existence is not wanting^historically authenticated miracles would
have no other status thairthat of magic or sorcery.
x x x x x x x x -x -x -x -x x -x x
The problem of miracle in its relation to the supernatural is
only one instance of the wider problem of religion in its relation
to the supernatural as its ultimate ground and justification. What
has been said about emptying miracle of its supernatural content can
now be said, in broader terms, about religion in general, . A
religion which is divested of special reference to the supernatural
can have either of two characters: it would be either ana ethic or
(
a metaphysic, depending on the emphasis it lays on the speculative
or practical interests of man. Such, for instance, is the nature of
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Confucianism and Stoicism, on the one hand, and of Hindpasm and
(79)
Neo-Platonism,on the other, But it is only through phenomena 1
confusion that certain thinkers identify the religious with the
ethical or the metaphysical. The ultimate ground of this ident¬
ification is the failure to perceive the distinctively religious
in religion. For it is indisputable that a religion which can lay
a genuine claim for being a religion, must needs have regard Jo the
life and destiny of man in his totality. Therefore its profession
cannot fail to impinge upon man's moral being, by reason of the
moral dynamism which the spirit works inwardly in the heart. In
this manner, the. life of virtue is seen to receive its flowering in
a life of holiness which transcends the plane of natural virtue and
sanctifies it from within. The spirit plays in this process of
ethical .transcention, the role of energising principle, one might
.
even say, the role of ethical .creation and fashioning. Nor can
genuine religion be without metaphysical grounding; because it cannot'
dissociate itself, or the role it plays in the life of man, from the
■
structure of reality and of man's perception of this structure.
But in neither case are we dealing with the distinctively religious
in religion;^otherwise, religion would be altogether superfluous.
The ethical and the metaphysical are integrated into the religious
as the underlying substructure; or better, as the 'organic frame-
(80)
work' of 'which the religious is the 'soul'. Thus is revealed
i
the distinctively religious in teligion as that which emanates
from a supernatural source, illuminftSfios the natural from within,
'
f
ana establishes in the soul 6f man a dynamic, whose source and
-Mi-
direction are beyond man. In other words, as that which is the free
outpouring into the soul; of man of the spiritual energy of grace.
In the external drama of history, this dynamic takes the form of -a-
supernatural providence. Now in both cases, in that of grace and
that of providence, in the external and the internal working of the
spirit, God is the sovereign source and sustainer.
For Averroes, however, the prefect of such incursion of the
supernatural into the natural order is unthinkable. ■ The two poles
(81)
within which his thought tevolves are Aristotelian determinism
and Ash'arite occasionalism. But the precariousness of the Ash'arife
metaphysics is so repugnant to him that he refuses to entertain for
a moment either its contents or the motives underlying its form¬
ulation, In their desire to rationalize miracle the Ash'arites were
led to formulate a metaphysic according to which God intervenes in
the cosmic order, at every instant of its life. Miracle is rationally
possible,baccordihg to this metaphysic, because God intervenes
directly in every natural operation ana in every natural phenomenon
This, in the last analysis, is Al-Ghazali's own justification of
niracle in rational terms. But witness here the paradox of Al-
Ghazali's solution of the protiem of miracle. If miracle is described
as an extraordinary event arising out of the direct impingement of
the supernatural on the natural realm; that is, of God's immediate
intervention in a historical situation here and now, then the manner
»
in which every natural event, on the assumptions of Al-Ghazali and
t'ne Ash'arites, icomes about is miraculous in this exact sense.
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Yet the significance of miracle in its character as probative
evidence consists precisely in this: that miracle is a unique
event in the series of cosmic events, a positive departure from the
normal course of things. In ths uniqueness is grounded its efficacy
aS ptoving evidence -,not indeed that the unique is always
miraculous, butrather on account of its emergence in a manner and
at a time.when this emergence is least suspected, through the
spontaneous determination of God's sovereign decree. And this
spontaneous determination has efficacy because of its avowed referenc
reference to the supernatural designs of God and His absolute; power.
Theistic occasionalism, as conceived by Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites
has not succeeded, therefore, in giving a rational account of
miracle which promises to safeguard the unity of the natural process, i
Instead it has dissoved the very meaning of the miraculous and the
extraordinary by reducing it to the statuB of the natural and the
ordinary; or what amounts to the same thing, by reducing the natural
and the ordinary to the status of the miraculous," This is the vrages
of false dialectic: the dialectic which proves too little in
proving too much.
Yet the motives of therAsh'arite doctors in formulating this
metaphysic are certainly genuine. God can intervene directly in
the cosmic process whenever such jjpacious intervention is-dictated
by the sovereign precepts of His love and His wisdom. Philosophy
must accept the fact of this intervention, once it is historically
t i ■ •
authenticated, as part of the data out of which its picture of the
-145-
universe must be framed. We have already hinted that philosophy
cannot undertake legitimately to call into account the fact of
miracle, with a view to affirming or denying it. Nor can it dis¬
allow the possibility of miracle on a priori grounds, because it
cannot be fitted into a metaphysical pattern contrived a priori.
The fact of miracle falls outside the pole of metaphysical
speculation: it is a'problem for the historian not the metaphysician,
to settle I The task, of the metaphysican, once the fact of miracle
has been historically ascertained, is to contrive a metaphysical
pattern into which the heterogeneous and the extraordinary can
be inserted without violence to the integrity of its structure;
since the heterogeneous and the extraordinary are as genuine
V
constituents of the real as the homogeneous and the ordinary. It
is true an occasionalist account of miracle threatens to defeat its
own ends and is, in any case, rationally indefensible. But what¬
ever account we opt for, once occasionalism is dismissed as
untenable,must meet the demands inherent in the problem of miracle
and of God's extraordinary intervention in history. And this is
"x. ' ...
precisely where the Averroist critique of Ash'arite occasionalism
spends its strength away in ill-counselled polemic.
The root of the Averroist error is .the absolute intellectualism
and determinism which permeate all Averroes's philosophic writings.
<
We will examine the nature of this intellectualism first, as set
forth in the tract on 'the Agreement between Philosophy and
(82)
Theology' and the Taha£ut. Here we find the substance of what
vent into Mediaeval thought as.the Averroist theory of the Two-Truths
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which played such a notorious role in the theological and philosophic
controversies of the later half of the 13th.Century and which led
finally to the condemnation of Averroism in 1277 by the ecclesiast-
(83)
ical authorities. In his tract on the agreement between philo¬
sophy and theology ( al Maqal), Averroes distinguishes three
»
species of knowledge: demonstrative (burhani), dialectical (jadali)
. (84)
ana rhetorical,;(khitabi). To the first species belong forms of
reasoning whiDh rest upon indubitable premisses which can be arrived
at only after painstaking study and training in the speculative
disciplines. To the second belong forms of reasoning which rest
on premisses which are commonly known or believed ..(mashihurah or
(85)
maznuna3i),5 but are not necessarily self-evident or t^podeictic.
This distinction between these three forms of reasoning tallies
(86)
perfectly with AristotleTs own account of the matter. »'ith
Aristotle, however, the distinction is of purely logical character;
that is, is a distinction which has regard to the inner stringency
of propositions and syllogisms considered in themselves. Averroes
exploits this distinction, instead, for theological purposes; and
herein consists the originality of his treatment of the subject.
To this threefold division of 'modes of reasoning', argues Averroes,
there corresponds a threefold distinction between the common run of
men (al-jumhur al-ghalib), the theologians and the philosophers -,
a distinction which is parallel to the distinction between the
i
three corresponding disciplines : philosophy, speculative theology
(87)
and rhetoric. This classification can ultimately be reduced to
ffl A (
a two-fold classification: the people of demonstration Ual-burhan)
on the one hand, and the common generality of men, on the other.
We have here the famous (glassification, inaugurated by Ibn-Tofail
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> i
fabubacer) in Hayy ibn Yaqzah, of men in to the'specially gifted'
(ashab al-fita*? al-fa'iqah) and the generality of men (al^jumhur
, r
al-ghatib), This classification, as is well-known, became c nclu
conclusively enshrined in Spanish-Arabiai) thought long before
Averroes; and it is in it that the origin of the theory of the
two-truths ought to be sought. It recurs in Ibn-Badjah (Avempnce)
ana in all Spanish philosophy, and is accepted by philosophic
opinion as an indubitable postulate,
how, on the surface of it, this theory seems quite innocuous;
Men are -divided, in point of fact, into the specially gifted and
the common generality of men; but it is the implications of this
theory which are philosophically and morally revolting. From the
moral standpoint, this theory amounts to the establishment of a
'closed philosophic caste-system'; since it leaves no possibility
of transition from one category intb the other, and this reduces
the qualitative distinction between men into a quasi-natural or
quasi-biological distinction, as in the case of the threefold
classification of socibty in Plato's Republic. From the philosophic
standpoint^ it amounts to the relegation of theology into a
subordinate position and the installation of reason as the ultimate
tribunal in conflicts where faith is involved, as will become
cleat in the sequel.
Throughout the whole tract on the Agreement between Philosophy
and Theology, Averroes insists th^t philosophy is the foster-sister
(88)
of theology; that the truth can never contradict the truth, and
therefore no conflict can arise between philosophy and theology.
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But when Averroes proceeds to develop this thesis and to specify
the relationship'of right' which ought to exist between theology
and philosophy, his sympathies are displayed in a naked way. No
sooner has he stated as an a priori dictum that the truth can never
contradict the truth than he finds himself face-to-face with the
actual reality of this conflict which is too glaring to be slurred
over with so much dispatch. In perfect conststence with himself,
he resorts to the time-hallowed expedient of explaining such a
conflict away by pronouncing it a purely apparent conflict, not a
genuine one/ l*ut without disputing his honesty in making this
assertion, the critic cannot fail to observe, upon a closer scrutiny
of the implications of this assertion,that this expedient is a
sheer gesture of good will which carries with it no rational weight.
It is an a priori presumption which cannot be validated from the
standpoint of the Averroist system itself. The impossibility of
this validation is rooted in the failure of Averroes to achieve
a genuine delineation of the respective, autonomous spheres of
theology and philosophy? that is, between faith and reason, or to
specify the exact manner in which they are mutually related. And
this is the inevitable burden of Averroes's absolute intellectualism.
Instead of a distinction between the.domains of reason ana faith,
Averroes establishes a subordination, in which the integrity of
faith is'sacrificed and the claims of theology allowed to be
usurped by reason. Thus theology and philosophy, the domains of
faith and teason, instead of being generically distinguished, at
least with regard to the grounds of their validity if not with
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respect to their positive contents, are pronounced homogeneous in
scope and in metaphysical grounding. Here the afore-mentioned
distinction between the three species of reasoning re-emerges to
lend support to reason in its claims for usurping the rights of
faith. For this distinction, as we have seen, is not vertical
but rather horizontal. Demonstrative knowledge is superior in
character to the dialectical knowledge of speculative theology,
because more certain, ow apart from the derogation of the
certainty of revealed theology which this thesis entails, it is
visible how in any conflict between philosophy and theology}, between
reason and faith, reason is inevitably bound to carry it over faith.
In this manner, the fate of faith is sealed beyond redemption, and
the authority of revelation reduced to the plane of dialectical-
spphistical reasoning. This is how Averroes urges that in the event
of conflict between theology and philosophy, recouse must be had to
(69)
rational interpretation (ta'wil), But inasmuch as this inter¬
pretation is not confined to the pure explicitation of the contents
of revealed truth, reason becomes the ultimate tribunal in conflicts
wherein it is implicated as party and arbiter. Thus the unqualified
hegemony of reason here vindicated has left no scope for the
independant validity of revelation, as a mode of knowledge ' ,y "<c ~
authenticating itself in anmanner generically distinct from
demonstrative or dialectical knowledge, by virtue of its reference
to the Tfuth which is the fountain head of knowledge, ajs.
rA+loh?\(
inueed ofAknowledge itself. Theology in this way becomes an<£ inferior
species of speculative knowledge, whose tentte can be entertained
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as relatively valid, on account of the pragmatic utility that accrues
to professing them by the unreasoning massesJ"rather that on any
(90)
intrinsic grounds of genuine validity.
It is here evidebt how imperative is the exact demarcation
of the boundaries of the contiguous territories of reason and faith,,
if the integrity of tevealed theology is to be safeguarded. Indeed,
whoever takes the truths of revealed theology seriously cannot
fail to acknowledge the irreducibility of its claims for absolute
validity. There can be no question here of a relative or compar¬
ative certainty of revealed truth, when contrasted with demonstrativd
truth. If revealed truth is genuine truth, then it is at least as
certain as rational truth. Critical scepticism might, of course,
cali^nto question this genuiness; but once this genuiness is
ascertained or conceded, there can be no more question of partial
or absolute certainty. Critical scepticism, that is to sayIf can
have regard merely to the initial process of acceptance of
rejection of genuine revelation. But the moment this acceptance
bas been granted, revealed truth becomes incorporated into the body
of beliefs and convictions which the believer accepts as irreducible*
regardless of the manner in which thesstage of belief has been
attained and regardless, in faDt, of the source or origin from which
an admittedly genuine truth flows. In very simple terms, there is
absolutely no difference, in point of strength, between truth and
(
truth, when formally envisaged.
Thus, we believe, there lurks ant insidious presumption in
the contention of scepticism, that revealed truth is designed for
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ihn-f'
the salvation of the vulgar, and the innermost secrets ofrathat truth
(91)
are reserved only to the specially gifted. Because such pre-
V/>V*
sumption is inspired by the desire to derogate the integrity
ana the absoluteness of revealed truth. At heart, its oponents
profess belief in its tenets merely as a subterfuge, or at best,
as a prudent counsel of secure credulity in the face of the
conflicting claims of rational dialectic. Of course, we do not
presume here to convict the proponents of this thesis individually,
or to expose to suspicion their sincerity in adhering to it. For
in these matters, judgment rests with God, who alone can read the
secrets of the human heart. Yet such is the wages of the failure
to discern the two distinct spheres of theology and philosophy:
theology is either pronounced co-terminous with philosophy in scope,
or its claims are dismissed as groundless. In both cases the
validity of its positive claims is impaired and its authority and
validity radically compromised. In the former case, because it is
inevitably subordinated to the authority of reason and reduced to
sheer"rational dialectic; in the latter, because it is thrust out
of the domain of the rational altogether.
The solution of the problem, as Thomas Aquinas perceived, o '
consists precisely in the emancipation of revealed theology from the
jurisdiction of reason altogether, both with respect to its extraction
una the grounds of its validity. Reason can, of course, undertake
i
anyt explication of the contents of revealed theology, prepare the
grounds for its acceptance, and rebut any specious arguments adduced
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in combating it. But beyond this reason cannot go; it cannot
determine a priori the contents of revelation nor can it load it
with a greater measure of certitude. Its contents and its certitude
are intrinsic to itself, by reason of the supernatural mode of its
(92) -ihn+
emanation. But this is to say'the tenets of revealed theology
c./
transend reason without violating it; since they flow from a super¬
natural source, who is the Guarantor of their authenticity, no less
than the authenticity of rational knowledge itself, in its reference
(95)
to the absolute truth. In this manner the autonomous spheres
of reason and faith are properly distinguished,.jand their respective
rights properly determined,. Therefore, neither can arrogate to
itself what belongs by right to the other; nor can a conflict, in
the strict sense, arise between reason and faith inasmuch as the
respective spheres of their jurisdiction are distinct from one
another. These spheres can interpenetrate in more than :one
direction, but this interpretation is not synonymous with encroach-
ment; because it does not entail any violation of the principles
(94)
of their reciptocal relationship.
The negation of the possibility of assigning any rational
grounds fo miracle is the consequence of the absolute intellectual-
ism of Averroes and his refusal to allow for the incursion of the
heterogeneous and the supernatural, on grounds pertaining to the
homogeneous character of knowledge. The reame refusal is equally
(95)
maintained on grounds pertaining to the homogeneous character
of being. Epistomologically and metaphysically, that is to say,
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the admission of miracle, Averroes believes, threatens to impair
the unity and integrity of the cosmic order, in its objective and
subjective aspects. We have already seen, in a general way, how
the epistemolggical pre-suppositions of Averroism, militiate against
the notion of miracle. Wenow^tura to the examination of the
deterministic pre-suppositions of his metaphysics in their bearing
on this problem.
The perusal of the clauses embodied in the condemnation of
Latin Averroism in 1277, as we have seen, brings out in vivid
relief the two most specious implications of Averroism, as the
Christian West saw it. These are the Averroist doctrine of the
unity of the intellect and its consequences for personal immortality
and personal merit and reward; and the metaphysical determinism of
(96)
Averroism and its inimical bearing on faith in divine providence.
The former Averroist error represents the original contribution of
Averroes to the Aristotelian problem of the active-passive intellect.
The pre-Averroist,Arabian Peripatetics had.solved the problem in a
manner which left scope for belief in separate, personal immortality.
The Avicennian psychology, for instance, does not threaten in the
(97)
least the personal immofctality of man. Nor does Al-Farabi's
I 1
interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of the active intellect
go very far beyond the Master towards ascribing to it, a distinct
universal mode of existence independantly from the individual soul.
That is why it does not figure in the Ghazalian polemic against
the Petipatetics, But the latter thesis, bound up as it is with
the cardinal metaphysical pre-suppositions of Aristotelianism itself
is combat/ed with unsparing vehemence by Al-Ghazali on account of
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its inimical consequences to the notion of divine volitional
activity and the possibility of God's occasionalist intervention
in the cosmic process. It will become clear in the course of our
discussion of Averroist determinism and the Ghazalian polemic that
the error of Averroism, grievous as it is, is grounded in a meta¬
physical postulate which is absolutely irreducible, this is the
postulate of an# imperative 'rational determinism', presiding over
the activity of the Almighty. Yet Al-Ghazali, in the vehemence of
his polemic, fails to perceive the imperativeness of this postulate
and, therefore, succumbs to the opposite error of absolute
voluntarism. But neither of these two errors, absolute determinism
and absolute voluntarism, can be reconciled with an adequate
conception of the divine being or of divine activity. If Averroist
determinism threatens to tie down the hands of the Almighty, as it
were, and reduce him to thraldom to reason, Ghazalian voluntarism,
on the other hand - promises to restore the liberty of the Almighty
at the cost of His intellectual integrity, By reducing Him to £he
status of a capricious despot, the counsel of whose providence is
a counsel of folly.
Yet whatever the exact worth of the Ghazalian critique and
whatever the naiveness of his reading of the Peripatetic teaching
on the mode of divine activity, his motives in combatting the
determinism of Neo-Platonic emanationi^m are commendable. In its
basic aspect, the Ghazalian thesis is valid, despite the flimsy
metaphysical cloak in which it is draped and its close kinship to
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anthropomorphism. Al-Ghazali argues that divine activity ought ..to
be described as voluntary activity, because there inheres in God a
quality of positive determination with regard to oppositesy and
(98)
this is the definition of will. The Neo-Platonists misunderstand
the nature of this activity, therefore, when they describe it a s
a mode of necessary procession of the creatures from the Creator,
as in the case of the procession of the effect from the cause, the
(99)
light from the sun/ Averroes meets this charge, as we have seen,
by pointing out that divine activity can neither be described as
voluntary or as involuntary or natural; but it is rather a mode of
activity , sui generis, whose modality is incomprehensible. Other¬
wise we are caught up in the predicament of anthropomorphism.
Averroesiteaching on this question,as we have seen, coincides with
(100)
the teaching of Aquinas. But unlike Aquinas, he nowhere concedes
the predicability of will to God, no1/even with the proviso that a
teanscendant modality must be assigned to such a will. Aquinas
encounters no difficulty in predicating'anthropomorphic' attributes
to God; since a transcendant mode of predication is reserved to God
in every case, as the proper (or primary) subject of all positive,
ontological predicates;, whose title for such predication is prior to
the title of the creatures themselves. Will, knowledge, power, etc.
Are not predicable of God, because they are predicable of the
creatures. They are rather predicable of the creatures, because,
<
in the first instance, they are prediaable. of God, in whose
(101) . '
perfections the creature participates.
The metaphysical determinism latent in the Averroist system is best
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visible in the Averroist thesis respecting the eternity of the
world and of matter, the impossibility of an effective divine
providence and the Neo-Platonic world-scheme which he tacitly
(102)
endorses. We can only touch briefly here on these three grand
of Averroism, in their bearing on the problem with which we are
here concerned. Both from the historical standpoint and from the
standpoint of general philosophical and theological speculation,
the problem of the eternity of the world represents the dividing-
line between creative determinism and creative voluntarism, with
v/hich creation ex nihilo is bound up. The centrality of this problem
is, of course, independent of the manner in which a solution can be
adduced thereto. Whether,that is to say, we maintain with the
\
Ash'arites,.Al-Ghazali and Albert the Great that a speculative
solution of the problem is possible, or deny this possibility with
Maimonddes and Aquinas, on the ground that this solutionimust be
sought in the order of faith rather than the order of speculation -,
is immaterial to the metaphysical and theological corrollaries we
derive from it. What gives the problem of the eternity of the world
its entire acuteness is the circumstan-ce that it introduces a
necessary determinism into the primordial genesis of the cosmic
order, grounded in the dualist metaphysics v/hich it must necessarily
endorse, as with Aristotle and Averroes, In this aualisifi, there
inheres an inevitable derogation of the creative role of God, on
account of the limitation on His creative resourcefulness involved
in the positing of a co-eternal principle of indeterminate possibility
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out of which He fashions the universe. For in this perspective,
God is not conceived as Agent in an absolute sense; but rather as
the Agent ofbecoming or mutation only, inasmuch as His activity
consists metely in bringing out into a state of actuality the
(103)
virtual possibilities latent in Prime Matter.
This statement of the matter must, perhaps, be qualified slightlj
Because it is inaccurate, in one sense, to say that Aristotelian-
Averroist Hylomorphic Dualism sets a positive limitation on the
free operation of the creative might of God, since the Matter,
which Aristotle and Averroes set up as a principle co-eternal with
God has no determinate being independently from the Pure Form, and
is,in any case, shorn of any specific determinations whereby it
can withstand the form-giving impact of the Pure Act, as in the
case of Platonic 'matter'. But even then there is implicit in this
Hylomorphic Dullism a positive derogation of the infinity of God 's
power, in His capacity as the Source of all Being. Matter, evidently,
on the assumptions of Aristotle and Averroes, is not nothing.
Therefore, it is manifestly endowed with a certain mode of being,
however minimal; and this being it does not owe ;to the source of
all Being. AS the potential substratum out of which the creation
is fashioned,it ^represents the substratal ingredient without which
the Demiurge is incapable of fashioning the products of his creative
fancy. And in"this manner, the scope of God's creative resource-
fulness is seen to balk at the threshold of.a sphere of pre-natal
possibility into which the creative might of God cannot enter;
because like a tangent sphere its circumference touches the sphere
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of God(s creative power without coincidingwith it.
The eternity of the world and of matter was never defended
with such staunch'resolution as it was by Averroes; no^4ven i>y
Aristotle himself, who confesses in more than one place in his
writings, the dialectical difficulties involved in the thesis of
(104)
an eternal universe. The Averroist reading of the Aristotelian
teaching on this question is in continuity with the tradition of
Arabian Peripatetism; notably,the Peripatetism of Al-Farabi and
Avicenna. It was this faithfulness to the spirit of the 'master'
which exposed the great Peripatetics of the East tothe inveterate
attacks of Ash'arite theologians. Al-Ghazali's polemic against
this doctrine in the First Disputation of the Tahafut leaves no
doubt regarding the grievous perniciousness attached to it, in its
bearing on the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. It is true, the
Ash'arites and Al-Ghazali, obsessed by the dread of this pernicious¬
ness, succumb to the temptation of facile dialectic and set out to
demonstrate the beginning of the world in time, as though it was the
easiest thing in the world. Their reasoning, as we have seen in
(105)
Maimonedes's critique, does not proceed beyond the dialectic of
circularity. If the world is created,(Hadith) they argued, then it
must have a beginning in time (Hadith); must be created, that is to
say. Now the world is created, ergo, it is created and consequently
has a beginning in time. But this is precisely what the argument
is designed to prove in a genuinely stringent manner. And Ash'arite
dialectic has not made a single step forward in the direction of
such a stringent proof.
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In confuting the arguments adduced by Al-Ghazali against the
Arabian Peripatetics, Averroes makes certain metaphysical concessions
which he considers congruous with the genuine teaching of Aristotle,
allowing himself in this way to line up with Al-Ghazali against
Al-Farabi and Avicenna. Such for instance is the concession he
makes over the Neo-Platonic account of the mode of the emanation
(106).
of the multiple from the One. ■ His view on the incomprehensible,
though transcendant, mode of divine activity represents similarly
an advance on Avicenna's in the direction of theistic voluntarism.
He likewise censures the Avicennian teaching on the determinism
(107)
inheting in the activity of the 'celestial souls', - etc. But
over the question of the eternity of the world, he is absolutely
adamant. It is true he nowhere expresses explicit belief in thea*
eternity of the world; it is true also that in the tract on the
Agreement between Philosophy and Theology, he gives the reader to
believe that he adheres to the view that time is co-created with
(108)
the universe; yet his whole procedure in the Tahafut and elsewhere
in exposing the spphistical fallacies implicit in Al-GhazalS's
argument against the Peripatetics, as well as the mastery and
enthusiasm he displays in this exposure> can scarcely be said to
leave any doubt as to where his real sympathies lie. The three
main points around which the issue centers in the First Disputation'
of Tahafut is the question of an infinite regress, the eternity of
....j
time and of movement, and finally the eternity of the material
• substratum of the universe.
1. With respect to the impossibility of an infinite regress,
which Al-Ghazali adduces in support of the thesis that the world
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must have a beginning in time, it is to be noted, Averroes remarks,
that it is only the 'infinite per se' which is impossible. The
'infinite per accidBns' (qhair routanazhin bil'aradh), according
to the Peripatetics, is quite possible, on the other hand. Such,
for instance, is the case of beings the corruption of which is a
condition in the generation of others. Thus It/is necessary to posit,
alongside the Unmoved Mover, who is eternal and unchanging, a
Movable Mover, who is subject to mutation in space, butwhose motion
(109)
is endless* This 'Prime Movable' or First Heaven, is the direct
(U co
cause of all cosmic movement and becoming. The argument of Al-
Ghazlli for the beginning of the world iD time from the impossibility
of an infinite regress rests therefore upon a false conditional
\.
premiss.
2. The eternity of the world is bound up with the eternity
of time and. of motion. With respect to the former, it can be urged,
with perfect consistency, that God could have created the universe
at a period in time, prior to the period in which it was actually
created - as Al-Ghazali himself concedes -, that He could have
created it at an antecedent time, and so on ad infinitum. Nov/ to
such assumptions there must correspond a real quantum, as the
measure of the pre-figured extension,prior to the creation of the
(111)
world; and th(4 real quantum is time. Al-Ghazali, however, after
expounding this argument, proceeds to refute j.t through analogy
t i
with space. But his procedure is illegitimate, because it is
impossible to assume a greater or smaller spatial magnitude
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of the universe than its actual magnitude: inasmuch as this would
(112)
entail the fallacy of an actual, infinite magnitude. The
arbitrary decree of God to bring the universe into being at the
special time he has chosen to do so does not strengthen the case
of the Ash'arites and of Al-Ghazali; because this would derogate of
GodTs power and resourcefulness. For manifestly, it is more
consistent with the notion of God's absolute power and perfection
to assume that He is capable of acting continually. And since His
being is not circumscribed by time, his activity which is consequent
(113)
upon His being, can have no determinate temporal conditions.
With respect to the .^"ternity of motion, the Peripatetics
argue, the notion of incipient movement is absurd, as regards the
whok universe. An incipient existence (huduth) entails clearly
an antecedant existent as the subject of the incipient condition :>d
of existence. To posit an incipient existent (hadith), therefore,
amounts to positing an existent preceding its own existence, which
)
is absurd. The notion of movement therefore cannot be divorced
(114)
from the notion of eternity.
3. We can, finally, envisage the eternity of the world from
the standpointnof matter, as the substratum of eternal 'possibility'
and of eternal movement. In restating the problem against the
attacks of Al-Ghazali, Averroes leaves no doubt respecting his
conviction in its incontrovertible certainty. And it is in fact,
difficult to see how the Aristotelian conception of movement in
terms of process from act to potency, as well as the general,
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cardinal distinction between act and potency, which represents
the foundation-stone of the Aristotelian metaphysics, can abandon
the thesis of the eternity of matter as the subject of eternal
movement and possibility. In the first place, movement, as the c.b
above argument shows, is inseparable from a substratum of movement,
(115)
which is eternal in the exact manner movement itself is eternal.
The very notion of movement involves its eternity; for motion is a
form of change, and change is a process from potency to act. In
Aristotle's own famous words;"Motion is the fulfillment of the
(116)
movable in so far as it is movable" ; that is "the fulfillment
(117)
of what exists potentially, in so far as it exist}? potentially,"
But this presupposes a (movable' which has always been at motion;
for it s incipient motion would be inexplicable, unless a 'beginning
=>/ t*> /n a -yvc/i / j a-ii u C- a/ , ^ cS /< / /-« /' « /jf —
as change from rest to motion - must be the "outcome of an ante-
cedant motion. Eternal motion has thus to be pre-supposed, the
moment it is conceded that motion exists. The actualization of the
potentiality of the movable -, whereby initial motion arises, must
be pre-supposed throughout, even when it is gratuitously assumed
(118)
that motion has a beginning. ,
of-th AT
But let us consider now movement from the standpoint' in which
it inheres. It is clear that the world, prior to creation, was
(1
always possible (mumkin.); otherwise it would never have come to be.
Wow possibility can have regard either to the patient(qabil) or to
t *
the agent (fa'il)-Possibility-in-the-patient is a pre-requisite
condition in the capacity of the agent; inasmuch as the agent cannot
do the impossible. This possibility cannot inhere in no-substratum,
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nor in the agent, nor in the possibility itself; since the possible
is that which is in the process of becoming actual. It remains
N'
that the subject Qnofnil) of possibility is something which is
susceptible of possibility, and this is matter. But matter does not
come to be in so far as it it matter; because then we would have
to assume a matter of this matter and so on ad infinitum. Matter-
in-becoming (maddah mutakawwinah) is, in fact, the state of the
composite in becoming; since things come to be in so far as they
are composed of matter and form. If-we assume that everything comes
to be out of something else, then we would have to assume an infinite jj
I!
succesLon of emergents in an infinite matter; and this is absurd
since it amounts to the admission of an actual infinite. Therefore
we have to admit that 'forms' supervene successively upon a sub¬
stratum, v/hhch neither comes to be nor perishes and that this
succession is circular and eternal. Consequently it is not Not-
ii
Being which is the subject of becoming, but rather something which
(120)
bears (hamil) the contrary forms; and this is matter.
In In rebutting this argument of the Peripatetic"^ Al-Ghazali urges
that possibility, like impossibility, is a purely rational notion
to v/hich nothing needs correspond in reality. For avowedly there
is nothing to correspond to the impossible (al-mumtani') in concrete
reality. But this rebuttal, retotts Averroes, rests on a sheer
sophism. All genuine concepts must have something corresponding
t
to them in the sphere of objective reality (kharij tmnofs ). The
impossible, no less than the impossible, requires a real entity to
Yfhich to correspond; because the impossible is the contrary of the
-162-
possible and contraries must have a common substratum. Now contrarie:
stand to each other in the position of Being to not-Being, inasmuch
as the one is the privation of the other. But manifestly, it is not
I
not-Being per se (nafs -,al-' adam)- which becomes Being ; nor Being
'per se' which becomes not-Being. Consequently the subjecto of
becoming must be a 'tertium quid' ofwhich possibility and generation
are predicable. Becoming and possibility are obviously impredicable
, (121)
either of not-Being or of actualized Being. This 'tertium quid'
as the subject of becoming and the alternation of opposites must be
in potency for thb reception of actual forms, and accidents without
itself being actual in any way. Were it an existent in act (mawjud
bilfi'l) there would be no sense in speaking of the coming-to-be
I
of things; since coming-to-be is a process of transition frcD not-
(122)
Being to Being.
Creation ex nihilo is therefore wholly irrational. All cha nge
is transition from act to potency; and the coming-to-be of things is
no exception. In a famous passage in his commentary otf the 12th Book
(123)
of the Metaphysics, Averroes re-affirms this thesis against the
Mutakalliros'doctrine of creation ex nihilo, in the n»am£i-of genuine
Aristotelianism. Here as in Tahafut, the role of the_First Cause is
reduced to the role of the Agent who bEings things into Being out of
the immanent potentiality of Matter and imprints upon the cosmic
order the impress of order and harmony.
i
'
It is here evident how Averroes' integral acceptance of the Hylo-
norphic Dualism of Aristotle -leads him to the indorsement of the
allied Aristotelian notion of an eternal Prime ^tter, which is the
abiding substratum of becoming and change in the universe. Nowhere
-163-
does he seem to show any signs of wavering or doubt over this
question. It is true both in Tahafut and in Fasl al-Maqal), he
endeavours to ward off the charge of infidelity.(kufr) levelled on
it!
if!
the proponents of the eternity of the world, either b}" pointing
(124)
the dialectical difficulties involved in its affirmation or negation,
or by drawing a subtle distinction between creation as continuous
production(ihdath da'ira) and creation as discontinuous production
(ihdath mungati'). But all this leaves totally unimpa ired his
• .
conviction in the metaphysical stringency of the doctrine of the
eternity of the world. And what is more, he finds notliiif3dbnojcvous
in its admission t> faith in the sovereignty and perfection^of God.




sovereignty and perfection, because it limits God's activity to one
(125) j
mode of creation: that is creation in time,as v/ith the Ash'arites
and reduces Him to a state of idle inactivity, throughout the infinite',
(126)
period of time preceding the creation of the universe.
The eternity of the world and of matter, as well^as the hylo-
morphic,metaphysical pattern in which it is cast, thus completer
the cycle of Aristotelian-Averroist determinism. At no point in
this cycle can a heterogeneous element impiqg e upon the course of
its autonomous movement. The Pure Act is as determined in its
relation of reciprocity to Infinite Potency, as the latter in its
desire for the ontological perfection with which the former is
1'OC-Atl
charged. Whatever movementis generated in the cosmos is thus seen
to be caught between the two poles of a twofold determination.:
the energy of the (Act' and the fertility of Matter, which respond
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to the call of one another like spouse and husband. Without this
'energy' Hatter would remain barren and formless; without this
'fertility' Form would remain unfruitful because self-contained.
In the domain of concrete existence at least, Form is a s dependant
on Matter as Matter on Form, without y/hose conjugal union so to speak,
(127)
cosmic generation would be unthinkable.
This determinism, as we have hinted previously, can hardly leave
scope for belief in an effective providence of God, Averroes, it
is true, concedes that God plays the role of Author and Preserver
(128)
of the universe ; butit is difficult to see how this role can be
interpreted in any but deistic terras. Averroes had disallowed the
validity of the heterogeneous and supernatural as a conception sui
generis, both with respect to faith and with respect to miracle.
But it is not a deistic, 'initial providence' which is here at issue.
This 'initial providence' is, of course, a desideratum of any
'N " ' " ' • •_ . . ' '
adequate account of the universe in its dependence on God , as its
Author; and over this question theism has no bones to pick with
Aristotelian-Averroist deism; as with any honest deistic system for
that matter. Theism, however, although it presupposes this providence
tacitly, finds it insufficient for corroborating the claims of
historical religions. Because, in the first place, these religious
themselves are the manifestation of a'historic providence sui
generis: the manifestation, that is to say, of God's immediate
intervention in history out of sheer condescending and gracious love.
In this intervention there is implicit already the supercession, on
the part of God, of Hi? cosmically-imposed duty as Author and
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Preserver of the universe. In the second place, these religions
claim that God intervenes directly and immediately in the course of
cosmic events with a view to executing His cosmic designs"and
implementing the decrees of His sovereign love. Such is the case of
miracle, historic revelations, the commision of prophets, and finally
the as sumption of the human form by the Deity Himself. The speculative
issue involved in this heterogeneous providence is not the purely
logical or metaphysical account of what happens naturally in the
natural realm. It is rather the issue regarding the supernatural
and extraordinary impingement upon this realm of a heterogeneous
dynamism rooted in God's generosity and love, rather than in the
laws of the universe and the principles.of its inner movement and
self-development. And on this Averroes has nothing to say; because






The Causal Dilemna and the Thomist
Synthesis.
I
The Abstract Formula of the Causal Dilemna,
The problem of causality, seen through the Averroist-Ghazalian
controversy, can be said to constitute a uiQtpphysical dilemna of
of which deistic determinism and theistic occasionalism .are the two
false solutions. If we discard the web of antithetic contentions
vroven around this dilemna and view the problem in its stark concrete-
ness, the issue is found to reserve itself into the problem of divine
versus cosmi'c causality. On the assumptions of occasionalism and
determinism alike, the twofold causality of the Creator and the
creature is an irreducible datum of the texture of conditions in the
midst of which cosmic events come to pass. No insight into the
nature of causal operations can fail to admit the irreducible given-
ness of this twofold causality in which all cosmic dynamism and
becoming are rooted. The admission of this twofold causality, it
should be remarked at the outset, is independent of any metaphysical
or theological world view into which causality is fitted; and like¬
wise of any positive concj&ption of the Deity, as First Cause, and
the role Re. plays in the cosmic process-, Deistic determinism posits
God as the First Cause of cosmic becoming and movement, without
passing beyond the closed circle of self-contained cosmic life; that
is, posits Him as the necessary condition of cosmic activity, the
First Principle of cosmic becoming, without Whom the series of
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cosmic conditions would be left totally unexplained. Occasionalism,
on the other hand,- whatever its claims to demonstrate the
existence of God from the condidttions of contingent existence,
starts by positing this existence a priori and thence proceeds to
explain in terms of this existence the role of God as the Unique
(1)
Agent in the universe. But here, too, the j^ality of mcosmic
activity is conceded as an initial fact. That the occasionalist
metaphysical justification of this tenet, owing to the specious
pre-suppositions on which it rests, ends by explaining this fact
away, does not affect the point at issue. Nor does the meta¬
physical account of the role which determinism assigns to the First
Cause in the drama of "cosmic becoming touch the reality or
irreducibility of divine, as against cosmic causality, 'The causality
of the Creator is said to run concurrently with the autonomous
causality of the Creature, without impinging upon it or deflecting
the course of its movement. But clearly the causality of the
Almighty is conceded here,too, despite the' implicit limitation oft
the scope of this causality.such:a conception of the matter
entails,
The Ghazalian-Averroist controversy, therefore, is an attempt
to grapple with the causal dilemna from two antithetic standpoints.
It is perhaps redundant, though highly important, to note that
both Averroes and Al-Ghazali are pre-occupied with the same
t
problem; and that they have, at least, so much in common: the
initial and implicit admission of the irreducible fact of
secondary as against primary ca usality. But the positive <•:
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contribution^bf Al-Ghazali and Averroes to the metaphysics of
causality does not consist merely in rasing the problem; for in this
respect Al-Ghazali and Averroes are not as much as disagreed. And
as these two great thinliers can scarcely be said to have envisaged
the problem in vain, the critic might ask at this Juncture: 'Wha t
ought vie to retain of the Averroist and Ghazalian solutions of the.
cuasal dilemna? And what is the positive contribution of these
two authors to the problem at issue?1*
Of course no answer to this question can be given independ¬
ently from a metaphysical synthesis distinct from the two syntheses
here envisaged. For from the standpoint of these two syntheses
the question is naturally meaningless. Viewed from within a -
metaphysical synthesis is always complete, even when it avows its
own incompleteness on account of the incompleteness of its data
or its scope. No honest and serious system of metaphysics, that
is to say, can pronounce an indictment upon itself. Yet there is
one reppect in which-such an answer is. possible. From the abstract,
critical standpoint a genuine problem is capable of a genuine
solution, at least within the limited scope of the data involved
«
in its formulation. Such a solution, however, can never be
adequate, since adequacy is a quality of the total synthesis in
its totality. What abstract criticism can aspire to achieve - as
regards any metaphysical problem, is to specify the necessary
conditions to which any hypothetical or abstract solution of that
problem must answer, and the necessary metaphysical grounds of s i
such a solution.
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Now if the problem with which Averroes and Al-Ghazali are pre¬
occupied is a genuine problem ana if thdir solutions, however
incomplete, are genuine, then the criticue is entitled to expect
a positive contribution, however minimal, towards a final solution
of the problem from both quarters. Aild.it is indeed curious to
note that such a contribution coincides exactly with those pre¬
suppositions of the two authors which we have criticized most
vehemently in the course of our exposition of their respective
systems. With respect to the Ghazalian system, it will be recalled,
it was the very mode of God's intervention in every cosmic event
at every instant of its life which we have censured as meta¬
physically indefensible. With respect to the Averroist system,
it was the deterministic enshrinement of reason as the absolute
'logos' of divine activityand'cosmic becoming which we found
theologically inadmissible. But both the occasionalism of Al-
Ghazali and the determinism of Averroes, far from being specious
in principle, are indispensable for any adequate conception of
the Deity And His role in the universe. It is only the extreme
4
claims with which they are loaded which renders this occasionalism
and this determinism metaphysically and theologically inadequate.
From the standpoint of abstract, critical theology, it is imperative
that God ought to be endowed with the attribute of infinite power.
But this infinite power mus.t be such as to be unlimited by any
conditions inhering in the structure of the created order. But
this Is to say that Goa's infinite power, being disproportionate
with the created order, has unlimited scope with iespect to that
order. God's extraordinary intervention in the cosmic sphere,
-170-
therefore, is rationally possible because GodIs power can never
be cirumscribed by the conditions of concrete existence. Nor can
the mode of this intervention be determined by the la?;s of cosmic
becoming,because the mode of operation of this infinite power,
instead of being determined by these.laws, is their primary deter®
minant. In this we have the clue to the definition of volitional
activity: namely, activity v/hicb/stands to the patient as the
determinant to its determined'subject1 and whose mode is rooted
in the spontaneity of the agent. Thus the infinity of God's power,
the voluntary mode of His activity, and the possibility of His
extraordinary intervention in the course of cosmic events are
rational desiderata of any adequate conception of God's sovereign
perfection and His role in the universe. And here Al-Ghazali's
theological reasoning is sound in principle, despite its flimsy
metaphysical drapery.
The infinite power of God, however, has one limit inhering in
the structure of tjse divine Being itself, if not in the structure
of the created order. If God's power is absolute, as regards the
created order, it is precisely becapse it is infinite and, there¬
fore, disproportionate with the finite order over which it has
infinite scope. Yet from the standpoint of the divine Being
itself, power being merely one predicate of the divine perfection,
essential
Is conditioned by God's othej^/predicates, and notably His wisdom
and His love. But this conditioning is not a limitation if by
limitation is meant subordination or curtailment. It is purely the
modfe of operation of the divine Being, in the integral unfoldment
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of His essence in which analytical reasoning distinguishes
wisdom, as the principle presiding over this operation; power as
(2)
the energy flowing from thisbperation itself, and love as the
'
law of the spontaneous unfoldment of the divine goodness and the
' !:
divine generosity. Thus the determinism inhering in divine
Ji.
n
activity is rooted in the Being of uod Himself, Whosis wisdom and
"V '
, ' . ' • . * h;
love, as He is power and will; rather than in the being of the
creation, which represents the external scene upon which divine
ii ■
activity is displayed. And here the determinism of Averroes is
valid in principle; at leagt as far as its conception of the
rationality of ^od's mode of operation goes.
Yet the rational determinism here postulated, although it
ir
accounts for the integral unfoldment of the divine essence in its
It
inwardness, leaves unexplained the exteriorization of this essence
, ..." . [iij
in the sphere of outward activity and creation, JDivine power
might be infinite and divine wisdom might be supreme, but the
question would still remain:'Why. should the divine essence unfold
itself outwardly at all? And what is the ultimate ontological
ground of the divine otherness, whereby God ghooses freely to
bring the creation out of nothing and thus to issue out of the
i
mwatdness of His self-sufficient, self-contained Being?
Sere we come upon the very limits of the Averroist and the
Ghazalian solutions of the causal dilerana, Averroes answers the
1
questibn in part by urging that creation, as the exteriority of the
divine will, is grounded in a lav/ of Reason to which God and the
universe alike are subject. In this way, he closes the deterministic
cycle in which the Creator and the creature are caught up. The
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second half of the question, regarding God's providential inter¬
vention in the course of cosmic events, he dismisses as philo-
sophica lly irrelevant; that is, pronounces it as a pseudo-
philosophic question.. But Averroes has failed, in fact, to settle
even the former half of the problem. The rational determinism
which he postulates as the lav/ of God's activity ana of cosmic
becoming is admittedly the law off/is activity andf/4.s becoming,
rather than the principle of the dynamic emanation of things from
the bosom of God, Averroes has merely explained How God acts and
How the universe develops its life-process, but not Why God should
act at all in the manner He freely chooses. And this is the
burden of his absolute determinism. But neither has A 1-Gha-zali
succeeded; in settling the causal problem in a sa tisfactory way.
In contradistinction to Averroes, he answers the latter half of
the question..in a 'de facto' manner, by urging dogmatically and
arbitrarily that God acts freely because He acts freelv. a nd
because the nature of divine power is such that He acts as He
chooses to act. The determination of the 'de jure' ground of
this activity he dismisses as irrelevant, by pronouncing it as a
pseudo-theological problem. Neither the How nor the Why ofthe
unfoldment of divine activity have thus been explained; and the
problem has been surrendered dogmatically and agnostically, as
insoluble.
From the abstract standpoint of critical theology, once more,
a final solution of the causal problem in its foregoing formula
nus-^be sought in the perspective of an integral conception of the
Deity, as Power, Wisdom and Love. To put the matter epitomatically,
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the God of Al-Ghazali is Bower, the God of Averroes is Wisdom,
and that is all. No1 wonder neither can give a complete ans wet
to the problem at issue. The ultimate ground of divine activity
and the exteriorization of the divine will, as we shall see, is
rooted in divine Love. Wisdom is only the law of this exterior¬
ization and powet the principle of its efficacy. The God-Despot
of Al-Ghazali acts capriciously because He is capricious Power,
The GOd-Philosopher ofAietroes"cannot even be said to act, owing
to Kis total absorption in Himself and the contemplation of His
essence. Yet neither a God,who acts capriciously, nor a God who
is totally inactive,can be said to have any share in the fullness
of the real Godhead. , .
We shall see when we turn to Thomas Aquinas that tipe causal
problem is capable, with Him, of a solution in the very terras
proposed above. The positive elements of theistic occasionalism
and of deistic determinism, far from being surrendered, are
incorporated into a complete synthesis in yrhich the theological
and metaphysical interests involved in the problem of God:: in
His relationship to the universe are fully met and sartisfied.
II
(3)
Aquinas and the Loquentes.
The alleged conflict between divine and cosmic causality
grew, in Medieval theological speculation,in East and Y/est, out of
two seemingly irreconcilable notions: the notion of God's universal
Providence and the notion of the efficacy of natural causes, ■: We
nave seen how in Islamic theology the Ash'arites and Al-Ghazali
sacrifice the reality of the latter for the sake of the'former and
-17a-
how Averroes, or) tb other hand), denies the possibility of any
effective divine providence owing to the deterministic pre-.
suppositions of his metaphysics, without - it is true - prejudicing
the reality of natural causes.
In the Medieval West, the controversy which raged over Latin-
Averroism in the 13th.century comprised, in addition to the
question of the unity of the intellect, the eternity of the world,
the doctrine of the two-truthe, etc. the problem of divine
providence and determinism as attested by the condemnation of
(4)
Latin Averroism in 1277. Aquinas seems to have had the proponents
of Averroist determinism, on the one hand, and the proponents of
Ash'arite occasionalism, on the other, in mind in his discussion
of the problem of providence and causality in the Summa contra
Gentiles and ©he De Potentia, and likewise, in the Summa Theo-
(5)
logica. The question is treated with dramatic concreteness In
the th^ird book of the Summa contra Gentiles, on which our attention
will be mainly concentrated. Here Aquinas is preoccupied with
sageguarding the bality and universality of divine providence
against the attacks of the Fatalists and the Determinists, who either,
like the ancient Materialists, denied this Providence, or like the
Peripatetics confined its scope to the world of incorruptible
(6)
substances only. The providence of the Almighty, Aquinas teaches,
embraces all things so that nothing in the universe happens out¬
side the order of His providence or contrary to it, not excepting
(7)
singular and contingent happenings. But this universal
(8)
providence, contrary to the assumptions of the Stoics, is not
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synonymous with necessity. Contingency,evil, liberty,of choice -
even chance and fortune, rather tiian infringe the universal juris¬
diction of that all-embracing providence, represent in fact a
vindication of-this providence in which contingency amd evil a^re
comprised as part of the sovereign designs of the Almighty. The
«
negators of providence find in the glaring reality of evil in
life the ground of their disbelief, in God and their despair in the
(9)
righteousness of His ways. But it is on account ofartheir mis¬
conception of the nature of providence and the role it plays in
the drama of cosmic becoming that their faith in the reality or
the universality of this providence is shaken by the perception
of evil in life. If evil ancycontingency reveal an indeterminisra
in the providence of the Almighty, it' is an indeterminism grounded
in divine love and generosity, rather thai in the inefficacy of
Kis power or the limitation of His foresight and fore-ordination.
God graciously allows the creature to subsist on its own and to
develop its life-process freely, as part of the ultimate scheme
of things enjoined by the dictates of His love and generosity. And
it is in this latitude, born of divine love, that contingency and
(10)
evil ate rooted, rather than in the powerlessness of the Almighty.
It is no less a misconception of the nature of divine provid¬
ence to hold that no mode of necessity can be ascribed to the order
of being it is said to govern. A totally contingent order of being
is thought to strengthen the cas^e for God's absolute power a nd
(11)
sovereignty, as, the Loquentes maintain. Yet an order of
contingent being, like that contrived by these-Loquentes, which does
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not endure for a single instant depends avowedly on C-od for its
incipient coming-to-be only. Beyond this the providence and
power of God do not go But it is more in keeping with the notion
of this providence to hold that its scope extends beyond the
initial production of things and embraces them throughout the whole
process of their production, as throughout the process of their
subsistence in being. A mode of necessity can thus be ascribed
to things from the standpoint of uod's own sovereighty, the
vindication of which a metaphysic of contingent being is designed
to serve. The Loquentes are obviously pre-occupied with the
vindication of this Sovereignty in the formulation of this meta¬
physic of contingency. But contrary to their expectations, this
Sovereignty, far from being vindicated, is grievously impaired.
The universe, as the workmanship of Crod, clearly bespeaks the might
and perfection of its Author, It is true such a workmanship is
far from being commensurate with the super-eminent perfection of
its Author. Yet within the scope of the perfection freely ..
assigned to it by the decrees of divine love, this universe is
Endowed with a measure of beauty and order which no scepticism
can gainsay. WhatJ.ever detracts of this perfection, therefore,
detracts of thenperfection of its Author -, or in A quinas's
words: "To detract from the creature's perfection is to detract
from the perfection of the divine power." Inasmuch as the
repudiation Of causal efficacy pertaining to things is a detraction
from their perfection, it is equally a detraction from God's
perfection: "since it is due to the abundance of its perfection




Thus the Ash'arite metaphysics of accidents amounts to an
impoverishment of the real and an infringement of the perfection
of its Author. As we have seen at length in the second chapter,
this metaphysics is implemented in terms of four major tenets
which Aquinas subjects to severe scrutiny. These are the 'passivity
or/Inertness of substances, the exclusive reference of ail causal
operations to God: the intransmissibility of accidents and the
(15)
contention that all production is creation. Aquinas, as we ha ve
seen, derived his knowledge about the occasionalism of the Mutakallims
from Haimonedes's'Guide' with which he was fully familiar. His
polemic against this occasionalism, as wet forth in the Summa
contra Gentiles and De Potentia, coincides in the main with the
Haimonedean-Averroist polemic despite his ignorance of the Anti-
Ash'arite polemic of Averroes in the Tahafut and theKashf -, at
least with respect to the metaphysical and epistomological
(14)
implications of this occasionalism. Such, for instance, is his
argument that the negation of causality militates against the
possibility of knowledge, especially in the physical science; inas¬
much as the nature of the cause is known through the nature of the
(15)
effect. Such, too, is his argument that action is consequent
upon being actual; that the 'form' is the principle of activity
(16)
in transitive operations, etc. But this, Averroes, Mainonedes
and Aquinas share in common as the common bequest of tradition al
Aristotelianism. The uniqueness and originality of the Thomist
critiqe of Ash^.arite occasionalims consists in its completeness;
and in this respect, it represents a positive advance on the
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Averroist critiqe. As we have hinted previously, the theistic
occasionalism of Al—Ghazali and the Ash'arites sacrifices the meta¬
physical interests involved in the positive admission of causality
as a primary predicate of being. Yetthe rehabilitation of causality
I
by Averroes, while it safeguards these interests, sacrifices the
the theological interests underlyingthe formulation of this
occasionalism and fails to give an adequate rational account for
the possibility of GoG^s direct intervention in the course of
cosmic events, owing to the deterministic presuppositions upon
which it rests. The merit of the Thomist solution of the causal
dilemna consists precisely in this: that it does complete justice
to the theological and metaphysical interests, underlying theistic
occasionalism and deistic determinism alike.
The positive element in the Thomist synthesis, through which
the solution of the causal dilemna is achieved is the notion of
love. This element is of Christian, rather than of Greek-.extract-
ion. We shall see, when we examine this notion of love, as the
principle of the divine otherness and the exteriority of the divine
will, that it is metaphysically affiliated to the Neo-Platonism of
Dionysius the Areopagite. But it is in any case a notion sui
gBneris which is not to be found either in Aristotle, Averroes
or Maimonedes. We have already said in the foregoing section
that Averroism fails to fathom the depths of the/mystery of divine
otherness 'and activity altogether and thus posits a self-centered
Deity who can hardly be said to act at all. The same charge can
be levelled on Aristotle's own notion of God. And in this respect,
Al-Ghazali's accusation, despite its naive anthropomorphic
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implications, is a devastating accusation. From the standpoint of
Aristotelianisra and Averroism, it is indeed difficult to see why
the Deity, who enjoys the everlasting bliss of contemplating His
own essence, should utter Himself out in activity at all. A Deity,
who is absolute wisdom needs not issue out of the orbit of self-
contained existence at all; since it is within this orbit that the
Deity fulfills His essence and attains thegoal of His interior
movement of self-contemplation. If creation, as an instance of the
divine otherneus and the exteriority of the divinn will is postul¬
ated, then it ought to be grounded in a principle sui generis .
distinct from wisdom altogether. And thus there must inhere in the
divine Being a dynamic principle of outgoing generosity, whereby
He communicates His being and His causality t> the creature out of
sheer and gracious love.
It can be safely maintained, we believe, that the notion of a
dynamic divinity, as of a personal divinity, is of Hebrew, that is
of Semitic origin. Islam, therefore, in its conception of God as
absolute powet was true(to the Semitic spirit in this respect^ at
least. And the reaction of Al-Ghazali to the notion of a well-nigh
inactive Deity was quite in line with the Semitic genius. Yet Al-
Ghazali in surrendering the Peripatetic notion of the Deity as
wisdom surrenders a positive element in any adequate conception of
the divine life. His conception of the Deity is a dynamic con¬
ception it is true; but it is a dynamic conception which has not
been fully rationalized. Clearly God ought to act, since an in¬
active Deity is either a powerless or a jealous Deity. But it is
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not clear why the activity of this Deity should, be devoid of all
wisdom and rationality. Not is it clear why a God who isr power
cannot also be wisdom. The error of absolute creative voluntarism,
as of absolute creative determinism, rests on. a false dmsjuntion,
which in both its aspects, is detrimental to the conception of the
fulness of the divine life.
It might be urged by the advocates of creative voluntarism,
as is tacitly pre-supposed by Al-Ghazali, that the notion of wisdom
threatens to introduce a positive limitation on the free moEveroent
of the divine will and the divine power and thus impair the
divine perfection. Yet there is latent in this contention a
positive misconception of the nature of wisdom in its relation
to activity. There is limitation whenever an- extrinsic principle
impedes the progress of an agent or restricts the sphere of its
movement. Such a limitation can be described as violent, inasmuch
as it violates the laws of the free movement of the agent whose
action it does impede. And avowedly this impediment or restriction
is derogatory of the notion of free activity, when predicated of
God. But there is no limitation when an intrinsic principle
presides upon the activity of a free agent, as the lav; and
principle of its natural unfoldment. For activity can be intell¬
igent or rational, without thereby ceasing to be free activity;
so thaiithe dilemna of freedom and finalistic rational determinism
(WO)
, ,
is a false dilemna. It is, therefore, a grave error to nolo
that free, rational activity - even when predicated of an absolute.
Agent - involves any contradiction, as the proponents of absolute
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voluntarism allege. There must inhere in the activity of an
intelligent, free agent a principle of wisdom or rationality as
the interior law of its development, without which activity looses
the eminent dignity of rational activity. As such, this principle
enters into activity as a constituent element thereof, rather
than as an alien,impeding factor which impairs its integrity or
reality. And even if a necessity, dictated by the conditions of
rationality itself, is found to supervenfc upon the agent in this
process such a necessity would not be the 'bad necessity' of
extrinsic compulsion;* but is rather the 'happy necessity' which
springs from within whenever the pbject of activity coincides
fully with the aspiration of the will directed towards it as its
(18)
genuine goal and fulfillment.
Ill
Causality, as an instance of divine love and
generosity.
In the course of his exposition of the causal dilemna in
chapter 70 of the Summa contra Gentiles (Third Book), Aquinas
examines the objections which scepticism mignt raise against the
notion of a dual causality, natural "and divine, cooperating in
the production of the same effect. The major objection -which
scepticism might raise is that of the simplicity of the ways of
nature which does nothing in vain. "We observe", he writes,"that
(19)
nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices."
But the contention that divine and natural causality converge to
produce the same effect amounts, in fact, to this: that two causes
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operate simultaneously where a single cause is sufficient; so that
one of these causes seems to be superfluous. "Since , then, the
divine power suffices to produce natural effects, it is super¬
fluous to employ for thb production of the same effects the powers
of nature also; or if the forces of nature suffice, it is super¬
fluous for the divine power to work for the same effect." The
solution of this dileinna rests on two divergent lines of reasoning
The first of these is the perception of a lav/ of subordination in
the hierarchy of causes, whereby the series of inferior causes
depends on the primary cause for its being and operation. The
basis of the second is the notion of God's infinite goodness and
generosity whereby He communicates to things His likeness "not
only in the point of their being, b ut also in the point of their
(20)
being causes of other things."
We are here face-to-face with a principle of far-reaching
consequence to the understanding of the causal problem. We have
already examined briefly the problem ofBeing and A ct, Yv\ VKeA
Ttc\ pro cal /ve fA»y> » Slc-A, t-jz, u.r^^c.o/J
are somehow related one to the other inasmuch as Act is somehow
revelatory of the nature of Being. But the discernment of such a
revelatory character of Act did not proceed beyond postulating a
'conditional law' of correlation between Act and Being. Unless
the Act were to utter Being, we reasone d, Being would remain
mysterious and hidden. The consequence is contradicted by the
testimony of experience and the actual reality of knowledge;
therefore the antecedent must be true and Being must utter itself
in Act. This process of reasoning remains, however, hypothetical
and indirqct, since scepticism challenges the actual reality of
-185- !
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knowledge and consents to bear the burden of this nihilistic
repudiation of knowledge by accepting the consequence of the fore¬
going conditional proposition. Thus the reductio ad absurduia of
this position which we have attempted remains of no avail, unless
the reality of knowledge is conclusively established or a primary
metaphysical law presiding on the relationship between Being and
Act is discovered. The positive enshrinement of the reality of
knowledge can of course be successfully achieved, in the face of
nihilistic scepticism. Scepticism cannot escape nthe reality of
knowledge withoutAoading itself with the'burden of the proof' and
thus abandoning its position of arm-chair nihilism. To disprove
the reality or possibility of knowledge the sceptic has to erect
a whole metaphysical edifice in which this possibility is discounted
on grounds inhering in the structure of the real, or in the
nature of the relationship between subject and object. But this
can be vindicated ohly on the supposition that the positive
knowledge Qf this structure and this relationship is possible.
In this way scepticism slips imperceptibly into the camp of
positive metaphysics, playing naively thtis into the hands of its
own foes.
Now the refutation of scepticism would naturally strengthen
the case for causality,since this refutation is bound up with the
thesis that knowledge is possible only in causal terms. But
causality would remain, in this manner, a purely hypothetical
principle whose validity is ascertained inferentially through a
process of backward transition from Act to Being, as it were, In
order to achieve a categorical vindication of the causal principle
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we must reverse this procedure. We .must attempt art'a priori
cle,d action'of causality from the notion of Being. Of course the
positivity of knowledge cannot be surrendered for a single moment;
inasmuch as the a priori procedure, no less thai the a posteriori,
presupposes this positivity. But the a priori procedure has the
inicrms ti
great merit of demonstrating the reality of a concept)- in this ' *
case, of Act in terms of Being, rather than vice versa.
In discussing the problem of the alleged correlation between
Act and Being, the question presented itself as a question of
relevance.'What is the justification' we urged, Iof the claim that
Act is even relevant to Being?' This question is clearly an
epistemological question; or at least, a question which can be
satisfactorily answered in epistemological terms, as we have seen
in postulating knowledge as the 'middle term'.in the relationship
between Act and ^eing. But now we are confronted with a question
of a purely metaphysical character, which nevertheless presupposes
the former. Even if it is conceded that Being utters itself in
Act, onemight still aste: 'What is the ground of this self-revelatory
utterance on the part ofBeing, and why should Being utter, itself
in Act at all?' The epistemological answer to this question
is infsuffieient, because it does not'go beyond the perception of
an external justification of the self-utterance of Being; a
justification, that is to say, which is meaningful from the stand¬
point of an external observer, hypothetical or real, only. The
substance of this answer, as we have seen, is that Being would
remain hidden, unless it is revealed in activity. But this




the inner structure of Being is reflected in an/thorough activity.
Yet whether Being remains hidden or unhidden does not regard Being
itself, independently of a hypothetical knower, The metaphysical
question here proposed, therefore, goes bdyond the sphere of an
external consciousness in which Being finds its reflection, and
♦
endeavours to find in the nature of Being itself the ground of a
dynamic procession beyond itself.
This dynamic p rocession of Being is rotated in the inner s
structure "of Being in its affiliation to the Good, The first mode
of this procession is the self-revelation of Being in intelligibility
by virtue of its inner benevolence. This is what one might call
the intrinsic luminosity or radiance of Being,-the luminosity and
(21)
radiance of Being which is identical with the True. But this
luminosity of Being is only the first mode,in fact the super¬
ficial mode, in the process of the self-revelation of Being; since
the radiance here described is the radiance of mere representation.
The most primordial self-revelation is thaijbf self-communication
or self-diffusion. Being communicates not merely its likeness
whereby it is externally revealed in intelligibility, but likewise
communicates its very substance, overflows with its innermost
perfection; the perfection of Being. In this way things are
invited, as it were, to share in the plenitude of its life, gracious¬
ly and benevolently. And herein consists the ultimate mystery of
i
Being as Goodness, that it is communicant of self.
As I hav«hinted previously, the notion of the self-communication
of the Good ana of Being, which represents the coping-stone of
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the Thoraist doctrine of causality and creation, as will become
(22)
clear in the sequel, is of Neo-Platonic extraction, ffits roots
can be found in Plato himself. It is well-known how in Platonic
ontology the Idea of the Good represents the ultimate source of
the intelligibility and the being of all things, as the sun repres¬
ents the ultimate source of the luminosity and generation of sensible
(25)
things. This role Plato assigns to the Idea of the Good through
a process of ascent from the ephemeral reality of transient things,
on to the ontological plenitude of Ideal reality, and finally, on
to the super-essentia-1 richness of the Good, which is the planetary
CBnter around which the galaxy of Ideal Essences revolves. Yet this
role is dictated, on the assumptions of Plato, bjr the immanent la ws
of this Ideal galaxy in the interrelation of its members severally;
*
rather than in the inner generosity of the Fountainhead from which
they well out. Of course the question of absolute genesis as regards
these eternal Ideas, is meaningless. But not such is the question
of the 'genetic relationship'in which these Ideas stand to their
Fountainhead -, with which, it is true, they are co-eternal and
co-eval. And when-the question of 'genesis' is raised from the
standpoint of the unenduring objects of snnse, it is found to
entail a grave issue which Platonic ontology could not afford to
leave unsettled. The Good, on the assumptions of Plato, is the
'Proton ontos', the First in an absolute sense. Whether this
Jfirstness' is derivative or primary in an epistemological sense;
that is, whether the determination of this status of the Good as
Absolute Prius is achieved by Plato a priori or a posteriori does
not touch the question at issue. Even for Platonic ontology the
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problem ofiitranscendant Firfct Principle is logically ana chron o-
logically (or better genetically) posterior to the problem of
the given phenomena of concrete existence, the determination of
a First Principle of which is dictated by the necessity of
rationalizing their being and their reality. In this respect the
Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence, set forth in the Phaedo, is not
without releva nee: the Ideas, "as absolute proto-types of particular
objects of sense, are revealed in consciousness through the per¬
ception of the latter. It is subsequently to this revelation that
they are progerred as the principles of explanation thereof.
Once this Firstness of the•Good is conceded the question
arises: 'Why indeed should the Good, the Primordial and Everlasting
Existent bring forth into being this Ideal Galaxy, or even the
world of shadowy existence of which this galaxy is the proto-type?'
Plato envisages this problem in its entire acuteness in the
i
^imoetts. The world of Being admittedly always was and is the same;
the world of Becoming is always in a process of becoming and
perishing. "Now everything that becomes or is creaxted must of
necessity be created by some cause, for nothing can be created
H (24)
'without a cause. The universe,- therefore, must of necessity be
created and have a beginning. But when this is posited as a premiss
the previous question recurs in its total concreteness. The.
creator has avowedly always been, and so have the Patterns upon
i
which his paze was fixed in fashioning this universe. 'Yet why
o
should the everlasting creator choose to bring this universe of
transient things out of the darkness of eternal nothingness at all?
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And why should he impart to it the perfection of Being, iForia
and intelligibility which pertain to him, in the first place,
alone??1- Because, Plato retorfe, the Creator" was good, "and no
goodness can ever have any jealousy of anything. And being free
from jealousy he desired that all things should be as like himself
(25)
as possible;" Here we have the ultimate clue to the mystery
of creation. Creation is the manifestation of the boundless
generosity and benevolence of the Demiurge, in whom there is no
jealousy or niggardliness; ana as such is a movement of free and
(26)
outgoing, love.
The notion of the good, as the ultimate ground of the
emanation of things from their primordial fountainhead^was enshrined
in Neo-Platonic metaphysics, following the example of the mas ter,
as an elemental postulate. According to Plotinus the One is the
superabundant store of all perfections, from which all things take
their origin; the supreme reality which" transcends Being, conscious -
ness, activity and life while giving rise to all these things;
the goal unto which all things yearn, while it desires nothing
and yearns unto nothing, "All things act with a view to the Good,
or on account of the Good, but the Good has no >nedd of anything."
\
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The Intellect, the First-born ol" the One, turns to the One by virtue
of the being and form it has received from itj but the One itself
desires not for there is nothing towards which it could turn.
"The Good has imparted to the Intellect... an image of itself, that
is why there is a desire in the intellect... But the Good desires
not, for what could it desire ? And it acquires nothing, for there
. is nothing for it to seek. It is therefore not the Intellect, because
(27)
in the Intellect there is desire and yearning for its own form."
And yet notwithstanding the superabundance of its riches and its
brimfull satiety it has generated all things.like a stream with¬
out a source, it pours forth its waters unto all the rivers; but
its waters are not thereby exhausted. Like the life which circul¬
ates in the veins of the tree without being spent away and which
animates ail parts ofthe tree while it abides motionless in the
roots, it gives life to aLl things while temaining distinct from
all things and stirs in all things while remaining motionless and
(28) i'
indiscernible.
The teaching of Plotinus was transmitted to the west through
the 'Liber de Causis' of Proclus, and Arabic recension of Proclus'
(29) ^
'Eleraentatio Theologica'. The doctrine of the self-diffusion
of the Good is stated in an eloquent way by Ptoclus. "Everything
(30)
perfect", he writes, proceeds to the generation of those things
whi ch it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.
t
For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives sub¬
sistence to all beings ( for the good and the one are the same, so
that the boniform is the same with the unical) thus also those things
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which are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection,
hasten to generate beings inferior to theif own essence. For
perfection is a certain portion of the Good,and the perfect,
so far as it is perfect, imhates the Good."
Aquinas, who wrote a commentary on the Liber de Causis in
(31)
1268, was fully fa^miliar with the thought of Proclus. Yet it
was primarily through the Divine Names of Dionysius the Areo-
pagite that the doctrine of the self-diffusive character of £he
Good found its way to the Thomist system, as evidenced by the
innumerable references of Aquinas to that vrork whenever the problem
recurs in his vrorks. In adaition to the Liber de Causis, the
Divine Names and the Mystical Theology - transmitted to the ^atin
Vest in the 9th century by Erigena, represent the main indirect
channel through which Neo-Platonism reached the 13th century
(32)
Scholastics and notaibly Aquinas.
We cannot dwell a t length on the Neo-Platonic mysticism of
(33)
the Pseudo-Dionysius, the great Neo-Platonist of the 5th.century.
We must,however, stop to examine his doctrine of the self diffusion
of the Good, as set f@tth in the fourth chapter of the Divine
Names, which exercised such a decisive influence on the theolggy
of Aquinas, The debt of Aquinas to the" Pseudo-Dionysius is in¬
calculable. With Aristotle and Augustine, Dionysius represents the
main spring from which the Thomist system takes its source. The
Thomist doctrine of the 'Via negativa' and the a nalogical
(34)
predicability of positive attributes to the Creator and the creature;
(35)
the Thomist doctrine of evil and the exclusive dynamism of the good;
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the notion of the good as essentia lly self-communicative: the
(36)
Thomist angeleology; the Thomist conception of causality as an
instance of divine generosity; and finally the Thomist doctrine of
(37)
love - are all of direct Dionysian inspiration. Aquinas, it is
true, recasts in precise technical language, the intuitions of the
Great Mystic, enunciated in symbolic mystical language.
The name 'Good1 which scripture attributes to God, explains
Dionysius, must be interpreted in a manner which sets the trans-
cenaant Goodness of the Divine Being apart from the goodnes s of
all created things. Eor this Goodness is the source and fountain-
head of all being and good."As our sun through no choice or deliber
ation, but by the very fact of its existence gives light to all
those "things which have any inherent power of sharing its illumin¬
ation, even so the Good (which is above the sun, as the tra nscend-
ent archetype by the very mode of its existence is above its
faded image) sends forth upon all things according to their
(38)
receptive powers , the rays of Its undivided Goodness," hence
the spiritual Beings (sc. the Angels) receive their being and
blessedness ana "pass on to those that are below them of the gifts
(39)
which have come unto them from the Good" - uttering in this way
the Divine Silence. And hence rational beings derive their being
and their intelligence, plants their life and- lifeless things the
quality of bare existence. In the Good are they all brought for^b
t
into Being and in the Good are they preserved. The Good is thus
the Fount of all things, the source of their being and reality.
And it is likewise the source of their preservation, of their
(40)
beauty and order, and even of their causality whereby they
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(41)
impart.their being to other things. In this capacity the Good
can be descibed as the Efficient Cause of all things. Yet the Good
is likewise the Beautiful unto which all things aspire, ana as such
is the Final Cause of all things. From it do they derive their
(42)
harmony, cohesion and unity. All dynamism, all motion or rest,
all being and order are grounded in the Good and Beautiful, as
their Efficient, Formal and Final Cause, "which is above all rest
and motion; through which all rest and motion come, and from which
ana in which and unto which and for the sake of which they are...
Yea, all that exists and comes into being exists ana comes into
being because of the Beautiful and the Good; and unto this object
all things gaze and by it are moved and conserved, ana for the
sake of it, because of it and in it existeth every originating
principle - be this 'exemplar' or be it final or efficient or
formal or material cause - in a word, all beginning, all conserv¬
ation and all ending, or (to sum it up) all things that have being
(45)
are derived from the Beautiful and the Good."
The sphere of the Good, therefore, embraces all Being, so that
"all creatures in so far as they have being are good and come from
(44)
the Good;" andliiave Being in proportion as they participate in
(45)
the Good. Outside this sphere, there is only darkness, evil,
not-Being. If the Good is the Fount of all being, then evil can
generate neither being normoot-being; that is can be neither its
«
own Source or the source of its opposite. Unlike the Good which
is pregnant with the infinite virtualities ofits overflowing gener¬
osity, evil is barren, niggardly and impotent. All dynamism, all
energy and all causality flow from the Good. Evil, qua evil,
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"causes no existence but only debases and corrupts, so far as its
power extends, the substance of things that have being."""And even
this power for destruction and debasement it derives not from
itself,but from the Good. "Qua evil, it neither hath being nor
confers it; through the action of the Good, it hath being (Yea, a
good being) and confers being on good things. Or rather... evil
in itself hath neither being, goodness, productiveness, nor power
(46)
of creating things which have being and goodness."
In the exact technical language of Aquinas, this profound
insight of the Pseudo-Dionysius into the nature ofthe Good and of
Being is stated in terms of convertibility. The Good ana Being are
convertible notions: things are in so far as they are good and are
(47)
good in so far as they possess being. Now if we were to enquirw
'what is it that constitutes the being of an< .existing thing, in the
Aristotelian scheme', the retort would be Act or Form: since Act
(43)
represents in thing s the principle of their perfection. but
act, in the Aristotelian-Thomist scheme, is not only the principle
of Being, it is likewise the principle of activity in existing
things; the activity which flows from the superabundant perfection
of Being. This is the genesis of the Aristotelian-Thomist dictum
(49)
that things 'act inasmuch as they are in being', - which corres¬
ponds in the Dionysian scheme, to the dictum 1 things are and act
inasmuch as they are good', as explained above.
The dynamic character of Being is thus rooted in the very
essence of being as self-communicative or self-diffusive. Whether
this self-diffusiveness is explained in Platonic terms, as in the
-194-
case of Dionysius and his predilection for the concept 'Good';
or in Aristotelian terras, as in the case of Aquinas and his pre¬
dilection for the concept 'act'^, - is immaterial to the major
question at issue. Aquinas, in any case, achieves a reconciliation
of the two concepts which, on the sufface of it,leaves no serious
dialectical remainder. Being, Good and Act are equivalent and
convertible terms. If the Good' is represented in Platonic and
Neo-Platonic speculation as the store of all perfections with which
it overflows, owing to its superabundance, and thus confers beauty,
being and energy upon things; this role can be ascribed, in the
Aristotelian scheme, to the Act which represents the principle of
Being and perfection in things. Yet even a superficial reading of
Platonic and Aristotelian ontology would reveal the conflicting (
i
motives of the two great sages in ascribing this role to two
concepts generiaally distinct. What corresponds to the Act or'
Form in Platonic ontology is the Idea, But whereas the Act (or
Form) is taken by Atistotle as an ultimate principle and loaded
with the absolute character of transcendance in the form of Pure
Act, the Idea is transcended in Platonism in the direction of a
superior reality which is the ultimate ground and principle thereof.
And this is the role ascribed to the Good in its relation to the
Idea in Plauo. The Good is indubitably a principle transcending
the Ideas,: as their source and fountainhead. If the Idea is being,
t
intelligibility, perfection (as indeed is the Act or Form in
Aristotle), then the Good is super-beingTsuper-intelligibility,
(50>)
super-perfection. This generic status oi the Good, as trans¬
cending being and intelligibility, is the great theme of later
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Neo-Platonism, whereby it positively departs from the genuine
Aristotelianism of the Stagirite.
The metaphysics of the Act, although it can be reconciled with
the metaphysics of the Good, cannot be said to coincide with it
completely. Thus Aquinas, even when he declares that being, act
and good are convertible notions, is nevertheless committed to an
ontology which ascribes priority to being qua act, rather than to
being qua good; and therefore, ascribes a purely axiological or
(51)
finalistic role to the good in its relation to being. In
this his faithfulness to Aristotle is demonstrated with striking
vividness. The remarkable aspect of the matter is that he endorses
so readily the Dionysian concept of the Good as self-diffusive
abundance that one might rightfully wonder how far the discrepancy
of the Good and the Act in metaphysical status,was perceived by him.,
For the Good, in the Dionysian ontology, is an ontological first
Principle, the Efficient Cause, as well as the Final Cause of all
(52)
things - , rather than a purely axiological or finalistic
principle.
What gives gravity to this accusation is that the Act is
enshrined 4s First Principle in the Dualist metaphysics of Aristotle
as a counter-part to potency, which is set up as a parallel First
Principle and co-eternal with it. Here the chasm which separates the
Aristotelian concept of the Act from the Heo-Platonic concept of
(
the Good is displayed to sight. The Neo-Pla tonic metaphysics
is a metaphysic of oneness, wherein the genesis of things is
described, as it must needs be described in such a metaphysics,-
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in terras of emanation from the unique principle of all Being, which
transcends ^eing, But not such is the Aristotelian, Dualist meta¬
physics, in which the Pure Act represents the Final Goal, the object
of desire unto which things yearn, rather than the A'ount of Being.
For it ii an draanationist account of the genesis of things - if
such an account is thinkable from the standpoint of Aristotelian-
ism at all -, can only be achieved at the cost of the most cardinal
distinction in Aristotelianism, the distinction between Act and
Potency; ana consequently at the risk of surrendering the most
(55)
decisive tenet of Aristotelian metaphysics.
It should not be suspected here that our critique of the
Thomist equation of Being qua Good and Being qua Act is inspired •
by any desire to surrender a positive gain which the Thomist
synthesis of the Weo-Platonic and Aristotelian elements of the
problem achieves. For such would amount to a falling back on the
irreducible dualism of Aristotle, with all the insoluble difficult-
(54)
ies it raises; and it is to the credit of Aquinas that his meta¬
physical vision on this, as on many a decisive issue, reaches
beyond the limits of Aristotelianism. What we are endeavouring
to show is that the unqualified identification of the Beo-Blatonic
concept of the Good and the Aristotelian concept of the Act
befcfcays a failure to see into the depths of the problem and
threatens to confuse the two distinct cory4pts. And this, as I
have hinted previously, is one decisive issue over which Arabian
(55)
Neo-Platonic Peripatetisra was courting the cause of error.
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Whatever our verdic^'on the Thorn1st equation of Being qua
Act and Being qua Good, it must^be conceded that, although the two
concepts are of heterogeneous extraction, Aquinas utilizes then for
his metaphysical and theological purposes with outstanding mastery.
The first perfection of things is the perfection of beinggwhich
things derive from the First 0eing, who is unto all things the
(56)
cause of Being. This perfection is even prior to the Good, since
being is predicable of all things in Act, whereas good is predicable
of things which participate in a certain grade of positive perfect-
(57)
ion only. Both objectively and subjectively (secundum rem
and secundum rationem) being is prior to the good: in the first
case, because being is predicated of a thing, inasmuch as it is
in act simpliciter; in the second, because being is what' is first
(58)
conceived by the intellect and what is designated by the name.
God confers upon things the perfection of being, by reason of
His superabundant generosity and goodness. As Efficient Cause, Ee
bestows upon them His likeness by conferring upon them the title
of existence; as Final Cause, He implants in them the desire to
(59)
seek Him as their ultimate end and goal. in this way, He is
the principle and Term of all things, their beginning and end.
The paradox of the divine goodness and generosity is that God,
notwithstanding His satiety and His self-sufficiency, has pleased
to bring forth into being the whole creation freely and benevolently.
1
i ,
por what otheyreason can be adduced for:this movement of free love,
save the divine munificence and liberality ? Creation avowedly
adds nothing to God whose essence exhauats all positive perfection.
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The 'ultima ratio' of the exteriorization of the divine will can¬
not, therefor?, be said to consist in God's desire for the creature,
as it were; but rather in the self-centered movement of dynamic
and outgoing love which wells out. of the bosom of the Deity,
not out of penury or desite but rather out of satiety and super-
(60)
abundance.
Yet the divine generosity does not manifest itself merely in
the perfection of Being. If things were endowBd with being purely
and simply they would be endowed indeed with a perfection which
is proper to God Himself and thereby the divine generosity would
be amply demonstrated. The infinity of God's generosity, however,
is such that in addition to the perfection of being, He has
conferred upon the creature the power to generate being, the enrergy
whereby it can communicate its own perfection to other things. And
in this is rooted ultimately the causality of things andjtheir
dynamic energy, whereby they share in the divine essence. "Things
tend to be like God, forasmuch as He is good.... Now it is out of
His goodness thatGod bestows being on others; for all things act
forasmuch.as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek
(61)
to be like God, by being causes of others."
A metaphysic of'inert being, like the metaphysics of the
Loquentes^which strips created things of the predicates of dynamism
and causal energy, represents thus a positive detraction of" the
perfection of its Author, It is, as we hatve seen, proper to being
to communicate its perfection to other things. In bestowing being
upon things, God can withhold fnom them what is proper to being
only through jealousy or niggardliness. But this is incompatible
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v/ith the notion of the boundless perfection and generosity of ^od;
so that the causality of things raustbe conceded in the interest of
(62)
divine perfection and sovereignty.
-s:- * -x-
The foregoing account of the self-diffusive character of
being is a purely Neo-Platonic account. 'How does Aquinas fit it
into his Aristotelian, metaphysical scheme' must now be examined.
The Act, in Aristotelian ontology, as we have already see? is
merely one constituent element of the real; vdiether the real is
taken in its individuality, as manifested in substance; or in its
totality, as manifested in the universe as a whole -, potency
being the other element. Even in its capacity as Pure Act, the act
plays only the finalistic role of the Immovable Mover unto which all
things gravitate. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Act cannot be
said to.be 'cause' in the precise sense. For Aristotle the Being
of things is an irreducible, initial datum of which he offers no
account. That is why he relaxes so complacently in the doctrine
of the eternity of the world. The 'genesis of Being', according to
him, calls for no account,because, in an absolute sense, there is
uo gBnesis of Being. "What calls for a metaphysical account is
Becoming: that isip the self-contained, circular movement of -^eing
upon itself endlessly and everlastingly. And here the distinction
t
between Act and Potency is more thai) sufficient to account for




In the Thomist scheme, however, such a conception of the
problem is inadequate and incomplete to say the least. xf the
Becoming of things calls for a satisfactory metaphysical account,
much more aoes their Being or Genesis call for such an account.
And for this to be achieved we cannot content ouselves with an
account of the transition of things from potential to actual being,
as in the Aristotelian doctrine of Becoming. We must proceed
beyond this and break through the circle of the self-contained
endless movement of Being, and thus settle the problem of the
%
initial eruption of Being into the sphere of actuality. Such an
eruption, when its reality is fully scrutinized, is found to differ
from becoming in precisely this respect:' that it is neither trans¬
mutation nor change, since change implies a process from one term
to another, and we are clearly confronted here with the problem
(64)
of the initial genesis of Being, Consequently philosophy must
reckon with a metaphysical problem which is even prior to the
problem of-Becoming. In metaphysical language, this problem can
be designated as the 'problem of the genesis of Being'; in religious
language, as the'problem of Creation'.
Bow note here in what position Thomism stands to A ristotelianQ
ism over the problem of Being and Becoming. The Act-Potency
metaphysics, formulated by Aristotle, is conceived with a view
to solving the problem of Becoming, and in this its success can
hardly be gainsayed; especially when it is recalled how difficult
the'prospect of such success was made by Parmenides and the
Eleactics. For the strict requirements of this metaphysics of
Becoming, the notion of Act as 'entelechy' and, in the la st
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analysis, of the Pure Act, as ultimate Entelechy or ultimate
Teleology, proved more than satisfactory. Becoming, change,
activity are interpreted, in the Act-Potency metaphysics of the
Stagirite, as the transition of a real entity from a phase of
incomplete perfection to a phase of complete perfection. And in
this process, the Act plays ideally the role of Final Cause; and
(65)
effectively the role of Formal Cause. But nowhere does
Aristotle ascribe to this Act the role of efficient cause; the
cause, that is to say, which confers being upon the Entity in
question. Such a prospect is precluded by Aristotle's very
conception of motion, especially, in relation to the whole universe
which is, on Aristotle's showing, in a process of endless develop-
(-66)
ment. It is curious to note that neither for Aristotle nor for
Greek consciousness in general does this problem present itself at
all. The problem of creation for Greek consciousness was dismissed
by Parmenides as an irrational problem, when he declared at the
opening of his poem on Truth that 'Being is, not-Being-is not.'
The assertion that Being could come out of not-Being involved thus
a violation of the law of contradiction.
Aquinas, notwithstanding his integral acceptance of the
Aristotelian metaphysics of the Act, professes a doctrine of
creation in which this very notion of Act is central,* One might
wonder how on earth this notion, born in such unpropitious circum-
i
stances, could be employed in the vindication of a thesis
repudiated so emphatically by the great representative of the
Greek genius. Might it not be that Aquinas, then, succeeds in
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accomodating this concept of Act to the requirements of his meta -
physics of creation only through a process of fraud? For how can
a concept contrived to meet the requirements of a metaphysics of
Becoming be transplanted integrally into a higher order and employed
innthe settlement of a more acute problem, the problem of the
genesis of Being?
Here the whole weight of our foregoing accusation against
Aquinas is brought out. Yet it ought to be remarked in all fairness
that Aquinas succeeds in accomodating the Aristotelian notion of
Act for his metaphysical and theological needs through a process
of modification rather than fraud. And. the justifiability of his
procedure rests upon one major circumstance: the fact that
Aristotle had left the way open for such an eventuality,' perhaps
inadvertently, through his notion of the Act, as 'Energy', no less
(67)
than 'Entelechy', Even for the purposes of his own metaphysics
a notion of Act devoid of dynamism,like the notions of Idea and
Being in Plato and Parmenides respectively, would have proved in¬
adequate, This was one of the major scores, it will be recalled,
(68)
on which Aristotle rejects the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.
If the becoming of things is to be satisfactorily accounted for,
an 'energising principle' must be introduced in which the dynamism
of cosmic life could be rooted. And the Act can be made to play
such a role, even though for the purposes of Aristotle such a
role is not altogether indispensable; inasmuch as the dynamism
latent in ihings is rooted 'in the aspiration of Matter (on account
of its penury: for the fullness of the Pure Act, which
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represents the 'Final Cause' towards which all cosmic movement
and becoming gravitate.
But to achieve this, as we have hinted previously, the
Aristotelian concept of Act must somehow be recast in ^eo-Platonic
terms. Aquinas, therefore, succeeds in conceiving of the Act as
communicative or diffusive of itself by viewing it through the
prism of the Dionysian concept of the Good. In this way he succeeds
in corroborating the validity of the equation Being-qua-Act with
Being-qua-Good. The procedure of Aquinas in this corroboration
need£ not arouse any surprise. The God of the Pseudo-Dionysius is
absolute Goodness, the God of Aristotle is Pure Act. But clearly
it is the same God who is here envisaged from two different metap
physical standpoints. In any case, this is precisely the point of
the claim, which can be successfully defended, that Aquinas
achieves a positive synthesis of^Aristotelian with Christian
metaphysical and theological presuppositions -, a synthesis in
"
>
which Neo-Platoniem indeed finds as prominent a place, we believe,
as Aristotelianism where the conception of the divine nature and
of divine activity and creation is concerned. God, whose first
(69)
attribute is Being according to both Aquinas and Dionysius,
plays the role of 'middle term' in this process of synthesising
the two heterogeneous notions of Act and Good,
Nov; if in God the predicates Act, Being, Good are submerged in
t
the unity of the divine essence, then God's activity cannot be
dissociated from the notion of God's Being or set up as a quality
of the divine Being effectively distinct from the divine Essence.
Rationa lly, of course, we can distinguish in God between Being
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and Operation3 but only rationally , since otherwise we threaten
(70)
to impair the unity and simplicity of the divine Being.
Owing to the fullness of His Being and the superabundance of His
Goodness, God unfolds His Essence in the twofold movement of
procession and creation, while remainingKilly within Himself, as
it were. This is how Aquinas describes the procession of the
divine persons from' God in De Potentia. Since it is of the nature '
of what is in act, he argues, to communicate itself as far as
possible; it follows that God who is the fullness of Act (maxime
et purissime actus) communicates His Being in the divine persons;
(71)
as indeed in creation too. In the Contra Gentiles, creation is
described in the same terms of self-communiuative actuality.
Inasmuch as every agent acts according as it is inixct, and inas-
{
much as it inheres, in the nature of the perfect to communicate
(72)
its likeness to fcther things, he argues, God creates things by
communicating to them of the fullness of His perfection T/hich is
(73)
Being. * '
At this point a problem presents itself not unnaturally to
our consciousness. The account of activity in terms of self-
communicative actuality might be legitimate in the case of God,
because in Him the Act of Being is identical with the Act of Being-
Good; and the self-communicative character of the Good is not here
in question. In the creature, whose being is not identical with
. • (74)
his goodness, on the assumptions of Aquinas, such an account
would seem totally unwarranted; and our analysis of causality would
gain nothing from the conception of the self-diffusi^ve character





of causality. In order to resolge this difficulty we have only
to widen our conception of the Act in its relation to the Good;
and thus load it with the character of an a priori principle.
Even in the unique case of God, the legitimacy of the argument
from the self-communicative character of the Good as A ct, derives
from the circumstance that, activity is rooted in the Good as such,
and is commensurate with it. It is true that in God, these two terms
coincide, because in Him they attain the degree of superlative
perfection. But clearly even in God, the legitimacy of this
contention would be unwarranted, unless the equation of Goodness
and Act were an a priori postulate. The self-communication of Act
is not predicable of God, because He is God. It is rather because
Act, qua Act, is self-communicative of its essence by virtue of
its affiliation to the Good, that God can be said to act, because
'
He is good. So that wherever a measure of actuality, however
minimal, is found in an entity, action can be seen to .emanate from I]
1;
this entity by virtue of its intrinsic goodness. The only specia 1
position that God occupies in this relationship of actuality to
operation -is that of eminence. Because He is Act, complete and
entire, God can act in an absolute sense and confer upon things
the absolute predicate of Being - a role which no particular
(75)
Created agent can perform. But created agents can acl; in
^ *
proportionately in the exact measure of actuality proper to them,
and it is in this precise respect that they differ from God.
It is only in this way ,that the reality of causality, as a
predicate of the Creator and the creature, can be saved. Cauaality
is not predicable of God arbitrarily, as it were} that is, by
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reason of His sheer divinity and sovereignty. For if so, then
the predicability of causality to the creature would be unwarrant¬
ed and the pretensions of scepticism would be justifiable after all.
But the dramatif, metaphysical predicament in which scepticism -
as we have seen in the case of Al-Qhazali and the Ash'arites,-
is caught up is that its procedure in predicating causality of the
Creator Himself is found, upon close scrutiny , to be wholly
unjustifiable. How, indeed, can we speak of a causal relationship
between God and the universe (as,in fact is implied in1 speaking of
God as First Cause of the"universe) when the causal principle
itself is without validity? Or, perhaps, the relationship of
authorship in which God stands to the universe is not, strictly
speaking, a causal relationship; since God as the aluthor of the
very t^ng of things, stands to the universe in an absolutely
unique and incommunicable relationship. Yet, this thesis, rather
than invalidate the predicability of causality to the Author of
Being,, raises a most decisive issue which must now be examined:
'In what precise relationship does causality stand to Being,
absolute or relative, essential or accidental?' 'And what is the
precise character of this relationship itself: Is it a univocal,
homogeneous character; or is it one which must be characterised in
other terms, enjoined by the precise character of Being with
which the meaning of causality is said to be bound up?'
We will postpone the settlement of these two questions for
the time being. What we have gained by raising them at this point
is a vivid awareness of the inescapability of conceiving causality
in the perspective of Being, The significance of this discernment
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for the Thomist epistemology and metaphysics becomes evident the
moment it is recalled that the legitimacy of the empirical procedure
of Aquinas in demonstrating the existence of God and determining
His attributes is bound up with the admission of a causal relation¬
ship between God and the universe, grounded in the very nature o f
Being. It is because our analysis of Being, as empirically
given, reveals the existence of certain universal determinations
\
pertaining to Being, as such, that we are able to rise from the
finite to the infinite and load it with certain positive contents,
without exposing ourselves to the charge of -groundless constructions,
■an
Only inN'arbitrary' ontology can causality be attributed to God
and denied to the creature, merely on the strength of God's
V \
'arbitrary' uniqueness and sovereignty.
I*/
The role of Causality in the Ladder of Analogical
Ascent from the Finite to the Infinite,
We have remarked in discussirg Aristotelian dualism and the
difficulties it raises for any positive doctrine of creation, that
the latter is possible only in monistic terms. Now whatever our
procedure in determining the existence of a First Principle from
which things can be said to originiate, this First Principle must
evidently be the chronological and logical (Prior' in a process
which is described as Creation. A monistic ontology, }.ike that of
Plotinus and Al-Ghazali, sets out inevitably from this 'First
Principle', as the source from which all things emanate, regardless
of the exact mode ascribed to this emanation. Dnce this emanation
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is posited, as an initial assumption a series of metaphysical
problems are forthwith raised with which such an ontology is bound
to reckon. 'What'} one might ask, 'does this emanation entail as
regards the creature?' The creature emanates, admittedly, from the
One, by reason of ite infinite plenitude and generosity. 'But
what does this creature derive from the One out of which it issued
forth; and what is the exact scope of this generosity as regards
the being of the creature?' This question refers clearly to the
status of the creature considered ', in itself; subsequently to the
act of its constitution in being. In settling it monism might give
one of two answers, depending in fact, on its conception of the
node of emanation of the creature from the One; and, in the last.
analysis, on its conception of the exact nature of the One itself.
The first of these answers, as in Plotinus and bionysius, can be
stated in the following terms: Owing to Its infinite generosity,
the One overflows with a measure of all its perfections which it
confers upon the creature. Its goodness is bestowed integrally
upon the creature, as regards its substance if not its degree.
The second answer, as in Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites, concedes
the reality of this emanation of the divine goodness; without
4
conceding its integral character. In its emphatic stress on the
transeendance of the One it declares that the 'integral quality'
of "Hiis perfection cannot be shared by the creature at all. Thus,
t
it creates a chasm between the creator and the creature which no
dialectic can bridge.
We have already seen in what"way this position detracts of
the divine perfection, while it professes to exalt the divine
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tran seendance and sovereignty. But the speciousness of this posit¬
ion consists in the fact that it rests upon two further grievous
metaphysical errors: a false conception of divine transcendance
and a false conception of the nature of Being. The wages of the
forner error is the impossibility of ascent from the crearture to
the creator; the wages of the latter is the unJustifiability of
predicating causality of the creator and the creature,.
DionysiuS described the Good as self-diffusive generosityrj
as oYeT-flowin^abundance, In this Good is rooted the emanation
of things from the bosom of God. Yet the emanation of things
from God is not only a self-communication of the divine goodness;
it is likewise a self-revelation of the divine essence, an utter-
(76*
ance of the Divine Silence,in the words of Dionysius. ' The
Godhead, in the super-essential unity of His ineffable Being, is
nameless, unknowable and unattainable. Were He to remain concealed
behind the veils of His undifferentiated identity, He would remain
totally inscrutable and ineffable. But owing to His boundless
goodness and generosity the Divine Being issues forth out of the
solitude of His undifferentiated Godhead, first, into the different¬
iated trinity of divine persons and, second, into the multiplicityy
(77)
of created things.
Here again we witness the significance of the Dionysian
concept of Being, both' as overflowing abundance and as radiant
i
luminosity. And this is the character of all Being, finite or
infinite, relative or absolute. Finite, relative Being,it is true,
is self-revelatory of essence and self-diffusive of substance, in
a derivative-and limited sense; inasmuch as it derives this two-
fold character from the First Being, with and through the Act in
vv&ich it derives its very Being. But even when the derivative
character of this twofold quality of finite Being is conceded:;? it
remains that it is by reason of its Being that a thing is capable
of communicating its perfection/, to other things, however
«
fragmentary and partial this perfection is. Thus even for Dionysius
and Neo-Platonism, in general, self-communicative goodness.is a
predicate of Being as such, It is indisputable that, in one sense,
the ultimate ground of this self-communicative -goodness is the
participation of all things in the Goodness of the One; so that it
is truly the One itself which is revealed and communicated in every
created thing. The pantheistic predicament, however, is not - as
would seem from this admission- totally inescapable. Outside the
One in whose fullness all things participate there is admittedly
nothing. Things come to be through participation in its in¬
exhaustible Being, without appropriating it, like the radii of the
circle which share the same center without appropriating it or
(78)
becoming identical with it. Contrary to the assumptions of
Pantheism, however, the One can be diversified in the many while
remaining distinct from them in essence; its perfection can be
shared by the many through a process of participation rather than
through a process of dis-integration, as it were. The One pro¬
liferates its Being without- being broken up or pulverised in the
i
multiplicity-of things it brings forth. And this is precisely the
nature of the relationship *creation' in which the One generates
all things.
-211-
Now in determining the character of finite Being, ITeo-Platonism
setting out from the First Principle of things as it must, proc¬
eeds to ascribe to finite Being the same positive characteristics
latent in its conception of this First Principle; while reserving
at the same time to this First Principle the character of trans¬
cendence proper to it. We shall describe this as the ( process of
descent* in the determination of the character of finite from
infinite Being. But for Thomism and Aristotelianism,this procedure
is unjustifiable; since the characteristics of infinite Being,
considering the actual stucture of our consciousness, can be deter¬
mined only through a 'process of ascent' from the finite to the
infinite. We arrive at demonstrating the existence of God and at
determining His sovereign attributes, Aquinas teaches, from the s
(79)
signs of visible things. The existence of God cannot be
demonstrated a priori; because we can have no a priori conception
of the^Livine Essence, which would serve us middle term in this-
demonstration, on account'of the infinite dispropottionateness of
' (80)
ihis Essence with our crealted intellect. Nor can any
'intelligible species', which our intellect abstracts from the
conditions of sensibility, correspond with the infinity of the
divine essence. If the a priori procedure were the only procedure
then the demonstration of god's existence would be a vain endeavour.
But in addition to this procedure, there is the procedure from
i
'effect' to ' cause',or the method generally knowmas the a
(81!)
posteriori method of demonstration. If the effect is completely
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adequate to the cause - and reveals as it were all its power and
perfection, then this method can yield us with incalculable gain
with respect to the nature of the cause of which it is the effect.
If, on the other hand, this effect falls short of the cause in
being or eminence, then we can scarcely expect to derive from it
. an adequate notion of the character of the cause. God, as cause,
stands to created effects, as the infinite to the finite. There¬
fore, no effect can be adequate to the revelation of His essence.
The a posteriori method proves at best , with respect to God, that
He is (an sit) never what He is (quid est). De/m6nstratively, "
(81)
the latter question admits of a solution only in negative terms.
Yet the legitimacy of the a posteriori method cannot be
admitted without qualification. The validity of the causal
argument presupposes the validity of the causal principle, as
a principle of Being qua Being. Otherwise the transition from
the finite to the infinite would be altogether unwarranted. In
the A ristotelian scheme, as we have already seen, causality is
said to be a concomitant of actuality, in real entities; in the
Dionysian scheme, instead, it is said to be a ooncomitant of
goodness. We have expounded at sufficient length the implications
of the Dmonysian position. We must now turn to causality in its
relationship to the Act in the metaphysics of the Stagirite and
Aquinas. The analysis of Being, as given in the order of concrete
existence, -reveals that the principle through which things 'are
(82) "
what they are'is the Form or Act. It iaou±d follows that the
Being of an entity is commensurate with its actuality. For
avowedly things are not, even, in the point< of being, of the same
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rank as It were^ and that precisely on account of the diversity of
their participation in" the fullness of the Act. The ultimate
reason of this diversity, as we shaiysee later, is the in-
commensurablility of any 'even' or uniform order of created
being with the divine goodness as manifested in the diverse
multiplicity of things. But whatever the metaphysical justif¬
ication of this diversity, and the hierarchization of things
consequent upon it, a 'law of ontological gradation' can be
discovered in the order of Being, running concurrently with the
order of gradation pertaining to Act. And in this parallel
gradation of Being and Act we have a decisive clue to the exist-
(83)
ence of God as the Pure Act, in whom there is no compositionj
or the First Being, from whom all created things derive their being.
The principle, invoked in the two Summas in the justification of r .3
this procedure, is the abstract maxim that whatever is pre-eminent
in a gemus is the cause of all the members participating in that ~
genus: 'Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa
omnium quae sunt illius gBneris, sicut ignis, qui est causa omnium
n(84)
calidorumv- ; Thus as the grades of nobility, goodness ana truth are
refe rable to a Pre-eminent Terra in their genus, so are the grades
of being referrable to the First ^eing in whom the perfections of
(85)
all things are rooted,.
But the Act, as we have seen, does not represent merely the
principle through which things are what they are; it represents
equally the principle whereby things act; the principle of their
dynamism and efficacy, by reason, it isttrue, of the fullness of
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being which the Act confers upon them/^as it were. If it is a
fundamental dictum of Aristotelianism and Thomism, as we have
seen, that things are inasmuch as they are in act, it is no less a
fundamental dictum that things act inasmuch as they are in act.
Things'are' and 'act', therefore, by virtue of the same Act which
confers upon them the title of being and activity. The indissol¬
uble unity of Being and operation, fcnd Aquinas, is such that he
calls the former the 'first act', the latter the 'second act* in
(86)
a real entity. But clearly the distinction between the first
and second act,'the integrity' and operation of the object - is
of a rational order. It does not and ought not to affect the
unity of the indivisible Act in which the object is constituted in
being. The utoity of being is a metaphysical postulate which is
indispensable for the adequate conception of Being, even when
it is considered in the concrete in its reference to a real
entity in its identical self hood and its distinction from ibther
real entities. A thing.clings jealously to its unity and integrity
(87)
as it clings to its being.
We are here face-to-face with the old Eleafcic dilemma. The
identity of being is somehow inescapable; but this identity should
not be conceived in such a way as to infringe the no less in¬
escapable notion of the diversity of being. In order to avoid the
Eleatic impasse, we must have recourse, in the first place, to
the Platonic' doctrine of participation upon which we have touched.
This doctrine finds the genetic ground of finite being in the
infinite/ Clearly then the finite and infinite, although they
somehow participate in the same category of being, are distinct
-215-
und irreducible into each other. The exact ontological statue
with-which the finite is invested in Platonism needs not detain us
here. For however minimal the shadowy existence ascribed b# Plato
to the particular things of sense, these things participate in a
positive way in the perfection of the infinite. The import of
this initial distinction between the finite and the infinite to
our argument is decisive/ tn the very admission of the distinction
between the finite and the infinte, Platonism posits bothoa law
of dependence, as between the finite and the infinite, and a law
of hierarchy, as between the members participating in the perfect¬
ion of the infinite. The finite and the infinite are clearly not
equal in the degree of being or perfection; nor for that matter
I
the finite participants in the perfection of the infinite.
Participation implies diversity in the grades of participated
perfection, without which the very distinction between the finite
anu the infinite would not arise at all.
How it is, of course, a serious problem how Being can be
taken as a 'common term' in the determination of the relationship
of hierarchy in which the diverse members of the ontological series
*
stand to each other; and in the last analysis, the relationship
in which the finite stands to the infinite. It is no less a
serious problem how the concept Being can as much as be predicated
of two terms between which there is no proportion: as the finite
and the infinite. Yet these two problems are found to rescue
themselves, upon close scrutiny, into one major metaphysical
problem: namely, 'How can Being be shared by the many and at the
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same time remain whole and entire*; or in simple terms: 'How
can we speak of Being as one and many without violating the law
of contradiction?'
To resolve this problem we have only to recall the Dionysian
doctrine <6f the self-diffusiveness of the Being identical with the
Good. The Good communicates its perfections to created things,
without thereby being exhausted or spent away; and without thereby
a lienating itself, as it were, and losing its identity and
transcedance. It is in its insistence on the irreducible trans¬
cendence of the One that the Monism of the Pseudo-Dionysius is
able to circumlocute the impasse of monistic Pantheism without
falling into it. For the Good is not diversified through
morcellation, but rather through duplication: it is not the
'substance*of the First Being which is shared by created things
but rather Its 'likeness*. Thus the First Being brings forth the
manifold diversity of things without -being conTpngled with its
v
workman ship. Owing to the inadequacy of any created "being to
represent the inexhaustible fullness of the Divine Being, things
are multiplied in accordance tith a gradational scale of perfection
and this is the ultima' rinciple of the- distinction and
matter in terms of the time-hallowed dilemma of the Eleatics,
by reason of its self-diffusive character. But in this self-
diffusion, being is not manifested, as it were, in one dimension,
owing to its infinite perfection 'and its incommensurability
with any of its finite manifestations. And in this same in¬
commensurability, as we shall see in the last section of this
multiplicity of things. The one becomes many - to restate the
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chapter, is grounded the rational possibility of the extraordinary
and miraculous intervention of God in history.
This account of the unity-in-diversity of Being can be invoked row
in the justification of the predicability of the concept $eing of
both the finite and the infinite. It is, of course, baffling that
• - . '
the notion Being should be taken a s a 'common term', as between
two entities incoromensurably.disproportionate with one another.
The Neo-Platonic conception of the One as a super-Ontx^l reality
seems, therefore, fully legitimate on this yery score. Yet Neo-
Platonism itself, notwithstanding the transcendance it asctibes to
the One, employs the concept Being as a 'common term', in speaking
of its relationship to things. For does it not speak of the
One as a super-Being., or the Fount of Being which itself trans¬
cends Being? Now however much Neo-Platonism might urge that this
inadequate approach to the matter is dictated by the actual
structure of our consciousness which can lay hold of ontological
concepts only; and however much it might insist on the rational




to admit that the Infinite exists, albeit in a transcendent manner.
What Neo-Platonism is struggling against is a univocal conception,
of Being, as a homogeneous quality of the finite and the Infinite;
and here Neo-Platonism is perfectly justifiable in its procedure.
If existence means a determinate mode of existence -, as it must
i
whenever it is predicated of any finite being -, then the
(89)
infinite cannot even be said to exist. Neo-Platonism, however,
cannot uphold successfully the thesis that the One can generate •
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Being without itself being related somehow to Being; or that,
in a strict sense, it does not exist. What ffeo-Platonism is
endeavouring to save is the super-eminent transcendance of the
(90)
One and in this endeavour its motives are perfectly legitimate.
In the Thomist epistemology, the doctrine of analogy proposes
to meet this very difficulty, "/hat justifies the predicability
of a concept (e.g.Being) of the finite and the infinite is the
circumstance that we can distinguish, as regards this concept,
between the contents of the concept (res significata) and the
(91)
node of its predication (modus significandi). When we predicate
the concept Being to the finite and the infinite, to the creature
ana the Creator, we would be fully justified, so long as we reserve
to the Creator the 'mode of eminence' which is proper to Him by
virtue of His infinity." And this predication would be meaning¬
ful inasmuch as it denotes a positive perfection. But it is not
meaningful in a complete sense, since its modality is absolutely
(92)
incomprehensible. When we speak of a finite being as good,
our intellect grasps the judgment in question beaause it can assign
the exact manner in which the determinate goodness of that finite
being can be so designated. But not such is the character of the
goodness inhering in God; nor for that matter, of all the positive
attributes we predicate of God analogically. Fo^'/hereas in the
creature these attributes refer to certain determinate qualities
«
supervening upon the subject or suppositum and distinct from its
essence, in God these attributes represent the self-subsistent
unity of the divine essence, which cannot be conceived through




Here it should be noted that the validity of t . he analogical
procedure rests, in the last analysis on the cardinal metaphysical'
principle which we have been expounding. Affirmative concepts
are not predicated of God infsuch a way as to'exclude a negative
defect rather than to affirm a positive perfection, as Haimonedes
taught (Guide,X,58); nor simply to denote a relationship of
causality between Him and the creature, as others like Alain of
Lille (Theol.Reg.21,26) held. Rather do these affirmative concepts
denot the positive perfections pre-existing in God and in which
(94)
creatures participate. It follows, therefore, that in a strict
ontological and logical sense, they apply primarily to God rather
(95)
than to the creature. We do not predicate goodness of things
and then proceed to predicate it of God. Rather do we predicate
goodness of things, because we discover in them a share of the
self^subsitting goodness of God in which they participate in
their capacity as the creatures of God. And this pre-supposes
that goodness, like all the positive perfections which we discover
fragmentarily in the creatures, pre-exist in'an undivided unity
in the First Being, who of the superabundance of His love and
generosity, has freely chosen to communicate these perfections
to the creatures that they might iherby share in the fullness of
(96)
His infinite goodness.
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the affiliat¬
ion of the doctrine of analogy to the Dionysian doctrine of the
self-diffusive character of Being. The analogical ascent from the
finite to the infinite rests upon a tacit perception of a positive
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'ontological kinship' between the finite and the infinite. From
the standpoint of the finite this ..ontological kinship can never be
ascertained conclusively: since at best it could be set up as a
contingent, empirical postulate; and in this manner, its
application to the infinite would be absolutely unwarranted. If
it is to be raised to the dignity of a metaphysical principle,
its roots mustbe sought beyond the finite. And if we are ever to
bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite we must state
the exact metaphysical relationship in .which these two terms
stand to each other. Th'Vs the Dionysian doctrine of the self-
diffusive character of the Good, conjoined to the Platonic doctrine
of participation to which it is closely affiliated, proposes to
settle. Upon this as its metaphysical groundwork, analogy can
legitimately erect its epistemological structure, and show in
what way the riches of the divine perfection lavished upon the
creature!., in accordance with the measure of its merit, can be
gleaned, as it were, in the reconstruction of out picture of the
divine Being. Paradoxical as it might sound, the analogical
ascent to the infinite is possible only because of a primordial
movement of descent;into the finite,on the part of the infinite.
The a posteriori epistemological procedure of analogy is rooted in
the a priori metaphysical presuppositions of Platonism and Neo-
Platonism.
The analogical method, when applied to the ooncept Being, is
found thus to settle at one stroke two acute problems: the problem
of the unity-in-diversity of Being bequeathed in its insoluble f
formula upon philosophy by Parmenides; ana the problem of a pc ~
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positive clue to the determination of the transcendant attributes
of God. In the former case, being is conceived as unity unfolding
(9?)
itself in diverse ways and unequal degrees. That being should
so unfold itself without losing the specific character of unity
or identity pertaining to it, notwithstanding its diffusion in
the many, is a problem which we have settled in the perspective
of Neo-Platonism by invoking the two principles of the self-
diffusiveness of Being and the incommensurability of its infinite
perfection with its finite representations. Y.et when this meta¬
physical problem has been settled, a logical epistemological
problem remains to reckon with. Granted that the many flow from the
one, as their source and fountainhead, what, indeed, is the exact
relationship between these two terms to which the analogical
concept of Being refers: And considering the actual structure of
our consciousness and its grounding in experience, how does the
perception of the one, as the First Principle of things, come
about in the first place?
In the a prioristic* ontology of Plato and the Neo-Platonists
the determination of the existence and the reality of the infinite
calls for no account, since it is with this existence and reality
that ontology must set out. Rather does the existence of the
finite call for such an account, inasmuch as it lacks the character
of finality and absoluteness proper to the infinite. Of course
chronologically and psychologically the infinite and its existence
ate posterior to the finite, since they dawn upon consciousness, as
it were, at an ulterior stage in the philosopher's perception of
reality. This is the significance of the Platonic doctrine of
reminiscence, which concedes a purely relative reality to the
finite and employs it merely as a means to the discernment of the
infinite, a transitional stage in the journey leading thereto.
In an ontology, whose epistemological pre-suppositions are
f
aposterioistic or empirical, like that of Aristotle and Aquinas,
the philosopher must set out from the given reality of the
finite in his determination of the existence and the status of
the infinite. In this procedure, a whole elaborate method¬
ology must be erected, no doubt. The infinite must possess the
same predicates as the fiite, since no other predicates can be
discovered by our consciousness; but must possess them in a
transcendant manner, if the character of infinitude proper to
it is to be safeguarded. What warrants the oontention that even
at the point of their superlative perfection, these predicates
preserve their specific or qualitative identity is the faith in
the uniformity and consistency of the ontological order, as it
were. This faith can never be rationalized from the standpoint
of a purely empirical epistemology. To achieve this rational¬
ization, philosophy must necessarily turn to the Platonic
doctrine of participation; and transcend, as it were, the plane of
empirical presuppositions. Aristotelianism is capable of
achieving this rationalization with which the possibility of
metaphysics as a science is bound up, because it ismnot committed
i
to a pure empiricism.
It would seem that even for Platonism and Neo-Platonism the
affirmation of a law of 'ontological consistency or uniformity'
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governing the finite and the infinite remains an act of faith,
which cannot he fully rationalized. Aristotelianism has - at
least, the great merit of determining the existence ana the
reality of the infinite, from the standpoint of the given reality
of that which is with which it starts and upon which it erects
its metaphysical edifice. Thus it posits the infinite an the
'necessary condition' of the finite, whether the finite is
envisaged as an dntity in a process of motion or a term in the
series of causation, - without which the very given reality of the
finite would be totally inexplicable. But Aristotelianism achieves
this result by virtue of its conviction that its metaphysical
procedure is valid; a conviction which rests upon a tacit
admission that the laws:-' of being which it invokes in its demon¬
stration are valid throughout -, and this, finally, presupposes
an irreducible faith in the 'consistency' of the ontological
order.
It ought to be candidly confessed, therefore, if the
predicament of circular reasoning is to be avoided, that the
Aristotelian - Thomist doctrine of analogy, rests indisputably
on a Platonic - Neo-Platonic metaphysical groundwork. And this
is not surprising, neither in the case of Aristotle nor in the
case of Aquinas. Aristotle was the disciple of Plato, after all;
ana Aquinas achieves, as we have seen in the instance of his
»
doctrine of Being-qua-Act and Being-qua-Good-^ a synthesis between
the positive elements of Platonic idealism and Aristotelian
realism. V/hatever its metaphysical groundwork, analogy, it ought
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to be remarked, posits the inclusion of the finite and the infinite
in one category; and this it must do if it is ever to lay hold
of the elusive reality of the infinite. And in this its procedure
is not unjustifiable. For the denotation finite-infinite pre¬
supposes an element of unity, underlying the differentiation of
the two terras. This denotation is clearly a dimensional denotation
or,rather, a denotation which has regard to the respective
magnitudes of the finite and the infinite. Without an element of
of community between the finite and infinite, the very distinction
between them becomes unthinkable. Between two realities absolutely
distinct, no common term can be found; and therefore their very
distinction cannot be affirmed. So that in the admission of a
dimensional differentiation between the finite and the infinite,
there is latent a tacit perception of an element of community
in which they participate. This community, reduced to its bare
ontological minimum, is found to be one of bare existence -,
one must say of indeterminate existence, if the just pre-supposi
itions of negative theology v/hich. we have examined above are to
be met. This indeterminate existence dis the emptiest rational
category which can be predicated of the infinite; it is so empty
that nothing 'positive' is said in it about the infinite - since
such is impossible. One can understand here the profound motives
of speculative mysticism and Hegelianism in speaking of the
»
Absolute as the' coincidentia contradictorum' and ultimately
(98)
as the entity in which Being coincides with not-Being,
Now in the perception of an element of community between the
finite and the infinite we have demonstrated their participation
in a oommon category, the category of Being, without, however,
impairing in any way their irreducible distinction. This
distinction, which we have described as dimensional, entails a
relationship of dependence between the two terms. Need we repeat
here that the assertion of this relationship of dependence is
the positive contribution to ontology of Plato ana the ^eo-Plato-
nists. The associated doctrines of participation and emanation
state that the finite depends upon the infinite for its very
being; derives its being from the infinite; is tooted in it as
its ultimate ground and principle. And in this mode of dependence
we have the most decisive clue to the relationship between the
/
the finite and the infinite without whiclj a whole series' of
metaphysical problems would be left without any possibility of
settlement.
->£ *>n" *>{* ~/c *>c or ~/c •>$->(- ->£"
It might be wondered of what relevance to our major problem
is this' incursion into pure ontology. This surprise is not
unnatural. Yet the validity of the analogical method which we
have been examining can be defended only once the metaphysical
pre-suppositions upon which it rests are fully expounded. And
this is what we have been attempting, in the light of Platonism
and Neo-Platonism. With this remark we can resume our main
i '
discussion.
We have seen how the notion of the Act represents the
principle of Being as well as the principle of activity, in
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Aristotle and Aquinas. If things are and act,, in and through the
same ontological sign imprinted in their depths, as it were, then
things stand to each other in the point of being as in the point
bf action, in exactly the same relationship. In the former typ§
of relationship, we have discovered a clue to the existence of
an '_Ens Eealissimum', as the Fourth Way has shown. And this clue
was successfully pursued up to its terminal point in the infinite,
by virtue of our analogical conception of the matter. This
relationship had to be specified in such a way as to reserve to
the two terms (the finite and the infinite) their diversity
without thereby abolishing their community; that is,'their
participation in an 'identical concept'. In thus specifying
the relationship between, the finite and the infinite in their .
participation in the category of Being, we discovered the clue to
the solution of the Parmenidean dilemma of the one ana the many,
What gain can be expected now from applying the analogical method
to the second type of relationship between the finite and the
infinite? 1
The general character of the relationship between the finite
and the infinite has been described as one of dependence. For the
infinite was said to depend upon the infinite as its ground or
principle; or rather to flow from it as from its souroe. Our
analysis of the nature of this dependence fevealed that , by virtue
of its self-diffusive benevolence, the infinite communicates to
the finite, first, its being, and second, its dynamic energy.
And it is the latter 'gift' of the infinite that is called the
oo7
(99)
causality of the finite. The infinite is at the same time
Goodness, Being and Act. In inviting the finite to share in its
perfection, the infinite invites it at the same time to part¬
icipate in its goodness, being ana activity, through the same
movement of overflowing generosity. And in this is found the
ultimate justification of the causal dynamism of things. The
problem respecting the justifiability of predicating being of
the finite and the infinite is, thus, identical with the problem
of the justifiability of predicatingteing of both these terms.
Like the latter, this problem can be solved successfully only
in analogical terms. -- —
The aposterioristic approach to the first type of relation-
i
ship between the finite and the infinite (i.e*;: the relationship
of Being) - notwithstanding its grounding in the apriori doctrine
of participation - yielded us with the clue to the demonstration
of the existence of God, as Ens Realissimum. We should expect
that the second type of relationship - when considered from the
standpoint of its inferior or dependent term, via - the finite-
should yield us with a clue to the demonstration of the existence
of God, as First Cause. And this is, in point of fact, what it
actually does. Now the centrality of the second type of
relationship to Thornism can scarcely be exaggerated. The Fourth
'Way' which argues from grades of being is of Platonic origin and
i
assumes, in Thornism, a rainor„importance. The predilection of(100)
Aquinas for the argument from cause is unmistakable. We have
no intention of recapitulating here the argument from cause
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(second way) as given in the two summas. We can do no better
than send to these works or to the discussion of Garrigou
(101)
Lagrange, in God His Existence and Nature. What interests us
here is the fact that the Aristotelian-Thomist argument from cause
depends for its validity upon the validity of the causal principle,
as a law of Being qua Being; since otherv/ise the transition from
the creature to the creator would be unjustifiable. In defending
this validity against the attacks of scepticism we had to show
how causality, like being, is predicable of the finite and the
infinite by reason of the 'law of kinship' which binds them
together, in their relation one to the other as generated to
generator. And in this endeavour the Dionysian doctrine of the
self-diffusive character of the Good and the allied Platonic
doctrine of participation proved more than remunerating.
The ground on which Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arites, as we have
seen at length in the first and second chapters, repudiate the
causal principle is their pre-occupation with reserving' the
prerogative of activity to God alone. An agent, in the genuine
sense, they argue, must be omnipotent and omhiscient, that is,
must produce the totality of its effect and know the consequences
of its activity to their minutest detail. No created agent,
however, answers to these two conditions, because of the in¬
sufficiency of its power and the limitation of the scope of its
t *
consciousness. Ergo. God is the Sole Agent,, inasmuch as He alone
is omnipotent and omniscient. In the refutation of this occasion-
alist position two genuine, difficulties can be noted, with which
philosophy cannot decline to reckon. First : How indeed can the
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concept of activity be predicated of the creator and the creature,
when the Creator so far transcends the cEeature that no proportion
between them can be found?; and second;How can the absolute
power of the Almighty leave scope for the operation of secondary
agents in the production of natural effects.?
We have already resolved the latter difficulty, in the
perspective of Thomism. The possibility of a concurrent providence
C>f the Creator and the creature is not grounded in the insuffic¬
iency of the divine power, as occasionalism alleges; but rather
in the abundance of the di.vine love and the divine wisdom, God
permits the autonomous causality of the creature that thereby the
creature might communicate to other things the perfection it has
received from Him; and in this manner, share in the perfection of
the Almighty who is cause in the most pre-eminent sense. In this
way, His love and His generosity are manifested unto all things,
and through all things. And He .likewise entrusts secondary agents
with the execution of His providential designs that thereby the
beauty of order enjoined by the precepts of His wisdom might be
revealed, in and through the ordered hierarchy of inferior and
(102)
superior agents.
There remains the difficulty of the disproportionateness
between the First Cause and the series of secondary causes. This
disproportionateness, it would seem, makes the inclusion of the
Finite and the Infinite, of God and the creature, in the same
category of causality)totally unjustifiable. Like the difficulty
which we have encountered in examining the predicability of being
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to the finite and the infinite, this difficulty can be resolved
through the application to the concept cause of the analogical
method which we employed in settling the problem of the trans-
cendance of the infinite. When we speak of the creator as cause,
and the creature as cause, we mean the same thing: namely, am
entity which bestows being, in one or other of its aspects, upon
another entity. But we do not therewith mean the same thing, to
the same degree, or in the same proportion. For the causality of the
Creator reaches to the depths of things and summons them out of
the darkness of not-being; and thus confers upon them the character
of being, per se. And this is the exclusive prerogative of the
Almighty who of the inexhaustible plenitude of His infinite
(103)
perfection bestows being upon all things that are. Yet, 'how
is the inclusion of the power to bestow accidental being and
being per se under the same concept Justifiable' is seen, upon
close scrutiny,to resolve itself into the question; 'How can we
speak of being per accidens and being per se' in the same terms;
and include relative and absolute being under the same concept
of being?' This question, however, offers no difficulty except
for an ontology which fails to perceive the analogical character
of being. For were being a generic concept, then avowed ly this
inclusion would be altogether unjustifiable. In the order of
reality as we know it a genus manifests itself in determinate
forms, through the supervention upon it of specific differentiae.
If a member of that genus, possessing in a unity of self-
subsistence all the differentia^pertaining to that genus to a
superlative degree, were hypothetically assumed to exist, then
i
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it would be impossible to differentiate it, and as such, it can¬
not even be said to belong to the genus in question. Nor do we
know, in the order of reality, of an entity which possesses all
the positive perfections existing in all other genera. Now the
First rBeing is not only said to possess all the positive perfect¬
ions pertaining to all things to a superlative degree, but also
to be their veiy source and origin. Such an entity if it were
ever shown to exist, would be such as to be incapable of in-
(104)
elusion in any genus whatever.
God is First Cause, therefore, in an absolute sense; because
He alone can bestow the character of being, per se. Inasmuch as
other created things can. bestow upon other created things the
character of accidental being, by imparting to them their part¬
icipated perfections, to that extent they can be said to be
causes, albeit in a different proportion.
:v
Miracle and the Incommensurability of the Created Order with
'
- the Infinite Goodness of God.
he are now in. a position to settle the Averroist-Ghazalian
controversy over the question of rationalizing miracle. The radichl
motive of Averroes in dismissing miracle as philosophically
irrelevant, as we have seen, was his endeavour to save the unity
and integrity of the cosmic order. The admission of miracle,
Averroes alleges, threatens to impair this unity and this
integrity by driving a wedge, as it were, into the heart of the
cosmic order and deflecting the course of its uniform movement.
Al-Ghazali,on the other harid, in his endeavour to rationalize mir¬
acle, erects a metaphysical edifice in which, as we have seen, the.
miraculous can have no genuine role to play. All cosmic events, he
argues, come about through the direct and immediate intervention
of God. But if by the miraculous is meant the extraordinary and
heterogeneous intervention of the Deity in the cosmic sqphere, as
we have seen, then the manner in which every cosmic event comes
about is miraculous in precisely this sense. Instead of explaining
the extraordinary and unique character of miracle, as an instance
of the heterogeneous intervention of God in history with a view
to executing His providential designs, Al-Ghazali succeeds thus in
explaining miracle away by loading every historic event with the
<
Positive contents of the miraculous and the extraordinary.
In order to settle the problem of miracle successfully^
Philosophy must begin with stating the exact problem it proposes
to grapple with, whenever it is•confronted with the historic
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reality of miracle as an irreducible fact. Metaphysically speaking^
the problem of miracle raises two cognate problems with which
we ought now to wrestle. There is in the first place the problem
which the mirachlous raises with regard to he 'uniformity of God's
ways'j as dictated by the counsels of His wisdom. If this uniform¬
ity of God's ways is to be successfully interpreted in philo¬
sophic language, then a certain mode of necessity must he ascribed
to the cosmic order in its internal structure. A deistic world-
view, similar to that of Averroes, would naturally promise to
achieve this interpretation with positive success; but this it
does, like Naturalistic Determinism and Fatalism, at the cost of
the genuine reality of God's omnipotence and His sovereign role in
' ■ V
the universe, by reason of its conception of the absolute
autonomy of cosmic life.
Now if the omnipotence of G0d is conceded, in the interest
of a genuine conception of the divine perfection, as we have seen;
and if the rationality of His ways, as manifested in the uniform¬
ity of natural operations is conceded too, then: *How,*one might
ask in the second place, * can God do something outside the order
of His eternally ordained providence, without infringing the
rational unity of cosmic life and without violating the
(105)
irrevocable decrees of His wisdom?*
To resolve the -former problem, we must begin by determining
i
the exact mode of necessity which can be ascribed to he natural
order. A metaphysic of pure contingency has been surrendered, as
in the case of Ash'arite and Ghazalian occasionalism, on two
accounts: first, its misconception of the nature of Being in its
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relation to activity; and second, its derogation of the perfection
ofGod and of His sovereign wisdom. Yet the fate of a metaphysic
of absolute determinism, as thqt of Averroes, did not prove any
happier. Granted that our critique of these two types of
metaphysics is valid, at least as far as it goes, then we mus t
proceed now to a positivfe determination of the precise'modality'
which can be ascribed to the natural order -, unless our analysis
is to remain oh the plane of negative contentions.
In grappling with this problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles,
Aquinas seeks the roots of this •'modality' in a sphere which
borders upon the spheres of the two antithetic errors of pure
contingency and absolute determinism, but remains distinct from
both of them. As is customary to his dialectical procedure, he
(106)
begins by subjecting to severe scrutiny these two antithetic errors.
Determinism finds the roots of the absolute necessity it assigns
to the cosmic order in the indisputable reality of God's necessary
will of His own .essence. Yet determinism misconceives the nature
of this necessary self-volition in its relation to the created
order. ".Then this nature has been specified the twofold problem
of the mode of necessity which can be legitimately ascribed to
the created order and the problem of the possibility of God's
miraculous intervention into the course of His eternally-ordained
providence would be settled.
The divine will has the divine essence for its object and this
(107)
it wills of absolute necessity. Yet the striking aspect of the
matter is that, inasmuch as that essence comprises all things in
itself as their Principle or CQUBe, God wills other things in and
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(108)
through the same self-centered movement of self-volition. But
this'aspect' of His self-volition entails no necessity in God,
because creation adds nothing to the fullness of the divine essence.
This essence stands fulfilled since all eternity, so that creation
must be said to stand to the divine will in a position of utter
indeterminateness, 'Why should God have brought things into
being', can thus be answered in no other terms than the free and
gratuitous decree of divine love and generosity, God inMtes the
creation to share in His likeness that the boundlessness of His Good
ness might be communicatl! unto all things. And thus the divine
goodness is shared by all things through multiplication in the
(108)
multiplicity of good things.
In an emanationist metaphysics of the crude type, the twofold
movement of divine self-volition and of the volition of tother things
is represented as one.of 'natural necessity'or natural consequence.
Things are alleged to emanate from God as the rays emanate from
the sun, and water emanates from a stream. Yet clearly this
emanationist view endangers the reality of divine volition and
divine consciousness. If things were to emanate from God, by a
'necessity of nature'; then tHe would be unconscious of this
process of emanation transpiring within Him, as it were; if by
a 'necessity of knowledge' then He would be conscious of it,yet
would be powerless to bring it about or arrest it as His free
will decrees. And in both these assumptions- there inheres a
positive detraction of the divine perfection. To guard aga inst
this danger, we must affirm categorically that God acts fleely,
because He acts intelligently; and that, in creation as in all
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divine activity, there inheres a movement of free volition
(110)
grounded in the movement of divine wisdom.
It might be urged at this point that the necessary relation¬
ship in which creation stands to God might be rooted in the necess¬
ity of the divine justice if not in the necessity of the divine
nature. Yet this view is found, upon close examination, to hold
no greater promise of success. Prior to the existence of the
universe which was brought forth into being through the spontaneous
decree of the divine will, a 'debt of justice' incumbent upon
(111)
God is wholly unthinkable. In the point of its being, of its
incipiency, the creation stands to the divine will in a position
of utter indeterminateness. Outside the divine goodness, nothing
can be enjoined in the justification of God's decree to bring the
universe into being. With respect to that goodness that which
conduces tb its fulfillment might be said to be 'due' to it and,
(lis)
therefore, to be enjoined by justice. -Kit this clearly entails
a mode of necessity intrinsic to the movement of divine self-
volition rather than an extraneous necessity of compulsion, to
(113)
which the Almighty must necessarily succumb. The ultimate
ground of this necessity is the counsel of divine wisdom and the
(114)
immutability of His decrees. Inasmuch as the divine power is
not wanting in efficacy, a 'necessity of ordinance' might be found
to ensue upon the free decree of the Almighty to bEing the
(116)
universe into being. But this is, in fact, a 'conditional
necessity', or as Aquinas puts it elsewhere, a necessity of
(116)
supposition. If we start from the actual fact of creation - the
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fact namely, that God has actually brought the creation into being
and if we .recall the immutability of the divine will a..d the
irrevocability of His sovereign decrees, then the creation is in
found to be necessary, through the necessity of God's eternal
(117)
design to bring it into being. But here we are arguing back¬
ward from the fact of creation. If we abstract the actual fact
of creation and the condition of tine implied in this facty and
consider the creation in its relation to the divine will absolutely
then not even this 'necessity of supposition' can be admitted.
And hence, in an absolute sense, the creation stands to the
divine will in a position of utter contingency; or what amounts
to the same thing, creation depends on the sheer decree of the
Almighty, whose sole principle of determinacy is the divine
wisciom,
When we turn to the creation in itself, and subsequently to
the act in which it was brought forth, we can discover in it a
'necessity of causal order'. Prior to God's decree to bring the
creation about, of course, no causal order could be spoken of
(118)
except in relation to God as .First Cause. But in this relation
only a'necessity of supposition' was conceded, "ith regard to
the'causal order' pertaining to the multitude of things in their
relation to their causal (or essential) principles or in their
interrelation severally one to the other, we discover a threefold
(119)
mode of absolute necessity.
1. First, in relation to the being of the thing into which
the aforesaid essential principles enter as constituents thereof.
Thus owing to their composition of matter and form, composite
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bodies are corruptible of necessity. But in incomposite substances
(e.g.spparate substances) this corruptibility is not necessary,
2.Second, in relation to the parts of these principles
constituting the composite. Thus there is a necessity in relation
to matter and a necessity in relation to form in such composites.
For instance, with tespectito iheiformer, man who has a Imiqsed
body'must of necessity have the humours, elements and organs
indispensable to this body. With respect to the latter, he must
of necessity be a rational animal, since this is precisely the
'form' of man,
3.Third, in relation to the properties consequent upon the
matter or' form in the composite. Thus it is necessary that a
" \ \
saw be hard since it is made out of iron.
It is to be noticed that the type of 'causal necessity' out¬
lined above relates to the material and formal causes taken in
conjunction, as in the first case, or taken each separately, as in
the second and third cases. Causality is thus taken as the clue
to the determination of the exact mode of necessity which can
be legitimately ascribed to things. As would be naturally
expected, in addition to the necessity consequent upon the material
and formal causes, two other types of necessity pertaining to the
efficient ana final causes could be discovered. With respect to
the former, Aquinas distinguishes a necessity of 'action' and a
t
necessity of ^passion'.. The first of these types of necessity is
accidental, since the relation of the effect to the agent is like
the relation of accidents tothe essential principles from which
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(120)
they flow. For the effect to follovf necessarily upon the action
of the agent, two conditions must he fulfilled: potentiality to
receive in the patient and 'conquest1 of the patient by the agent.
If these two conditions are fulfilled absolutely and always,
there will be absolute necessity in the effieient cause: as in
those things which act necessarily and always. If, on the other
hand, owing to defective power or the hindrance of an extraneous
factor, these two conditions are not fulfilled, then this
(121)
necessity would not be absolute.
With regard to the final cause, a mode of 'finalistic deter-
in
rainism' can be found both in voluntary and natural agents.
In the latter case this determinism is consequent upon the
'form' proper to the agent; in the former upon ithe perception
of the end proposed to the will .'under the aspect of the good'.
The finalistic necessity which determines the activity of the
voluntary agent has scope only where the end is concerned.
Therefore it leaves the will undetermined as regards the means,
inasmuch as the fulfillment of an end necessarily proposed to
(122)
the will can be achieved in a variety of conceivable ways.
The ontological order, born of divine wisdom, no less than
divine power, is thus seBn to be an order which is determined
inwardly by the necessary causal laws pertaining too being. In
creating this order, the divine wisdom has enjoined that it should
i
be endowed with the perfection of being, and likewise with the
perfection of order and 'lawfulness'-, which pertains to genuine
being. It is true in this injunction the divine power has been
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freely curtailed; made to recede before the divine wisdom, as
it were: but only that it might yield thereby to the ordinance of
the divine love. And in this respect the curtailment here described
becomes a positive manifestation of the divine wisdom and love,
rather than of the powerlessness of the Almighty, In the same
way, the divine wisdom has conferred on things the character of
contingency - which is as proper to genuine being as necessity.
Thus God has permitted the operation of secondary contingent
causes: has receded before the creature, as it were, - that the
immensity of His love anu generosity might be manifested in the
(123)
most glaring way. And thus, in this ontological order, necessity
and contingency co-mingle and intertwine, revealing thereby the
fullness of the divine generosity and love, ' V
\/ \f \/ \/ */ N/ \/ \/ »/ W •/ \f
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In assigning the ultimate reason for creation, we found in
God's will of "Hiis goodness the ground of the exteriorization of
(124)
the divine will. This will, we said, id determined necessarily
by the divine goodness as.its object; but inasmuch as this goodness
stands in no need of anything extrinsic to it, owing to its
self-sufficiency, whatever exists outside it is found to stand to
it in a position of sheer superfluity. God, therefore, doe's not
will the creation of necessity, because it adds nothing to the
(125)
perfection of His essence.
i
Now if the ultimate reason of creation id the infinite
goodness of God, then any conceivable created order would be
incommensurable wifh this infinite goodness inasmuch as it can
never exhaust its infinite perfection. The possibility of solving
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the latter part of our problem is thus grounded in this very
incomroensurabiltiy between the infinite perfection of the divine
goodness and the finitude of any created order contrived by God.
Whether God can act outside the order of His providence is thus
seen to resolve itself into two cognate questions: whether God
can act freely; and whether in this free activity the divine will
and the divine intellect can extend beyond what was actually
decreed by the divine will. The former question has been
.answered in the affirmative.- TheifLatter question must now be
attended to.
The-mode of divine activity has been described as rational,
it* so far as the divine will was said to be determined by the
divine intellect in the production of its effects. But the divine
intellect -, which is one with the divine essence, embraces all
things, possible or real, as flowing from this essence by way of
(126)
likeness. It follows, therefore, that no degree of finite
perfection actually decreed by the divine will can exhaust the
fullness of the divine essence, in its infinity; nor consequently,
can it set any limits to the boundlessness of the creative insight
A (127)
of the Almighty. God can act outside the order of His
providence owing to the disproportionateness of the created order
with His infinite goodness and knowledge, without violating there¬
by the rational unity of His providence or transgressing against
i
the precepts of His sovereign goodness.
'But would not this account of the matter', the critic might
object, 'jeopardize the universality and the certainty of divine
providence?' The created order is said to depeDd exclusively on
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on the self-determined v;ill of the Almighty which is said to be
the' sufficient reason' of the specific structure in accordance with
which "this order was fashioned. 'Yet would not this amount to
surrendering the results of our previous analysis and reducing
the whole created order to the status of sheer contingency?'
To resolve this difficulty we have only to recall the exact
character of necessity which can be ascribed to this sorder, from
the standpoint of divine wisdom -, and the manner in which the
immanent 'causal necessity' of the created order is related to
(128T
the spontaneous determinism of the divine will, Considered in
itself, the created order is causally determined - in the manner
we have outlined above: the inferior in it depending upon the
superior and the superior determined bythe laws intrinsic to it.
Once this order is posited, it forthwith becomes subject to this
type of determinational pattern. But for it to be posited, in
the first place, a primordial condition must ne fulfilled: the
decree of the divine will. This divine will, as we have seen, is
determined by the laws of God 's inner unfoldment of His essence
in accordance with the immutable precepts of His wisdom. In this
respect nothing can be effected by the divine will which has not
been foreseen by the divine intellect. And this is the exact
sphere of divine providence -, a providence which has been
circumscribed by the divino will and the divine intellect since
t
all eternity. Considering the immutability of His v^ays, not even
the Almighty Himself is capable of effecting anything outsiae the
order of His eternally decreed providence, without violating the
rationality of His ways. Yet inasmuch as He is not bound by any
determinate order of creation, - especially with respect to the
initial establishment of things, He can legitimately be said to
be able to initiate a causal series which represents a positive
departure from the normally assigned course of events in nature
(129)
and this is what is signified by miracle.
To specify the manner in which this comes about, we must
consider,once more, the oarticular effect mn its relation to its
proximate cause, on the one hand; and to the ultimate cause on
the other. It must be avowed that normally an effecc comes about
through the agency of the proximate cause, which actualizes
its virtual potentialias. But the efficacy through-'which this
proximate cause is capable of actualizing its effect is itself
(130)
ultimately derived from the Universal Cause. Proximate agents .
stand to this cause as intermediaries or subordinates entrusted
with the execution of His sovereign orders. Yet there is nothing
to prevent this Universal Cause from intervening directly in
the course of natural events, and bringing about a certain effect
in a manner freely assigned by Him; dispensing thus with the
services of His subordinates, as it were; with a view to
(131)
manifesting His power or advancing His boveriegn designs.
If it is objected that this extraordinary intervention in
the normal course of events threatens the integrity of God's
providence and the immutability of His ways, it would be
i
fcetorted that miracle itself, as a positive departure from the
normal course of events, is contained in the order of God's
eternal providence; since nothing escapes God's eternal fore-
(152)
knowledge and fore-ordination or happens contrary thereto.
Within the eternal framework of that providence the miraculous
and the extraordinary have as much scope as the 'ordinary and the
natural, but never without it, since outside it there is
absolutely nothing. Ifit is further objected, on the other hand,
that God's freely ordained departure from the normal pattern
imposed upon things in the universe, would impair the unity and
the integrity of the natural order, it would be retorted that
such a contention rests upon a sheer misconception of the natural,
' ' *
We can describe as unnatural that which happens without reason
altogether, or contrary to its norm or principle. But that a
patient be acted upon by the First Agent, and thereby brought
forth from the state of potentiality to the state of actuality -
without the action of the proximate agent, involves no genuine
(133)
rational difficulty and violates no genuine rational principle.
God's disposition of certain agents directly and immediately
can be likened to the. disposition by the principal agent of an
instrument he has designed for a given purpose. Secondary
agents, being the instruments of God, might be moved by •dim
freely without violence either to their proper function or their
(134)
proper nature. Jith respect to the contention that this
departure inHLnges the norm or principle of the agent's natural
node of operation, it should be observed that the First.Norm
or Measure'of all things is God. Whatever norm or principle is im¬
planted in a thing by Him is natural to it. It is to the extent
an agent operates in conformity with this norm that its operation
is said to be natural. If it were,however, to operate otherwise
-245-
by reason of a novel 'principle or norm' imparted to it by God,
its operation would be natural for exactly the same reason: that
in and through its proper 'norm', it conforms frith the First
Measure of all things. Thus God might choose to effect certain
alterations in His workmanship, like an artist who retouches his
(135)
work of art, without thereby violating the laws of its nature}.
because whatever He. does is done in accordance with the counsel
of His wisdom which Is the measure of all natural things and the
(136)
ultimate principle of their rationality.
Thus the rational possibility of miracle is ultimately
reducible to the spontaneity of the divine will in its relation
to the order of secondary causes and in the incommensurability of
divine goodness with any determinate order of being, conceived
by the divine intellect and executed by the divine will. God
can work, outside the order of nature, in a manner exceeding the
(137)
powers of natural agents, because these agents derive from
Him the specific powers and the specific role normally assigned
to them. If He should freely decree to assign .to these agents
an extraordinary role dictated by the precepts of His sovereign
wisdom, then nothing can be legitimately adduced against His title
to dispose of His workmanship as He pleases for His greater glory
and for the advancement of His grand providential designs.
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Conclusion.
The analysis of the causal principle which we have attempted, in
the preceding pages, represents and endeavour to defend the
validity of causality against the sceptical claims of theistic
occasionalism. The radical error of occasionalism, as we have
seen, consists in its failure to perceive the positive significance
of causality for any genuine metaphysical, or theological world-
*
view. In its endeavour to safeguard the absolute uniqueness and
soveriegnty of God, bccasionalism strips the created order of the
positive ontologmcal predicates of genuine being, reserving them
exclusively to the Almighty. Yet, in the naiveness of it-©
enthusiasm, it fails to perceive that whatever threatens'the
solidity of the metaphysical substructure upon which it establishes
the cosmic throne of the Almighty, threatens in a similar manner
the solidity of that throne itself.
In substantiating this thesis, we were confronted with the
question:'In what sense does a positive conception of causality
contribute to the conception of the genuine perfection of the
ontological order? The examination of the causal principle has
revealed that causality affords us with the clue to determining
the precise relationship between the finite and the infinite,
between the creature and the Creator. This relationship has
(
been described as one of dependence. But instead of disputing
the reality of this dependence of the creature upon the Creator,
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occasionalism loads it with the character of absoluteness. And
that is precisely its ultimate motive in repudiating the reality
of the causal principle.'
To answer this question, we were led to determine the exact
status of causality as a predicate of the ontqlogical order. The
determination of this status, it will be recalled, rested on the
perception of a law of ontological fecundity rooted in the very
nature of Being, in its affiliation to the Good. The perfection
of the ontological order, we argued, demands that this order
should be conceived as dynamic, as pregnant with the virtualities
of its own sel£-propogation. An inert, ontological order,
howevermuch it might be found to 'depend' on its Author, is an
order which is deficient in this very quality; ana, therefore,
un order which is lifeless and barren. And it is on account og}
this barrenness that such an order is in the last analysis,
unworthy of the perfection and generosity of its Sovereign Au.'thor,
The question respecting the status of causality,'as con¬
tributing to the perfection of being, was.found, however, to be
distinct from the question respecting the positive validity of
causality as a genuine category of the ontological order. The
former question was concerned with the 'why' of causality: its
metaphysical justification as a genuine concept, from the stand¬
point of the perfection of the created order and the sovereignty
i
of its Author. The latter question, on the-other hand, was
concerned with the 'how' of causality: its phenomenological
status as a principle among other metaphysical principles. To
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determine this phenomenological status of causality, we had to
seek the roots of causality in Being. Being, we argued, utters
itself out in dynamic activity, by virtue of its munificent
character whereby it communicates its substantial perfection, cr
on the ana hand; and by virtue of its inner luminosity wherehy
it reveals its inner being, on the other. Were it not for this
self-revelaation, ^eing would remain bidden and mysterious.
The clue to this twofold self-revelatory character of Being was
discovered, it will be recalled, in the i>i.onysian Conception
of ^eing as Good and in the Aristotelian conception of Being as
Act. These two conceptions, as we have seen, had to be inte¬
grated into a synthetic conception of Being in its relation to
causality -, a task successfully achieved by Aquinas. '
The sceptical pre-suppositions of theistic occasionalism
had thus to be rejected on grounds inhering in the nature of
Being, on the one hand, and in grounds inhering in the nature of
knowledge, as the self-revelation of Being, on the other. The
strength of the occasionalist case consisted in its apparent
success in emptying the ontological order of any causal content,
ana confining causality to the unique relationship between the
universe and its First Cause. Yet the latter aspect of its
solution of the causal problem was found to conflict with the
former, so that the validity of causality, as a predicate of
i
the order of Being, had to be restored thrpugh the extension
of the allegedly unique relationship between the Creator and
the creature to the whole ontological order, by pronouncing it
-249- '
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a category of Being qua Being, In this endeavour two genuine
difficulties had to be met: the validity of the allegedlyy
necessary relationship between ^eing and causality, and the
legitimacy of the inclusion of the Creator and the creature in
the same causal category. The latter of these two difficulties
was resolved from the stand-point of Thomism, through the ana¬
logical conception of Being and causality -, a conception which
found the clue to the legitimacy of predicating Being and
causality of the finite and the infinite in a law of 'ontological
kinship' between them, which left unaffected the 'order of
eminence' in which they stood one to the other and the dimensional
discrepancy between them. The former difficulty was resolved in
terms of a metaphysic of Being whose foremost ontological predicate
was that of dynamic' energy.
As a predicate of the ontological order, causality was thus
seen to represent a positive sign of the perfection of Being,
conceived as vital and dynamic. But there was another Espect in
which causality was found to represent an^ indirect sign of this
perfection in the logical order itself. Causality,it was shown,
is not only a quality of Being; it is likewise a nexus between
conditions or entities, hypothetical or real. The occasionalist
metaphysics of contingent Being, as we have seen, destroys at
one stroke the character of causality both as a positive onto¬
logical quality and a necessary logical nexus. This is Jgow Al-
Ghazali refuses to concede the validity of the category of
necessity, outside the order of abstract logical relations.
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Having emptied the order of Being of any inner dynamism, he is
inescapably committed to an epistemology in which real entitled
can only be represented in unrelate isolation. It follows, on
his argument, that no transition from one order, of reality ( the
order of effects ) to another order ( the order of causes ) is
possible. Such a transition is possible only in the realm of
abstract concepts.
The error of Al-Ghazali in this procedure consists, as we
have seen, in his failure to perceive that the very validity of
necessary logical relations, in the order of thought, rests on
the validity of these relations, in the order of being, to which
the former must correspond, if they are to remain genuine relations.
These logical relations are ultimately grounded, as Maimonedes
shrewdly perceived, in the generic structure of the real, rather
than in the representations of the imagination. And it is on the
former that the human intellect feeds, as it were, rather than the
latter.
A causally-related order of -^eing bespeaks the perfection of
Being, inasmuch as it conceives of the members of this order as
bound up by a law of ontological kinship. It is, of course,
difficult to grasp how a universe of truly unrelated entities can
be imagined to exist; since every entity in such a universe would
constitute a world of its own with its own laws ana its own
c
processes. The continuity of cosmic life would become altogether
unthinkable, on this hypothesis; as indeed the concurrence of any
series of cosmic conditions; and things would stand in jealous
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aloofness one from the other. Although occasionalism concedes the
validity of a series of necessary logical relations - to which
there must correspond a parallel series of real ontological
relations in which the former are rooted, it nevertheless re¬
pudiates the reality and necessity of the causal nexus, ^et the
causal nexus, whether its necessity is conceded or not, is the
only positive relation in which the 'jealous aloofness' of things
can be surmounted, inasmuch as real entities are said to go
beyond themselves, to issue out of themselves, as it were, only
in this mode of dynamic communication of self. And here we
find ourselves,at our initial starting-point: causality is
ultimately grounded in the self-diffusive character of Being.
~Ar -)c ur ->f vr -/c ->f ->$■ -)$■ ->(- '
There remains on4final question to settle. Causality has
been vindicated as a concept whose toots lie in.the metaphysical
sphere. The repudiation of causality by scepticism, as in the
case of Hume, is bound up, however, with the repudiation of the
possibility of metaphysical knowledge. The necessity of the
causal nexus, as an a priori category, is rejected on the grounds
that no positive a priori categori«can apply to the empirical
realm, even if such are said to exist. Although it is beyond
the scope of the present discussion, it can be shown successfully
\
that the hKantian retort to Hume cannot be accepted as final.
For Aant refuses to concede the metaphysical validity of causality,
notwithstanding his admission of its validity as a transcendental
a priori concept, which like all transcendental concepts^can.
apply to the empirical realm, without forfeiting its a priori
extraction. The metaphysical validity of causality, however, can-
rot be surrendered on two major accounts: First, the significance
of causality as a clue to the existence of God is bound up with
its validity as a metaphysical concept. l£ant surrenders the
* l
causal concept in the demonstration of the existence of God in
the Fourth Antinomy of Pure.Reason on precisely this score: that
causality is vali d only as a itranscendental concept. Second,-
a complete refutation of scepticism is impossible, except in the
perspective of a positive vindication of the possibilty of
metaphysics as a science, in which the causal'principle must
play a decisive role. In this respect the endeavour of Sant to
disprove the sceptical pre-suppositions of Hume amounts to
meeting Humean scepticism half-way. The positive validation
of metaphysics as a science,is, of course, beyond the scope of
\
the present essay. That is why it did not figure in the fore¬
going discussion, save to a minor extent. Nor did the tTtheological
starting-point of our problem make the treatment of this question
imperative, For theistic occasionalism, despite its sceptical
assumptions, pre-supposes tacitly the validity of its own meta¬
physical procedure in positing God, as the First Principle of
things. And however false its conception of the nature of
metaphysical knowledge, the critical question respecting the
»
validity and scope of metaphysics is not an issue which criticism
must imperatively join with sceptical occasionalism.
.With this the thread of the argument can be relinquished.
The limited scope of our initial problem having been compassed
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we can leave the latter problem with no further effort to
settle it. Scepticism, we believe, can be silenced only once
this is successfully and completely achieved. But the present
essay was not designed as a complete and final refutation of
scepticism. Any positive success achieved in our foregoing
endeavour to validate the causal principle, it is true, would
naturally weaken the sceptical position. Yet the task of
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Ibanah, PP. 54 ff.
For an account of Orthodox Ash'arite teaching in general on this
question: cf'.Baghdad! - Usui ud-Difi, BP.88-93.
AlsoiAsh-Shahrastani, - wihayat al-i^dam.PP.180 ff.
In Milal, Ash-Shahrastanl relates th&t Al-Ash'ari was categorical
over the reality of God1 s attributes as subsisting in "is .being
.. . f .. to<-
G C' iw ). «s to the mode of this subsistence, positively
leaned towards an agnostic view according to whahrastani:
J&yt ^ ^ •. J l5u.(L.clt .p.67, also
[P.65 where the doctrine of (blla kaifa^Oitno queries) is
underl ined.
t-32) cf. Q,.VI of Tahafut (PP.163 - 172), where ^l-iihazall engages
in a polemic against the philosophers and the uau'tazilites over
their doctrine of identity of essence and attributes in God.
r*
also.PP.149-162. on his opting for an agnostic view, cf.PP.180-1
{33j The 'Book of the fundamentals of gellef'- in Vol.! of
ihiya" . cf.B.79
a
l34) Al-Ghazali goes on, developing the same theme, in an
eloquent manner*
V J <■ O ^ CU ^ -C ) , ... ^ I^ . y '
c c ^ j | o>
v" '' T" " >» "
c O ^—j> J,y t y ^ i <: J«-) ^ c
•> ( , ^ ^ . 0 I • *
&
J J C-"£x-> ^ ^ J J O** ^ }
(9)
y, XJJ ^ f vi. u>
0y Jy ^ ^ ( A' _✓* vi ^ A,—l/* I t ^ !».
m 1 %# * I % ^ \ *
*u-j y j C-f s—^ ^ ^
v% ^ - > 1 ^
yy . <iT>y L? *~L io <•> o^ ;'--^» W^ J
y j fuJ'<> V^ C'l »u y uv>, y*
^U^L.1 os' y '•yy
j^-y t> 1y "o^ >- o^j/0> r1 ~^ "y y - V
<ov_/> u? yCy <f c^> u>, J> y y iy y »ty--"'
<7 ;^ \? ~y\"y ? iZs>-> J>y <- >>- I _»y-> w^6 *--* *S \ t?
yC^, 'tf'yl'1- 1 ^ ~ ' L O W ! I * f *1 f» i ^ 1 A J K . . . Ay l/ . . • .w/ J ^ IV . y -
J-:
• ' <x<«^t>OO- «yiv jL (yy 0 c» ✓ ^""^V ^ k> 1 w-- >s J _
(35) This is the substance of the ' five Contentions' which «1-
uhazali states dogmatically and emphatically as part of the
orthodox creed in I^tisad, (pp.73-9). uere is the text*
' . ► - «-
^
NJ>^. <J<o> jy y-y * •. *
cA-A? fl/-^ \>\_s c (V^ O » aX> jylo- \>tj L 4j-«- tor )j CZ^J o^*
^ ' " »* • . %»
. . / /lAj. U-f L>
j/-'< C. L U^'yc (/y/l J-*v^'c/^ vJt *>" Cy> <y^,' .
I^V-yj '•• ^fWc^iol ; ^JU. r>L
0 I i- i O^' ^ ^ X^> C yj v_Cji ^ y, ; ,'-^ -l—> c> •
W .^ iiT- ^ vy), e yW ' V^ 1
Wr-^'O V U ' '
(La-u j> . uG ^, u (Jci oyT d>) <y) c/^joo U ...
y^L/ Vj .. . \-J \ ^IjC _Aiy) Iho . fy^UL^J rixCb'
Qu- ^ ^ » k> . » v ,
cZ>^ -dZo ^-> o* ^ U )
/ & / t
".0^^) -shj> (J>j yo. ^ 1 y J 1 I ^
[.. y 1. _A » • ". ^ , *-^Cj ' -W ^ V ^j; CL»-^ ^c-^-e^O I ^ _v
I ( II Vo» U ) 0» ^ ^_e ' Zf-
110) 1
C? y-V* ^(_y-Xj^ ^>^P"rf2/sx ^ >~<t~A' i-* -A>* ^ y O. J-Axj t V«L> L» ^J~c>_»
t k~s& (r *SrsJ\ - •• ^vVfc, ^j,<jL> (
('V^1 i C-^ O^O- <—■'\A^ A^ls- *—£ ^ o jJ*{} u ^ 1>\ tSU;
^ SA* f> fr>^y ie"
• a> c-c Ia* -v» > • <-^ H2" vr^u-> ^J*^^
-«.>» \L/Uv\>s * cU> CUJ.< CL^Joj
(36) Igtlsad, P.84, cf. oupra ? 3<5"it e . | ", G-Ap/>*">
/. ; ' .
i37; ibid. - *.83.
(38) ibid. ~i
(39; Met.BklCii',7 „/*.V® 7* £ .
(40) ethics, Bk.^C., 7 , P. HI 1 *•
- """i .' • ' V
I■ • i,i) ^ >^y) O/ j ^ i \ O^jJ> *<
(41) Igtlsad, p.83. ^ -
V '. . . \J^~ Sr^S cAt v^j) ✓
*^ ^ •
(sh. uod'a arbitrary flat)
(42) al-Lrhazali is very critical of the peripatetic conception
of &od as 'thought thinking Itself' (lntellectus lntelllgans
intellectum). (expounded iahafut, pp.154-5* and 173t*4), because
it entails a limitation of uod's knowledge to the sphere of selfhood.
a
Aocoffing at this thesis he writes: OI o>< j* i (/?/-?(*
<^1,$ k yUfl J ^ u.,—' J. —' _>-"1'
£* .xAx- L? vjLL I > ? ^Afc Oy ( c—11 Oyj> *°~y
p. 112. " °y^r "V1
The same difficulty of specifying the notion of divine life
is encountered by uaghdadi in his attempts to state the urthodox
doctrine on this question;
f ^ (J
xhat he does not in this manner succedd in proceeding beyond
'negative concepts' is shown by this conditional proposition:
C- o u> )•^ o U \>^ t. ^ v u> £W ">> «
LiSnf >j- D< n; "7<>S '' Ui» ^ iAt v1 ^ t' ^c
whereby life is reduced to an 'inferencial notion'.
(43; The theme of u-dd's all- circumscribing knowledge recurs
very frequently in #1-Ghafflali' s works:
cf.,for instance, Ihiya', -coIaI , p.79.
(44; Depending on whether the existence of the said'extrinsic
agency' is admitted or not.
* '
\45; in xahafut, £.377, Al-uhazali brings out the agreement
of the T?erlpa^etics and the Mu'tazilites on the question of causal
efficacy: *
^ *■ ^ - • I
As-ohahrastanl (Mila&{ p.52.; finds the same identity between
the teaching of the Jahizites (Mu'tazilltes; and the philosophers',
ne TOltos: ^ ^ If'
. * v i- u>' o—u>iJ
On the mutazilite doctrine of xawallud (generation and its
origins) cf. xnfra, ch.XI, pP.^tff.
,j >o<?o^w o^o(46; jr-<—-
, _ A , r' o 1 - VAJlJ ^rahafut, p.279
^47; it is well-known that this is the problem which pre-occupied
^ume and Kant and which le/d ifent to enquire into the grounds
I
U2>
of the possibility of 1 synthetic Judgments a priori' in the First
critique. ^1-vjhazali writes on the contingency of empirlbal
Judgments; I "
V O^cAC- o V—- ^
lahafut.r.318
ihis inductive procedure j f he adds, cannot "furnish us
with reliable certainty, but only mere conjecture. P.319
n - ii
\48) Ahis is the text of this difficultly rendered passage;
^yfJjUc; Y^^ J V; If (j yT o' ^ ^"
vii h/ 'y u y>-£*»-'6
2^,V. (p. a- o ,"o U^L> t> V ^
\49; ihe dator formarum ^ar.wahibus - suwa r, is the separate
» »
♦ i
intelligence, wnich in tne «eo-Platonic scheme confers forms on
material things. The doctrine is attributed to nvicenna and was
well-known to the scholastics. ,
150) Infra.Ch.II, SAc.t.Jv





(54) Creative Determinism is rejected by Thomas Aquinas (S.Theol.
la, Q.19, arts. 2&3, s. cont .U-ent. Bk.II, chs. 2,CL3, 24, uc ~ t.r.ti
&e.pc>Y>
B&.I, chs.80 -83)1 Q.Ill, art.15— y on grounds not unlike those on
which Al-Ghazali rejects it. it is significant, however, (and
this is the issue which ultimately divides the Thomist and
(13)
Shazalian metaphysics) that Aquinas reserves a mode of determinism
to the creative act of uod, in the name of divine wisdom and lwve;
and this is God's necessary volition of ^is goodnesB - in and
through which things are created.
155) Tahafut, PP.96-7
Ibid.P .96. cf. also PI
v57) Ibid.P .102. ,
(58) Ibid.P.103'
(59) '^he emanationist weo-Platonic scheme is rejected by al-
Ghazali on the following grounds: 1
1. its failure to account for multiplicity and composition
In the universe.
2. Its admission of plurality in the First Intelligence
can legitimately be applied to the one, thus vitiating its
monistic presuppositions.
3. amanatlonism cannot bridge the gap between the one
and the multiple; hence it is imperative to assume a free
agent who creates whatever he wishes a doctrine taught by





^6l) Ibid.r.132. The relevance of this citation from nadith,
which recurs in the discission of ^od"s attributes (Tahafut P.180)





in the same agnostic Con+*C"rtf;ls to repudiate the demonstrabillty
of the mode of Creation and the manner 1 n which the Blvine Being
chooses to unfold nis will.
(62) Al-Ghazall writes In developing this objection to his thesis:
(^-5 ° -> ^ 1 ^ C)j> U, ' ^ U^-JL t
"* v'
v ^ | • '
y C c. y^> *s c/-*-*1 ^ c3" y
*V>^w—- V cAU_o ^ "eJu^C_^ O jA' j» ly? f t___ A- O* O >> O *
. », • " , ^ — - ' , ~
• A) <L- ^ ^ rjiXs (_✓—(J u» tp!/- y _^o ? ^—y 1 ^ —'
c^^ ^ t_jC^ o/oi ^ Sf L t*^ *
i^U-p<> ^»u '
cJ> u) ^Ax) </JJ^ 6 * C—J1 cp u y,j>*V o »
o—J ^ -*O^AP * ♦ • o—~y C-^ ^ +X-tJ a c CJ ''—*"* cp y
O ) ^ yoJycU-* 0" <_)" 0~» <v*-^ O' t~^<J I • > G-i»
. civ7 (A-° ^ >T ^ ^ 4—c (^* s t<-—•' cJm^kjj t Xjr~"cl»
(63) Igtisad,"> P.39. - Al- ®hazali writes: ' -
^ f Cyc^J> ^ <tA-~s *r o^SjJ t ci^ LLJ ^ °
V yJ) I ,ZJ, c cU
. 1— / j t/\s 4s *yy L_VjC ' o N <y-y y^>« ^ ^
(64)
? XJ>^ o~—J t>^> ^ , , ^Pjc* S J> ^A-5" d ' O V vV
t.4A »l j>^ ^ <uuu«' £p cr~—O- c>
t p (' J^y \ '^£©(71 J. >/ f -*^> l«J' ^ (-* C~d^^s\
The Thomist teaching on this question Is Identical with "1-Ghazall1s,




De Potentia. QI, arts., Ill, IV^
\
(15)
(65) Tahafut, PP.292-6. cf.supra P. zzff-
For the conflicting theories of the mutakallims on this question,
cf. infra
(66) cf. I'ahafut. p.285. This, as * can construe it, is the
Import of £he following obscure passage:
167) The instance which ^l-Ghazali here cites is the instance of
the uninstructed ( whose intuitive faculty might become so
acute that he isuable to partake of the 'prophetic sense( and the
faculty of prognostication, alluding to the philosophers' admission
of such a possibility, he.argues that uod might bring about that
this should come to pass. "The ^Ixilosophers' proviso that such has
not actually occurrd does not Invalidate this claim since its
logical possibility has been conceded. - cf . iahafut .P .286 .
it should be noted here that *1- Ghazali's theory of a
contemporaneous creation of the event and the Judgment about the
'
event in human consciousness proves tin t his occasionalism is not
limited to the natural, but extends also to the epistemological
r
• • iV > "
spheres. Note •»l-uhazali's own phraseja:t-?, -lb.P.285
t <-z»OI'
168) The reference is to Abraham, who, according to Koranic
Edition, was cast into the fire but came out uninjured.
<!
(16)
(69) ,JL'he Instance which ^1-Ghazali cites in illustrating the poimt
is that ofthe metamorphosis of the animal through the following
phases;
Earth gives rise to vegetation; vegetation, upon consumption
by the animal, to blood; blood to semen; semen to the animal,
"The normal process takes place throughout a given lapse of time,"
he writes, "The opponent cannot uphold the claim that it is
impossible for God to transmute matter through these phases in a
shorter lapse of tlme....unve it is conceded that a shorter duration
is possible, there is no assignable limit to the shortest
so that these faculties (sc. of the natural elements) are speeded
up in th&ir operation and thus the miracle comes to pass."
Tahafut, r.288.
(70) cf. Tahafut, PP.274-5, and supra P. 17-
(71) xahafut, p.290. The 'primary causes' are the Intelligences or
the angels, of which the 1 dator formarum* is here in question.
(72) Al-uhazali cites here the example of sorcerers who have
succedded "in combining the heavenly powers with the mineral
properties" in such wise as to dispel snakes, scorpions and bugs
from whole towns. - ibid.P.291
173) Ibid. p.291
(74)








_ * -wi LSK -J'-yo1^ ^oj, c »
»P '• / . P- "*■ ' 7 ~ ft
(3) Schmolders - jissal, P.190
(4) cf. ue Boer « Hist, of Phil, in islam, PP-.44-46
in the prologue to Milal, Shahrastani (an;.&sh'arite) relates
\v »
that the 'first controversy1 ( to arise in Creation was that
of Satan (Iblis) and his rebellion against Cod's authority.
J'L^, j G (LVfrt 0^/ c'V uA ^1 C-A— t_r» c ^ ^ "
>X3_J , ^ C/-J v\J (> P I ^*2^* ^ ,^c
" -X*- 1 aJ> ( v c/c AF» ) v
than follow the 'seven queries' directed to cod over the "wisdom
in creating him (sc.Iblis) in order to sin as foreknown by c0d"
I- L.clt. PP. 5-7From this ohahrastani goe s on to argue that "the Insistence of
tha advocates of free-will ( the Qadarites) on akking for the reason
I'lllah) for everything is an insinuation of the devil;(N> op*-^) who
J->>•"
&aked for the reason for creation and the prudence of obligation
<jand the benefit of prostrating himself to Aolam" .Ibid.8-$
ihis is how "Shahrastani further on contrasts the orthodox with the




KJ j« *>J Vjr-P ^ C? cj —» JS? 4. ^ c *2 to ' CP
1 (J~& \ >../> j ... . Cy- j )\> / J?
f s 9 ^ ^ ^ ^ . p t ( * '* '
th?1' OJK* j> <Xl-. <. > n- 1 to ' CP <J (A (X
^ y> ^ ^ ^J\^ c Jj|; f ^
(.y I ! O) ^ ^c> ) uAa >. t_Xr£->' CP ^ >
» ,/, -U» ^ c"rA_sT 'cJ—
(5)
(18)
supra, P. 3 ^
(6) Nlhayatul-j.^d-qm fi * Ilm il-Kalam, P .370
(7) The same teaching Is expounded by Baghdad1 - Usui ud-uin,
'
PP.24 ff, 202-5
, Juwayni , irshad, PP.138-154«
(8) Nihayat, PP.372^4




UO) cf. ohahrastani - Hllal, p.31 «. „ ...
CIj>> j> Cs—^U-It ^ I >'-> o—• 4-®" ''
1 ci c/^uw od>"t i '■p**
, V) cJj>> i .? C ' — ' *
i '
On the teaching of the Hudhallte sect (MU'tazilite) regarding the
possibility of rational knowledge of *»od and the moral law, through
demonstration and prior to revelation, cf. Ibid, P.36; cf.P.55 for
the Juba'lte and Bahshamiyyaln sects.
111) &hahrastanl - j.nlhayat, pP.374-5
112) ibid. P.375
(13) Ibid. p.375 - 7
(14) Shahrastanl relates that It Is part of Ash'arl's teaching
that ''obligation bests on authority. Reason enjoins nothing as
binding; i.e.:as reprehensible of commendable ... not even the very
notion of obligation"- Milal. PP.73-4 ><.
Baghdad! writes on the same Ash'arifce teaching.
(19)
J J ^C?L<rkj>' .? 0 U^Jv^O- >»-JJ („ ) \\
■*"
■ ' " » •
Usui ud-uiu, P.24. cf. also PP.2u2-5
That punishment and reward are coeval with the predication of the
law according to ash'arl, Malik, ohaf 1' 1, ibn-nanbal and ^hluz-
• j
< Zahln, etc.cf.xbid.p.25 and rP.202-3.
ihat on these premissAs, G-ot^ould have enjoined what he has
prohibited or vice versa, cf.xbid.PP .213 ff.
(/]} „Jj>, ^ o^_p I J^ c» oL> y tOl cJ l>j 1 C n
/' J 0- cry u 1 jJ j, J, ip- 1 ^
ibid. P.213.
wn the same ^sh'arlte teaching on the justification of obedience
to the law. cf ijuwayni, Trsjnad, PP.138 ff.
(15) Supra,p. ^3
On the same conception of righteousness as conformity to the
command of a superior, cf .Ash^ ari, Ibanah 'an Usui id-^iyanbk^P-65.
* •
un the illegitimacy of attributing 'vanity'(Safah) to God, in
whatever He pleases to do, £f. xbid .
On impredicabllity of injustice to trod, according to ash'ari's
teaching, cf. Shahrastani, - wiilal, P.73
It must be noted in this context that al-ASh'ari and the Ash'aAite
school, in general, adduce a third argument in support of the
lmpredicabillty of injustice and evil to God-, the argument namely
that the cause of injustice and evil needs not be unjust or evil
1
himself, as the 'cause of conception is not said to b^regnant
himself1.- cf. Ash'ar1-Maqalatul - lslamiyyia, P.554 ( the reference
e
is actually to Mu'ammar ( a QadarUbe;. cf. also -bhahrastani,
Nihayat, P.251.
(20)
It will b e shown later that this teaching violates the principle
of analogy, In regard to the concept of cause and that of attributes
generally, as predicated of the creator and the creature. It
also militates against the attempt to qualify the creator In any
way -, a task which, as we have seen, is fundamental to Ash'arlte
teaching regarding divine attributes.
• • • ' i
\
(16) cf. Ibanah, tP. 60-2; Milal,P.72
Ash'ari writes • in Macplat, P.552:
y (J I s~ Lt> ^ e O '
- ?/
compare Al-Ghazall's definition of ^udwah (power) in Igtisad,
P.39, with the Ash'arite conception.
" . 1 '
(17 ) 'Kun' - fiat.
(18) Ibanah, p .9
(19) On will - cf. ibanah, PP.60 ff.
on predestination, P-P.67-8
on capacity (Istita'ah) P.69.
* •
(2.0-) ohahrastani sums up ASh'ari'a teaching on obligation in the
fl
following way:
a. All obligation rests upon theexpliclt enunciation of revelation
(sam' )








fully legitimate, por "9e::is not answerable about his deeds but
thou art" - Koran 2- ; ^ ^ '
cf. Mllal, pP.73-4
(21) supra PP.69-71
The former Is the teaching of the Mu'tazilah, the latter that of the
Philosophers.
(22) Nihayat, P.381
(23) Ibid. PP .381-4
and pP. 397-9
124) Nihayat, P.401
x'he Mu'tazilah adduced another reason for creation and
obligation, namely: the"enjoyment of the bliss of rewarding the
pious" by God - P.403
($ ) Ibid. Pp.401 -404.
)
cf. also - uaghdadi - Usui ud-0in, P.150
(26) Op. cit. PP.140 -5
(27) Ibid. P.150
In the same contest ^l-Baghdadi sets himself in (Opposition to
the Qadarites and the Karramltes - the former because 'they contended
that Lrod was bound necessarily to create the animate and the inanimate
the gpdly and the ungodly', the latter because they1enjoin that
God's first creature should be a living being.'
As a pernicious thesis, he also cites the mu'tazilite view
(22)
thst God was 'bound to create ( the creatures) that they might
worship and thank riim' .
The issue as to whether a reason can be assigned to God's act5
was discussed in ash'arite-Mu'tazilite circles under this problem:
•whether God must needs have regard to the fittest1 in effecting
his providential design s - ohahrastani devotes a whold chapter
(ch.l8l of wihayat al-Iqdam ) to this .question: S' ^^
Juwayni rebuts the contentions of the ^u'taniiah along similar lines
in a section entltled(^^]?£>l^^,>>jV)Xrshad, PP.165 - 174- #ote the
persistenjs appeal to the gratuitous and arbitrary character of. God's
acts.
(28) cf.Ibid. p. 24 ff, and PP.31-2. uaghdadi sums up the teaching
of the orthodox (Ash'arites) On this question in this way:
J Js j> s J U^J/' «— t G : L. \ST° ',J (J
_r % . • ' •
L I <X- .<>_> (~£- cA-C- cP" >A «-h' "■ j
>' Ji^ i? ->V ^ -A * . f^j> j> fl/J' O^—/ (• j>1 i>
^ I I • «—
ts^~ 0—c ^7yCy^ j> (^VJt<Js ^—> I
V I * ^ ' i , v
^ V' 7 tr—" j L//^ tp 1 t>o > . o o lJ
A I- uc ^ jS ;;y ) c>L> pIjO ^ U Ji/>. ap- 1 cA* U L>*
"U-L^hcA-O (i I '— v luD .0 "... Ji.V. /7,1-K * ^ ^
cf. also, Suwaibrri, irshad, PP.138 - 9... *\C^ "]41> I, ( <u*J£*P 'cA*- *4/ v- U i
, P'Vf . Vv'
^29) 0n the ash'arite teaching on this piint:
cf. Juwapri, Irshad, rP. 160 -5- Mote Juwayni b polemic against
tlf"Ldu'tazilah over the 'remuneration1 of the innocent for the
suffering they undergo in this life.
V 30 > supra r . 3 if/-
smop
(23)
(31) cf. PP. 24-25 and pp. 240 - 1.
The account of punishment and re ward as consequent on the
predication of the law la attributed by naghdadi to al-Ash'ari,
Malik, ash-Shafi' 1, Al-Awza'i, Ibn Hanbal, and the collective sect
of Ahluz-4ahir, etc. Ibid.P.25.
I
I' (32) Man, they said, is; Khali^U af'alihl s cf. bhahrastani, Milal
p.30.
cf. also, ash(arl - xbanah, P.6. - when'ash'ari calls the
iiu'tazilah 'the Manicheefa'of Islam (Majus), because they affirm
'two creators' - a theme which recurs in Ash'arite writers,
cf. too, ibid. PP.73 ff. X>-
(33) Ibanah, P.9
(34) cf. Juwaynl, xrshad, PP.106 ff.
|
(35) Ihiya' , IV, P. 5 and 6
(36) Milal , P.60. ' •
Shahrastanl1s definition of Jabriyyah as / the impredicability
. • 1
of real activity of the creature and its attribution to God" -
brings out the extremist character cf this school. Ibid.P.59
Jahm b. oafwan is reported by ohahrastani to have taught
1. ihat human predicates do not apply to @od, nor divine
predicates to man.
2. ihat capacity and activity are impredicable of man
except figuratively as they are of things and elements.
3. j.hat obligation.v Taki^f reward and punishment are compulsory
Uabr;. - Ibid. rP.60 -61.
(24)
I
on same school cf. Ash'ari - maqalat, PP. 379 - 80
(37) in his argument with $rhe .^adarittes, phahrastani briig s this
distinction "between reference (Ta'alluq) to the agent and efficacy
(Ta'thAtf*) as the Issue of the controversy. Speaking in the mouth
of his critics, he writes: s ^ .
A o> £A ■;
yj/p! tr -^U~" A*"* ° °
I
" yC 1 to1 fc*
Nihayat, P.72. —
(38) bhahrastanl'- Nihayat, p-P. ?2-6
Shahrastani hitoself speaks approvingly of this thesis of al-
| Baqilani which he seeks to reconcile with the thesis of the Ash'aii
*
Who did not concede aby efficacy to the human faculty at'all: wither
with respect to r>elng per se or to any of the attributes of oeing"
Ibid.P.72. F~or Baqilani's theory cf. also Milal P.69.
(39J Khalq (creation) is difined as the "production of the effect;
by its author", Kasb, as the 'reference of the contingent agent
(Qudrah hadithahj to a possible (maqdur) .M The former has for its
principle the postulate that the author is not "effected by the
production, "and as its condition that "the author is conscious
of it in all its aspects." The principle of the latter is that the
two refernts ( the acquirer and the acquired) are mutuxally
affected, so as to deBive a quality ( sifat), one from the other;
( •
its condition is that the agent is conscious 'of certain aspects of
the act^* - Ibid.P.77.
(40) Ibid. P.77.
(25) ,
(41) Ibid. pp. 79-80. This Is how shahrastanl reports this
important argument of the Mu'tazilahj
•u>,Pe£ I <**■ iW1 i_>i> «/—J & !V^"
* * * I
U p I* ^ ^ J L£» v-tjl >*>> . *>»
P. 73..'cL/'j "»—
(42) c v^io'a )(l/ <J <
v*\ \vk ,A^> . t 4j* X, lXJ£J> «JSJ
r >V ' cJ^-9 u » . *
i> C> . (I^>Co 0>L- ^—O . JX+J- ' u< ^—
Ouofj | v> 6 ^ o u c>^>'
c)-*-5 ^ *j !»• w ^->a£J4 o> UXS' t- >-i^>
(43) cf . bupra - P. 10, °6'tfbT1£/+z.
h striking instance of the Mu! tazilite preception of the
problem of consciousness of self-determination is shown in the
curious theory which some mu'tazilite authors upheld, with a
'
)
view to safeguarding the reality of moral autonomy, in the face
of the Ash'arite charge that human activity is conditioned by
physical limitations over which human power has no sway. These
authors are reported to have taught that the real man was his own
spirit only - since this, obviously, is the domain where
his autonomy can be best ascertained. This theory is attributed
by Ash'ari to Hisham b. al-riakam, Mu'ammar and An-NaJJar -
haqalat, P. 331.
(26)
It ie noteworthy that al-Ash'ari discusses this theory
under the question: 'Vfhat is man' - which seems to have been
an issue fraught with controversies among the Muslim ethicists.
(44) of. Ihiya, IV, P. 221. 0. vi «
(45) On this distinction, c.f. lejtisad, P. 98 & P. 39.
P. 98. >> *>'/y} • 1
■/.Tahafut, p. 292 - in the course 6f discussing the absurd
consequences of the arbitrary power of God, in the mouth of
the opponent. •
(46) cf. supra, p. 6*$, v4 /s/toj6ee 1.
(47) Al-Ghazali even goes the length of contending that power
Is impredicable of the creature, because of this unawareness, on
his part,„of the minutes and numbers of the movements it is said
to Effect in nature, (cf. Ipjtisad, pp. 43 & 98).
(48; (Sc. determinism and creation of deeds)
• v J (5c.. /~7o // 0 n y V' ' ? ^U-C> >/vc? -> ^ \
) Iq;t isad, p. 98. - 1 ^ -> > u




' • v ' ■
(49) IhiyaIV, P.5.
(50) '■'■'his first 'movement of deliberation1- as the Mediaevals
called it -, Al-uhasali relates to the good (Khayr); Inasmuch as
it culminates in decision or choice (Ikhtiyar) . cfl. xhiya',IV, P.219
(51) - Ibid. P.220
_
^ ' ***
(82) 4^ (sc. this process described here/c^V
(channel) ( suppositwm) ^J> uC.y/^^y
j/y •C-r O^ d/l U
I
S - . y . . . ?
Ibid, jr.220.cf. also P.221.
153) IhiyaJ XV, P.219
Mh. calls them three acts: ^ ^"4">
respectively. 1 have adopted the technical biological term for
respiratory movement, sc. autonomous.'
154) X* -j^G w
Ibid, jr.219 — ■- -•■ - ' ^
rtl-tthazali, without doubt, means nothing but the'intellect ' by
what he calls here the 'heart' - a term recurring frequently in his
mystical writings.
(55) Al-tjha7ali here writes in the mouth of the opponent:
^ ; xJLs V' O > t«2^p v-*3 0» >uJ> 'c> "• ^ "
O ], C C Up <2^ >
^ ^ ^vl,' jAx- lp > * > O*/ >-*- 1—1 * C41—• i C~l ■> J> <
0 (6 J Cp \ (2 ^ f ^ I > 1. ' ^ 1| < ci-j 1 ^
^' r / • ^ (w^JUiL> ^ ' J—^\ £-» ^ ^1 '
-> ' vJl V
/
c>^>V ^ 6 y j\ . f r' ^ o i < *o '"
Ibid. Rp. 218-9 ~ * X- ^ oT'^iM j_>—>j «^->) AJU_d-> o"
"
^ %%
xhis acute formulation of the dilemma of indetermination recalls
Kant's dialectical analysis of the problegj of a 'free causality'
- as the principle of the spontanwous origination of conditions in
the subject without which the series of conditions is inexplicable -
h
cf. Ill Antinomy of the 'Dialectic of Pure Reason' - c. Antithesis of
Pure Reason.
(56) 'i'his extension of God's power to the utmost limits of possibility
r*
we hold, is Ghazali's manner of closing the cycle of determinism
which otherwise would Involve an infinite regress, as stated above.
Ghazali writes in I^tisad on the universal reference of all move-
♦
ment to God, as its first term; . ■ .
.•>— '> Ux. i -^>i>J-W'fs OA* 0j.»
■J'jS " J—O'J'' "->1- U*U.
1 .C .P .98 \J , W) \5J ^ c > O' -y I
*
_ *' 7 b £-* \ j 1^. 1*
The affirmation of the 'generic identity' of all pp'ecies of
movement is of course gratuitous; since it is this precisely which
is in question.
(57) cf. Iqtisad, P.44. "wJ') ( b>M
rAj> -v> j/-o- <>" ^ is^**fL 1^/ U r ^^c/' «-o-—U ^
I "* ■ " " — - * I *
S y> >»' O « ^>0 . ....
«**
(as anticipatory of occurence) -> *j>
C^ J -<1_L 1 V .J J^0 ^ jJ JhslC 0.'5
Vu^( C ^
(29)
; us ■ • ^ b ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "
J^j, %/r+> <" o^ L>>; *f j,^ v> <—<✓'V^-"S &1' o,
V1 tf ^ V ^ c> ^ ' •-/ 7 sZJj • y^ ^\) V >^l
^ ^ <* ^ ^
' Oe^- <■—c "* G-V^ «"/O V £-*' /■' > >-t-t*'
Igtlsad,P. 45 • ' ' '
(59) Ibid. P.49
Z\l
(60) '..n r-' ■- "l'~J".'jr« Ockhamist Nomln'ism culminated in a
similar occaslonalist metaphysics, for exactly the same reasons.
cf. <?;/,.* , pA
ihe occasionalism of M-olebranche, bound up as it is with Cartesian
%
dualism, is defferent in inspiration. Greek atomism, from which
the Ash'arite doctrine of atoms is derived, belongs clearly to
an altogether different order of discourse, ■•■here is in it, in the
first place, no preponderent role, if any, of the Deity. In the
second place, bothewith the Epicurians and the tttoicfl, it forms the
basis of a deterministic metaphysics.
'
t
(61) cf. achmolders - Essai sur les ecoles philosophiques cheu
les-ttrabes - PP.155-6 and W0.144 ff. .
bchmolders points out that maimonedes's avowed "bias against the
Mutakalllms, in favour of nverroism and Peiipatetlsm, vitiates the
objectivity of his account, xhe only plausible charge he levels on
him is the allegation of universal scepticism against the tin +**■
ihis allegation, as we shall see later, is not altogether unfounded.
162) Guide of the Perplexed, pt.l, ch~ 73.
ihere exists a complete and authoritative translation in rrench of
the Uuide ( or More Nebuchim), embodying the original Arabic; fully
annotated by d, Munke,Pails, 1856, 1861,1866. "The English
(30) l
translation of M. Friedlander, (London 1919, second ed.), does not
i'
embody the Arabic text, but hag the merit of sober rendering.
|
(63) cf. Ash' ari-Maqalat, PP. 321-2 , /
y p £-* & 9 ^°—*'*" " t*-5 -5 ® y—cJ G— <-?
vjio- (_? uy? V> tX- < v> ' SJ 1 -*-** 1 0 ^ y
" » • 4 »
%, « ,




(64) Need we remark here that this is the theory which w have
called 'conditional relatlonality'. cf. Infra, section V.
(65) fc'or a list ofthe Accidents according to the Ash'arites:
cf. Saghdadi-usul ud-Dln, PP. 40-47. 'i'hat life, knowledge^ sensation
/ *
are among these accidents, cf.pp. 42, 44.
I
(66) Maimonedes notes here' a significant difference bf opinion
among the Mutakallims. some of them, he says, (and they bealong to
to the sect 6f the Mu'tazilah) hold that some accidents endure
for a certain period, others do not. AsH'arl attributes this view
to Abul-nudhail. cf. Maqalat.P.358.
I
(67; On Annihilation, cf. infra, Pp.
Also, ash'ari-Maqalat, PP.366 - 8, and 36u £f.
(68) Guide, I. ch.73, Prop.6.
(69) Guide, pt.I.ch.75, 6Jth Argument ,p .141
cf.also Maimonedes's gibe over the futility of the Mutakalllms-
arguments for God's unity and incorporeity from the notion of creation
(31)
f
ex nihilo - ibid, ch.76, 3d.argument. ne writes: "The proofs of
all these doctrines must be based on the well-known natures of
existing things as perceived by the senses and the intellect".P.144
xhe course followed by the Mutakallimx"whereby they assume such
a form of the unir erse as could be employed to support a doctrine
j' for which otherwise no proof could be found" ( ch ,75*^rgt. 5-P .141)
far from leading to a valid demonstration, does in fact weaken
any arguments: which might otherwise be possible.
We must instead follow the saying of xhemlstius that "the properties
f'
of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but our opinions
must be adapted to the existing properties." Pt.I, ch.71, PJ.10
(70) I am following in this rendering Munk's translation which
I
brings out better the false dlsjunbtion.
cf. Guide des fiigares , tr. Munk, P.348.
(71) Guide,Pt.I, ch.71 .P.111.
The import of Maimonedes's argument would become fully clear when
ft is recalled that, lil£ Aquinas, he held that the non-eternity of
the world was rationally indemonstrable - Ibid.P.111. and Pt.II, ch.23
P.195 and also.PP.174-92.
(72) Ibid. - 1, ch.73 Prop.5 - P.123.
(73) Ibid. -frop. 6.P.125.
On the determined sequence of will, power and motion in al-Ghazal}.,
cf.supra,P .73 f, It is noteworthy that Maimon&des, in the analysis
of activity in relation to God, cites the instance of the pen and
thecalligrapher's hand - an instance which as we have seen recurs
(32) )
frequently in Ash'arite writings and notably In Al-Ghazali -
cf^.e.g., Ihlya' IVjP.214;the simile of the ant and the pen,P.214
It Is needless to say that this theory is peculiar to the
rtSh'-arU e Mutakallims.
(74) Ibid. Also P.124
(75) Ibid. P.125
(76) Ibid.P.125
(77) Ibid. Prop.10 - P.128
cf. Aquinas's critique of this theory in con£.Gentlies .III, 97.
(78) Ibid. P.128.
un impossibility of substances existing without accidents,1 cf .infra
?, <39(note also) p.l3C lots.
On impossibility of interpenetEation of atoms,cf. a.
On intransmutabili^y of accidents ibto substances and vice versa
cf. p. i oo ,tl/r*;also : Ash'ar i-Maqalat, P. 567 and 371
•
(79) Ibid. Prop.10, note. pp. I3u-1
(80) ^ied in 427 A.H.
(81) Op.cit.- cf. rP .315-7
cf. also, ahahrastani - Milal, P.39 • '*> «4-u5« o"0 ..
' * »
s ■> y





Ibid.P.304 and 3l8, for r/azzom'sview too.'
7 ■
(82) Died 324 A.H.
I '
(83) Maqab^at, vo .1, PP . 59-60
voi.n.ppi3oi -321
(84; Ibid, P.311,314,31?, 317,318.
The position of Abu Hifsain as-Salihi, who identified'Substance
• '
and 'Body'.represents a qualified version of atomism, which does
not seem to have been in line with the common teaching- cf .PP .301,
and 317 and 310.
On definite distinction between ®ody and Substance cf .Baghdsdi-Usul(
P.35, where body is said to be 'composed of atoms (sc.substance) and
accidents\ . * '
(85) Abul-^udhail held a theory which is quite anomalous. The atom
he said, has no dimensions and is divested of all accidents except
motion, contact and sparability(Infii)rtad). Yet God can single it
out (yofriduhu; in such a way as to make it vi sible to us. He
conceded,however, that accidents are predicable of the body alond.
I
cf.aaqa^at, PP.314-5
(86) ^ ✓J-*'' <y"\ (A* ^ cj Cj .«
/Vdf . /. ? /f '' A j I o— U (*
'tfubayan1 is the impersonal tense of the intransitive of 'bayana' -
which means : to be distinct from.
(34)
(87) This theory, ash'ari reports, was challenged by a sect of
Atomlsts who claimed that "an Atom must have length (perhaps they
meant mass) proportionate to itself; otherwise a body would never
be long; since the agglomeration of particles devoid of length
would never produce ( a body) endowed with length". Ibid.318 P.
(88) Usui ud-Dio, P.33. '
#
(89) Needless it is to refcark that-this definition of substance
reduces it to mere physical entities, and surrenders the refined
notion expounded above.
(90) The complete list of these accidents comprises 30 accidents
among which figure the generally accepted qualities and a number
of curious attributes like life, knowledge, ignorance, will, speech
and belief - which corroborates MaimonedAs'a account with respect
to life, knowledge and sensation , being reckoned-among the
* • *
accidents, cf.ibid .PP.40-45
(91) cf. ibid. PP.35-6
(915) P. 36
(92) Baghdadi - Parpj, P. 3l6and 317
(93) Baghdadi mentions alHsamm and the Materialists among these.
- P.367
■ i
(94) Ibid.P.37. The same argument occurs induwaynr, Irshad,
Pp. 10 - 11.
Ob) !
IJ Uis J. U*» O V^» O-f'^^S-3
Ibid p. 38. . " ^ (^<rl
| 196) - This terminology is not Baghdad!'s, although his
classification corresponds to it.
I
I ,
(97) This is how uaghdadi reports al-Ash1ari teaching on this
question; - - . , •» t , c i ,
j uc>J>/>**.</? c^'''
ISi9 ^
v ^ \j>- e cS ^ x •»
I Ibid. p. 56.
. . ___: _ _ .
iS \ v *\ __
Compare Maimonedes"s account - Guide, I, Ch. 73. (Prop. 4)•
I ' -
(98) cf. Usui, PP. 46-7. also, Milal, P. 38-39. J
i
i
| (99) cf. infra, pp. 127-128.
(100) Averroes points out the contradiction involved in the
Ash'arite notion of durability owing to the supervention upon
substance of the accident of durability in a similar way, cf.
Tahafut, P. 88 & P. 139.
(101) Usui - PP. 50 & 51. cf. also, P. 42.
| ?. 5i. . " u.<^vOt-G U-JU^ ,h
Al-Ghazali, after expounding the Ash'arite & Mu'tazilite
teaching on extinction, defends it in terms of God's omnipotence,
thUS; fc > J <Scr': c>c^ c> ^ .
J JvA"cA**ijp,. ^ d,\
- '' C> ' J *-—<S j/ <Zy 'j (J j
(36) > I
Tahafut, P. 90.
of., also, PP. 86-90.
(102) Ibid. PP. 51-52.
(103) Maimonedes - Guide, I, Ch. 73, Prop. 1., PP. 120-121.
"These atoms, they believe, are not as was supposed by
Kpicurus and other Atomists numerically constant; but are
created anew whenever it pleases the Creator; their annihilation
is therefore not impossible."
That the fate of the atoms is inseparable from the fate
of the accidents they support, can be gathered from this passage;
"Wh9n God desires to deprive a thing of its existence, he,
according to some of the Mutekallimim, discontinues the creation
I
of its accidents, and eo ipso the body ceases to exist." Prop. 6,
P. 124. That'annihilation affects both constituents of the body
is thus obvious.
(104) Usui - P. 56. . , < A i>
oy^ off
(105) Usui;PP. 45 & 67. A slightly different variant of this
theory is attributed to a certain Muhammad b. Shabib, cf. Ibid. P.231.
(106) p. 45. - *a?
cf. pp. 66-67, for a discussion of the various theories of extinction.
(37)
(107) Baghdadi argues that death is not merely the opposite
of life as the philosophers hold - Ibid. P. 43. On P. 231, he
notes significantly that Qalanisi affirmed baka' as a distinct
notion from that of the body, contrary to Al-Ash'arl. The latter,
though he admitted the latter thesis, rejected the former.
'(108) Usui - P. 45 & P. 231 & P. 67..
(109) Al-rarq, P. 317-
cf. Ghazall' s refutation of this theory in 'i'ahafut, PP. 86-8,
along the same lines as Aah'arl and Baghdadi.
(110) Usui, P. 137.
(111) Maqalat, PP. 402 ff. It is difficult to make out from
ash' ari's account the exaot extent to which these Mu'tazilite
doctors accepted this theory and its implications. What is
indisputable is that this theory was discussed in Mu'tazilite
circles and that the motives underlying its discussion were ethical,
m a general way, the Mu'tazilite doctors here discussed fell into
two categories: those who admitted 'generation' in toto: in the
external and the internal worlds; and those who limited the role
of the 'conscious agent' in this process to the mere imitation of a
series of conditions, which forthwith became independent of his will.
I
in both cases, the conscious agent represented , in the series, the
primary determinant; the efficacy of his determination throughout the
"hole series being conceded only in the former case.
(38)
^ . i
I • y" I/J I ■ , • ■- ^ 7 ••
(112) U O4 O i t ( cA—-*£>.> 0->-> ) v>^>* 0 U'j »»
** r-. ' *. r# - .%4 • , I ^
Ibid. r. 402.
, *^^
(113) Ibid. P. 4u3.
(114; Ibid. pp. 406-407.
(115) Man, according to him, being an atom indwelling the body
in the capacity of 'governor', with no contact or inherence
in it. only consciousness, will, representation and
hate are predicable of him, as intrinsic acts. Ibid. P. 405.
(116) Ibid. > . y ' . - .
O* >>—J>~sJ jF 0—- i > js & K*j yJ >—A-' o *
y Cr*4' 0-^ !/*«>'
» # » ^ ■
(117) Baghdadi - Usui, P. 46.
1, .
(118) Ibid.-, Maqayiat, p. 404; Milal, P. 38. '
(119;- j> ^ 1^ V^~> U» 1 ^ " . Ibid.
Milal, P. 38. «-I—
Here Shahrastani aptly remarks: - c ^





(121) Maqalat, p. 404 — '^^c_3\ J _>x> *
—-
(39)
I [122) <» ^ 0^Os ,• 0 ^ ' <u^ <jr~ZsK>) ^jCo
'[. .^ ~>J' ' f U-L ^^
^J^jKe- ^/X^> £>^ »Jj> £>- <y^! AIA-?J V -v-1^ ^--»
•> • _
Mllal, P. 38. - • ^ *y
This is how Ash' ari relates the same;
^ JJ1 O 1 -A** ./> </ c-^-e- ^0 1 ° ^ > vv
r irZJJ ^X*~ vUL
c—u.£>3" C/ * t"* *-* ^ * k"~"^ 1 -"^• <£2>> j Cr^» j?
• ^a*-*-' x U->>^' ✓ 0^^)j
Maqalat, P. 404.
(123) Maqalat, P. 412.
(124) Ibid. P. 413.
\
(125) Usui, P. 137-8.
P. 138. '^X<^ \"jZ> d" J
Compare opening passage, lahafut, <£l. 17.
Al^Juwayni repudiates the uau'tazilite thesis of generation
(tawallud) on two similar grounds;
(1). Its admission would entail the predication of causal
determination of the creature and militate thus against the
exclusiveness of its predicability of dod.
(2). It Implies a tacit belief in an impersonal, determinist
inertia which dispenses with uod altogether - since "events are said
to emerge from a determined cause".
cf. Ir^had, PP. 131-132., also p. 133.
(40) v. I
(126) Maqalat, p. 406. cf. P. 407., for the story of the
tent whence he derived his name,
cf. also, ibid. PP. 568-569.
1127) Ibid. P. 407.
• 1128) Ibid. PP. 309-310.
(129) cf. Usui, - PP. 56-57, for the orthodox Ash'arite teaching
»
on this point.
(130) Maqalat, PP. 310-311.
(131) cf. al-Ghazali's teaching on this point: -- —
Ihiya1, IV, PP. 220-221.
Ifjtisad, PP. 45-46. ,
lahafut, PP. 293-296.
in criticising the position of balihi, Baghdad! adduces
a very interesting argument; namely, that the repudiation of
necessary conditionality between these terms militates against the
determination of God's attributes through analogy:-
t ^vj j ^ \±. U- <>■ ^ Cx ^ ■* *
W * " — 1 ■ — . .
This is how he sums up the teaching of the orthodox:
) c/( ij^v» 'J*> v<
Usui, P. 105. ' ^ ^ <U ' O
» ^ \
also, cf. PP. 78-79. -
i
(132) Maqalat, PP. 570-71, & PP. 310-12.
%
Also, Usui, PP. 56-57.
(41)
(133) cf. Maimonedes - Guide, I, Ch. 73, Prop. 10, P. 128.
(134) Maqalat, p. 567.
? *
(135) Tahafut, P. 294.
(136) Ibid. P. 295.
1137) For this definition of power, cf. igtisad, p. 39.
. • *
cf. also, for the argument here expounded, PP. 40-41? Tahafut,
p. 70 ff.
Chapter ihree.
(1) On the deceptive character of sense-experience inash'arism,
cf. Guide, i, c]J.73, prop.12, PP.132-3. note on this question the
famous crltlqe of the validity of sensuous knowledge in uhaeali's
Munqidh, pP f. This negative part of hid critique is, without
doubt, inspired by the arguments of the ijreek sophists, as set forth
in Plato's Protagoras and IhexxtltUs. ith respect to the un¬
reliability of deductive reasoning, we must add the Ash'arite notion
of the contingency of the intellect which is attributed to abul¬
ia' all and Ibn-nazm by averroes, xahafut, PP.541-2
(2; Maimonedes is, wiyhSut doubt, indebted to averroes in the
formulation of his critique of Islamic ^-alam. nls critique of the
Ash'arite proof of creation ex nlhilo; of their failure to demonstrate
the existence of God, owing to their occasionallst presuppositions;
of'their scepticism and its nihilistic implications as well as their
(42)
sophistical demonstration of the beginning of the world in time -,
are all derived directly from Averroes, as will become clear in
the sequel, malmonedes departs from his master on a very important
question: the rational indemonstrabillty of the beginning of the
world in time, belief in which must be based on faith . aven this
original solution of the problem is envisaged as a hypothetical
possibility by Averroes in xahafut, f .96 and 95*
[3) j-ioc. clt. rP.416-7 - xvverroes writes:
Ve- oX i c ^ rl> •«
—~ /> vj >-> >--» c~-"S—'j 4 c i
C- < u-^l ' o—CsyLt.
, * ^ i [> OOv to- Je-.




J '» ^p> 0^VxJ L>j> . U (/^ t^'r oX'Ot
" u>»l *S jj\ (yAit-U> Lit C JLL- >Jx-~
Against the ash'arite doctrine of 'contingency of attributes'
"
i
pertaining to thlngd, cf. ibid.P.476 and PP.530-1.




"Effects whose causes cannot be perceived are unknowable and
pursuable (matlubah) on account of the fact that t'heir causes
cannot be perceived. If, things whose causes cannot be perceived
are unknowable and searchable by nature, then the causes of what¬
ever is not unknowable are necessarily capable of being perceVed.
a/ liMI /<K * U/ ojf U. » tVl » i
Only one who cannot distinguish between the knowable-in-itself1 would
(call this into question)"
(43)
The word which I have rendered as perceived Is 'mahsus' -
which is the exact equivalent of the English both in its abstract
and its empirical connotations. 1 believe, however, that Averroea
cannot be said to confine the perception of causes to purely-
sensuous perception. More on this in the sequel.
(5) cf .Al-Gha?,ali's account of the matter which we have examined
at length - bupra,P,Xo.
(6) cf. Tahafut, PP.432 ff. for this Aristotelian doctrin^of
the Act, "as the perfection of the substance-in-Potency an^as the
telos of its being, (Kamal) since it is indistinguishable from
it in act."P.433. This is how Averroes defines the Farm, in relating
the Peripatetic teaching on the distinction between form and
Matter. "Form is the principle (ma'na) through which a being comes
to be; and it is that which the name and definition designate; aid
that from which the action proper to an existing being emanates,
it is this action which reveals the existence of Forms in things"Ib.
Averroes is in this whole passage setting forth the reasoning of
the Peripatetics in positing the Pure act, as the principle of
movement and activity in the universe.
(7) This is how averroes formulates the problem of oeing and
Acting and the nihilistic consequences of 1 metaphysical monism:
"it is self-evident that things have quiddities and properties
necessitating the specific operations proper to an existlrg being
and on accouftt of which the quiddities, names and definitions of
things are differentiated, were an. existing being devoid of a
specific operation it would be devoid of a specific nature -, and
(440 I
consequently shorn of a specific name and a specific definition.
I
_
xhus things would become one thing and nothing at the same time, ror
the one is designated thus on account of the action or passion
pertaining to it; so that if it is conceded that it has a specific
action, then it follows that there are specific actions emanating
'
1 from specific natures, if, on the other hand, it is alleged to be
I devoid of a specific action, then the one is not one; anc^lf the
nature of the one is negated then the nature of oelng is negated...
and consequently not-oeing is posited of necessity"-
iahafut, rP. 520 -521. • " fS
Ibid.
I 9 ) id • ,
I
(lu) Ibid.PP.521-2
(11) Let me quote in full this central passage which I have
attempted to outline above;
"Reason is nothing more than the knowledge (idrak) of things
throughitheir causes, whereby it differs from other noetic
faculties. "hoover repudiates causes repudiates reason. For the
science of logic posits as an axiom that there exist causes and
effects, and that the knowledge of the latter cannot be adequate
without the knowlege of their causes, J-he abolition of these things,
therefore, amounts to an abolition of science...; because it Implies
that nothing is known with certainty but pnly as a matter of
conjecture. Likewise, there would be no demonstration or definition
(45)
at all, since the essential predicaments tfpon which demonstrations rest c!
are negated, jnow whoever posits that there is no necessary science





(13) Ibid. P.531 - Averroes writes;
"If there is nothing in being except the possibility of the
opposites, with respect to the agent and the patient, then there
is no secure knowledge enduring for one instant of anything
whatsoever; inasmuch as we assume an agent of this kind who
tyrannizes upon things like a Despotic King whose word is law and
with whom nothing is impossible in the width and length of his
realm and of whose way no law or habit can be referred.to; evidently
I
the acts of this monarch are necessarily unknowable ; and even if
an act is seen to be done by him, its continuity throughout every
moment of time is necessarily unknowable."
(14) cf.Ibid. PP.219 and 257 - in both passages averroes is
arguing explicitly against the Ash'arites, who threaten to dissolve
the Identity of things and, therefore, their distlnctlons, by
negating the fixity of their specific determinations and powers,
cf.Also P.476
(15) cf. ibid. PP.530-1 and note (13) above.
t
fc
(16) icf. ibid. P.220 and 158
"The Ash'arites claim that every activity,,r>as much as It is activity,
emanates from a willing, powerful, free, living, oonscious Agent;
(46) !
because this is necessitated by the nature of activity
since activity cannot emanate from the lifeless; xxYjfcth is the
attribute of the living alone, xhus they repudiate the acts
emanating from natural objects, and likewise the acts pertaining
to living, visible agents, xhese acts, they claim, appear in
correlation with the visible agent, but tHeafreal author is the
lhvisible living agent, ^ut this entails (contrary to their
assumptions;, that there is no life in the visible agent, since life
is deducible from the acts of an agent; and what isiiore, wherefrom
do._xth.ey arrive at this judgment upon the Invisible agent." P.220
The same argument is re-stated more fully, in kashf 'an ManallJ,p.89
(17) Averroes dwells at length on the negation of the causal
I ' t
determinations of things in its bearing on the demonstration of the
existence of (jod, in 'Kashf 'an ManaliJ',, PP.66-73. -this negation,
he argues, leaves us with no clue to the existence of u-od, since
no' 'reasofa or wisdom' can be said to Inhere in the production of
things, uontrary to the assumptions of the Ash'arltes the
argume nt from contingency (Jawa^.or possibility of contraries^
posits a random production, rather a creation by an intelligent
creator, He writes: / , . . - • - . j
J vj* -if & ^ '> > • ♦ • f ^ ci" JJ* <-*-*■' f '
'^6-^Ly O I If1> J >-**? C>) y
O- C/ 1 ^ V> jl4- ' > > Ol \ d, I t *- J^j) ? V J, (j?
wU-vtu
-L.cit.;).68-9 The consequence of this position is either to
repudiate the existence of the Author of the universe, absolutely,
oi^the^xistence of such a wise, all-knowing author. cf.P.70
(47)
I (18) ibid. - ::l^
I ----) o' Cs-S ue-S • J^ u I o lS'^jS
j t/..A, /. /5 sr' • >•«-
(19) This is the substance of question III of Tahafut al-.calaslfah
J
which is entitled : 'On the (Philosophers') Duplicity (talbis).
in s f> c cx /e j> n£ A®- »a. £ ) tA. £># f $■>**■ ($*■*' 'I
j (20) Ibid.cf.pp.96-7 and 99,100-2 */ ***
(21) Ibid.P.102
(22)ra "Now when the teaching of the jiautakallims is scrutinised...
it is seen that they have posited the Ueity as an eternal man;
'
inasmuch as they have assimilated the world to the products fbof
man's will, knowledge and power, when they were told that (the
Deity) must thus be a body, they retorted: ' aut He is eternal and
all bodies are in time (muhdath). ^hus they were driven to posit
an 'immaterial man" who is the author of all things." Tahafut,P.425
On the inability of the ^sh'arites to prove the incorporeity of t*od
here referred to, cf.PP«220-1 , also Maimonedes, uuide,I,ch.76»
i-r 0 7.
C/ . 7* A C, /r / , / £/.. £
(23) Tho -(M-otIno^l-on bafcmaen unlvooal andaou^vocal agents la
'Hrtmlnt 1n Wn. >~borr^w^.th©—^h-oml-»t--exprea-s-l-on—
J
it- gonvey-a—fully, the—ld«erHwhl^h.n.^varro»fi-^l^hsa-..to. .4.mparts.
a
I
a£r' J 1Th9O1 fty—
(24) cf. Tahafut, P.148
T - ass=g^»^.-i
(48) I
(25) Ibid • P • 149 • . (j> Ky~/jI ^ ^ *
/' 4.—<vJj > ss s*-1 >-i> ^ ^ '■»**
This seems to me to mean that the volition of the agent (al-murid)
cannot enter into natural activity as its necessary determinant, since j
the grounds of its^ necessary determination are immanent to itself;
, that is, consequent upon its own nature. Therefore, natural activity




(27) Ibid, p.149. - Averroes puts it : "God wills through a will
to
disslmilat ( la fcushblh//the will of men ... and knows through a
science which l^dlssimilar to h4man science, and as the mode
iKayfiyyah/ of His science is incomprehensible, so is the mode of
nis will."
Averroes returns to this problem frequert ly In J-ahafut, cf.e.g.,
PP.15u-l. tiere he makes an explicit statement of belief in creation
ex nihilo. "The philosophers',' he writes, H believe that God ...
is distinct from the universe... and that He is not an agent in the
of
sense in which the visible agent is spoken, whetherothe voluntary
^fa'il/
or the involuntary; but rather that ne is the author/of these
causes, who brings forth the universe out of nothing and sustains
it in a manner nobler and flaller than in any of the visible agents".
Ibid. P.151'
ihis statement is difficult to reconcile with averroes's account
of creation as 'composition1 (tarkib-r.152); or as a process of
'bringing; out from potency to act* (P.149) ; or as 'correlation*
(irtibat/ -'inasmuch a s being is consequent upon coBrelation',\ '
(49)
!j
the two terms^of which are said explicitly to he matter and form (PP.180-B
In both instances Averroes is expounding with approval Aristotle's
hylomorphlc teaching on the question. Of this more in sequal,
infra P.
On the 'modus eminenter1cf. also PP, 424-7, 450, 439 and 441.
ihe teaching of Aquinas on the mode of predicating analogical
attributes to the creature and the creatorf.conees very near to
Averroes's. cf . especially, a .Theol .la, Q13 and JEL/Ofik'rQ lj XStjr 34S
in -fr CX.
(28) Supra, P. llo> The former being the concept 'cause', the
latter being the concept 'design'.
(29) cf.xahafut, PP.219 -220
(30) Ibid.P.92. That is how averroes winds up his argument agalnt
jtbe thesis that uod could have created a world of a different
magnitude than the world actually created, cf.PP.88-91.
ne will have occasion to return to this position and its deterministic
- -
j
implications. On same, cf.lb.PP.412-3 . Also, Kashf 'an ManahlJ
al Adillah, PP.32-2
(31) cf. Ibid. Px .475-6 xiere Averroes is arguing against
Crhazali's oontention that the specifications of things depend on
the divine fiat as their sole determinant.
11
(32) Note the Neo^Platonic account of the matter in Tahafut,
PP.338-4U /
(33) cf. xahafut, p.154.
(34) xhat is the Peripatetics and notably Aristotle, as is
(50)
explicitly stated in more thafcn one place by averroes.
(35) Ibid. cf.pP. 210 - 211.cf. also PP.531 and 150 for a
J vindication of this theory of fourfold causality.
(36) Ibid. p .433.
^^j
"̂ I y tW"1" JjJ+SJ
(37) lb id.p.224 - >% u:J ^^ ^ V <-* ^ ^ ^ ^ '14
also P.169. xhis formula recalls the famous xhomist formula to
the letter:"unde unumquodque agens agit secundum quod actu est"-
De Potentia ,<£.1, ^.Ll*, also S .cont .Gent lies.11, ch.vi,vii,vill etc
(38) cf. xahafut al-FalaBifah, PP.120, 176, 182 and supra P. (1°) no-U^O-x.
. ' ,
(To on protpn)
(39) The one, or God, in the Neo-Platonic scheme is not strictly
speaking #hB First Intellect (Nous; who is the first emanation from
)
the une. Averroes calls it the 'One Separate Principle1 or simply
.
the One (al-awwai; - (P.217;. The order of the universe is stated
explicitly to depend on the First Intellect or wotiis( Ibid. );
but it is clearly refer/abl^to the One (through the agency of this
intellect). Averroes is trying in this passage to prove that wod
is a simple Intelligence (Ibid.P.193 and 185 and PP.434 ff.) -
and his procedure is certainly ocongruous with arlstotle's; for
whom uod is "Thought thinking itself". Although the intellect¬
uality of the Flfcst Principle is not here in question, it is
difficult to see how in Arabian Neo-Platonic,peripateticKism
the Plotinian notion of the 'to on proton1, as a auper-Intelligence,
(511
was identified with ^ristotle's notion of uod, as a primary
Intelligence. ihe super-intellectuality of the one of Plotinus is
of mystical inspiration and is certainly a notion sul generis, aei
compared with Aristotle's notion of God. It is therefore, difficult
to see how in Aristotle the ^irst Principle and the * irst Intellect
can fail to coincide, assuming that they are two distinct principles
(in Plotinus),
Un super-Intellectuality of the One, cf. a.nne evades, III, 9.PP.
175 ff. tr.tsreHiert, Paris 1925.
140) cf. Ihid, PP.217 and 552. lhis is hew 51 in fact<, averroes
resoves the conflict between Al-Ghazall and thepfcj^ipatetles
(especially Avlcenna). God's knowledge is altogether different
from our own that no awnmon term for comparison can be found. God's
knowledge is 'cause of the known1, whereas ours is 'effect of the
known'. In fasl al Maqal, Averroes writes: "This difficulty
v »
»
is resoved, according to us^by noting that the nature of eternal
knowledge ^sc.God's knowledge) in its relation to existents id
different from temporal knowledge ('ilm muhdath); inasmuch as the
being of an existent is the cause and condition of our knowledge,
whereas eternal science is the cause and condition of the existent,
in question." P.25, cf. also iahafut PP.552 and 462.
With respect to this distinction, Aquinas is in agreement
with Averroes (cf .S .0 .Gent, tiki, ch.49 & 50, S.Theol.I a, $.14.a.5)
Aquinas, however, crit icises the Averroist thesis on the ground
that it detracts of the perfection of uod'b knowledge. Averroes,
according to Aquinas^ has not proceeded beyond ascribing a
(52) !
universal mode of knowing singulars to uod; fcince he teaches that
uod knows singulars " in communi", that is, "Inasmuch as they are
beings"-^S .Theol .'4.14 • art.6xhe reference Is to averroes, In Met ..bib
xii, comm.51, viii, 337 a), ""his charge ^justifiable, as can be
seen from averroes's summary of the teachings of the peripatetics
, on this question, in Tahafut, I?#.462-3. although Averroes concedes
here a 4 modus em&nenter1 to divine knowledge, the object to
which this knowledge is referred is explicitly an 'fcnSo eminentar'
(wujud ash^tfaf).
'
• ' - 1 »
~e r— i — i'i".Tral —e—.—^ '32 T ^ *• ThA T* — 1 ^ —ae.
(41) cf. for the exposition ofthls theme, xahafut, PP.433-6,
1 ' '
142) On the teleology grounded in rirst principle - cf.
i ■
Tahafut, p.232
(43) cf. supra, 3 4- //-• •
(44) Tahafut p.524» averroes writes:
"It should not be doubted that things act upon one another and are
generated out of one another, although they are not self-sufficing^
in this production, but rather depend upon a xranscendant agent, who
is the condition of their operation as well as their being."
Also, aashf 1 an ^anahij, pP.86-7
(45) .-.s an example of such accidents averroes cites the so-called
'four cnfttures1 - nainely, the dry andthe humid, the hot and the
cold. cf. ibid.p.526
Accidents, according to the ash'arltes, are continually generated
by clod, cf .supra^ The controversy between averroes .and the
(53) I.
*
Ash'arltes revolves, therefore, around this very point. Averroes
solves the difficulty by urging that the productlonoof substances
(jawahlr) is the exclusive prerogative of uod, whereas the
accidents are generated by natural causes, in this sense, God is
said to be the sole creator, or "Inventor of substances"
cf. Kashf ' an ManahiJ', PP.88-9
(56) Averroes writes, xahafut, P.131.
"The activity of the agent, according to the Philosophers,
is nothing other than (the process) of bringing what is in
potency into act; so as to have reference to being on both sides".'
cf. also. ibid. P.102, 156
(47) cf. Ibid.P.221 ' ' , ■
"Tha activity of the visible agent consists in converting
a being from one character to another (JSifat) ...(that is) to bring
about its conversion into the form and the specific property
through which that being is transmuted/into an object of a different
essence,!, definition, name and operation. "* -
(48) cf. P.180 ff. Expounding Aristotle's teaching on the manner
in which the production of the universe must be ascribed to God,
Averroes writes: "The answer according to the Philosopher/ is that
things whose being depends on their correlation, as in the case of
matter and form and the correlation of the simple particles of
the universe, depend for their being on'their correlation; so
that the author of this correlation is the author of being."
(54)
This is how Averroes interprets the unity of the First uause and
its production of the universe. That Averroes betrays here the same
failure as his master with respect to the creation ex nihilo and
.
providence is obvious, rhe First uause is clearly not the oreator
(Kaliq) but rather the srchitect (Sani1) of the universe; so that
j Averroes has not really succeeded in meeting the allegation of
I Al-uhazali against the peripatetics in their negation of creation
ex nihilo.
With respect to the preservation of the world in being, Averroes
writes: "But he is (sc. uod) the author of these causes, bringer
thereof forth from not-being to being; and .preserver thereof in a
more perfect and more eminent mode than in visible agents." Ibid.P.151
- The not-being here referred to is potential not-being, (cf. Ibid
PP. 105, 131, 142.), and the preservation is a preservation of
eternal movements cf. P. 168 where Averroes states explicitly that the
'
"essence of the universe is movement", cf. also, PP. 59-60.
(50) The distinction in the dual role of causality, between relative
and absolute beingls important because of its bearing on the
problem of the analogical predicability of causality to uod and
j
I things, to which we will return. The notion of Being as analagouswould thus safeguard:
on ■/« f
1. An cA.-conception of causality - i.e. a conception in terms
of Being.
2. A non-univocal conception of uausallty, in its manifold
manifestations in the diverse causal relationships discoverable in
nature .
(55)
3. The validity of the notion of rirst Cause as Creator,
(its causality having regard to absolute being).
4.Thelegitimate predicability of this concept of God, as
Dirst cause, as well as of secondary causes. It is patent that
the predicability of being itself of the Creator and the creature
is possible only through an analogical conception of the notion
of 'Being1. v
(51) Supra, b. I o £>■
(52) This, clearly, being the subject-matter of epistemology.
Ihe point here maintained is that epistemology, what ever its
conclusions with respect to the nature, conditions and validity
of knowledge, ought to set out from the fact of knowledge. The
admission of this 'fact of knowledge' is sufficient for the cogency
of the argument as stated above.
«-/Vt •
✓ ✓ r<^
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(56) I
(55) Although Averroes does not state the argument in question
In these words, the grounding of knowledge in Induction tallies
fully with his claim that definitions are imoossible if causality
Is abolished; since as a true Aristotelian, he could not hold that
such definitions are possible a priori, - an admission which would
H "
1, in any case defeat his own ends and destroy the alleged bond between
| causality and being.
7 ^ '
| 156) cf. Supra, P.(43). (notey^. I must quote the conclusion of the
passage in which averroes proves the poncomitance between Causality
and knowledge, from the nihilistic consequences of its negation:
"Were an existing being devoid of a specific operation It would be
devoid of a specific nature and consequently shorn of a specific name
and a specific.definition. xhuB things would become one thing and
nothing. i?or the one is designated thus on account of the action and
I passion pertaining to it...(So that if it is alleged; to be devoid
-
I
of a specific action then the one is not one,; and if the nature of
"77 . 7: i ' *■'. --v f • ■ .V 7 *v' • •. -7 "•
the one is negated, then the nature of Being Is negated too." -
| Tahafut, BP. 520-21.
[ . ■ ' 1
(57) Tahafut, b. 521.
(58; Ibid, P. 523.
(59) Koran, XXXV, 41.
(60) Tahafut, B. 523. The refenence to Abul-Ma'ali and Ib^
Hazm, cf. Ib. pp. 541-542.-
(57) I
(61) Ibid, PP. 523-24.
(62) Tahafut al-Falasifah., P. 3.37 & Supra, P. 4-S>
(63) Ibid. & Supra, p.*/£//• ■
(64) Tahafut at-Tahafut, PP. 537-538.
(65) The distinction which averroes has in mind here is that
between the 'common1 (i.e. primary) matter, as shorn of all specific
forms, and the 1signate matter' (materia signata of aquinas and the
scholastics; which represents the immediate substratum of any
specific form, averroes calls the latter the 'specific matter*
(maddah KtossaiV, P. 531- Tahafut.
(66) "The philosophers reject (this contention) and urge that
were it possible, then wisdom would have enjoined that man be
created without these intermediaries; since this creator in this
manner would be the best and ablest of creators." Tahafut, P. 540.
(67) Supra, P.7 • - - -
(68) Supra, P. £.
(69) Averroes attributes this naturalistic interpretation exclu-
tn
slvely to avicenpTa, cf. Tahafut, P. 515. /
(70) Tahafut, p. 514.
t
(71) Ibid, P. 515. Averroes is advocating here the principle of
authority, as the initial ground of speculative and practical
disciplines. The implications of this thesis will become clear in
the sequel.
(58)
(72) cf. Tahafut, P. 527. This 'pragmatic theory1 of religious
truth whose validity rests upon the social role it plays in
affording a 'social deterrent' (wazi' ijtima1 i) against unvirtuous
conduct is expounded in pp. 581-586. The origins a>f this theory
are to he sought in ibn Tofail's famous 'Hay ibn iaqzan1 - in
which also, the origins of the theory of the two-truths is to be
found.
173) Averroes writes; "Not everything which is possible-in-itself
(fj/tab^lhi) can be performed by man. Because what is possible for
man is clearly known; so that the greater number of things possible
in-themselves Impossible for him. The power of-the prophet to
perform a miracle (is to be reckoned among; things impossibla-for-
man though posslble-in-themselves. cut this would not Justify the
claim that things lmpossible-in-reason xifsepossible, even for the
prophet." Tahafut, p. 515.
(74) Ibid. PP. 515-516. cf. also; Kashf 'an uiianahiJ, PP. 73ff.
in the course of his examination of the claim of the Mutakallims
that miracle represents conclusive evidence for the genuineness of
revelation and px-ophecy, averroes returns to the same point, here
he reduces the role of the prophet to promulgating moral laws
(wadh al-oharaV) -L.cit. P. 78; miracle as the extraordinary manner
in which such laws are set forth, as in the Koran (Ibid P. 79).
Other forms of miracle, such as healing the sick, Averroes argues,
have nothing miraculous about them and do not, in any case, confirm
(59)
the genuineness of the prophet's claims but rather his ability
as a physician. (Ibid pp. 76,78-79). The miraculousness of the
Koran from its stylistic perfection is waived gently aside, ibid .P ,77.
(75) cf., for Instance, ahahrastani, Nihayat al iqdam, PP. 447-
451; Baghdadi, Usui ud- Din - PP. I&3- *£ ; Al-Juwayni, al-Irshad -
PP. 1<3 <d ff- ; Al-Ghazali, Ihiya^H, at ^ ; Al-itur Jani, A.Q.,
I'Jazul- Qor'an - ; Ar-raf i* i, M.S. y Ta.^ ^*7 *** * .
(76) This is the substance of Averroes's own retort to the
Mutakallims, in ManahiJ, P. 74ff. Averroes resolves the problem
into two propositions: A miracle has been ascertained; whoever
performs a miracle is a prophet. The 'major premiss' being actually
gratuitous, no conclusion can be derived from these two premisses,
cf. Ibid, P. 76. In all this reasoning the fact of faith in
supernatural revelation is tacitly presupposed, when Averroes turns
to determine the mlraculousness of the jior'an in authenticating the
prophecy of Muhammad he reduces this mjfraculousness to the superiority
of the moral code promulgated in it. The curious thing to note is
that Averroes Invokes the authority of the jvoran in validating this
thesis (ibid P. 78) succumbing thus to the dialectic of circularity.
The qualification that a supernatural origin (biwahyinThihal-lah)
must attach to this moral code is vindicated on the grounds of the
pragmatic tlrroughness of noranic law (Ibid P. 80) and its extra¬
ordinary coherence and social usefulness (p. 81) which he corroborates
from within the horan itself. Nowhere does Averroes seem to proceed
beyond the genuinely ordinary and natural..
jn-.-,. .-I..— . M ■ 11 il ii ! in „„ ,
(60)
(77) -hatever apologetic wmslim theologians might think about the
matter, there is absolutely no doubt that Muslim consciousness has in
general equated the miraculousness of the Koran with its stylistic
perfection . &ven learned theology fails to specify any other tenable
gtound of belief in i'jaz save stylistic perfection. I fully concur
5
•with Noldeke (cf. chapter/Ion Koran in 'Sketches frcfjtz )
( ■ TV' / 5 v — //, ^ VI-— J G-
that it is truly baffling that this claim for stylistic perfection
should have; accepted with such docility by the greatest of Arabian
authors and prosodists, when its legitimacy is all too unwarranted.
(78) We have already touched on nl-Ghazali's teaching on this question
,
supra P.i/v-/oAquinas teaching on the same question can be found in
o.Theol.Ia, Q.7., arts.,! and 2.
)
S. con&. Cient. Bk.I., ch.84
• -!" ' '
he Potentia, £.1, arts. 3 and 4.
(79) Both btoicism and Neo-Platonism, though admittedly philosophic
systems, have indisputable religious implications.
(80) The figure is borrowed from the Aristotelian conception of
the body-soul relationship. Aristotle, as is well-known, defines
the soul as the "form of an organic body endowed with life'j-De Anima_,
v jj; {'
(81) The legitimacy and meaning of this term will be Justified in
the sequel.
(82) The tract in question is entitled: 'Fasl al-Maaal fl ma
.
bayha 'l-Hll^mat i»ash-3hari' ah mlnal1 it-Tisal' . Like the Tahafut
' i
this tract was unknown to the scholastic doctors of the 13th century.
(61) I
It represents the only ex profess^ treatment of the subject by
Averroes and is a work of singular originality. The Tahafut was
||
was translated into Latin for the first time by Oalo Calonymos in
• 1
1328 and was published in Venice in 1437. cf.mink-Melanges, PP.435-6;
and Renan-Averroes et L'Averroisme, Paris, 1866, P.216.
jfij
in a long study of averroes's teaching on the subject of
reason and faith, M.Asin Palaeios maintains that the Averrolst teaching
is identical with Aquinas1, cf.article entitled jlI Averroismo f
/ - /
teologieo de xomas de Aquino, in ^studios de jirudil/ion Oriental,
|
baragoza, 1904'. PP.27 - 331. This thesis is decr^dd by P.
Mandonnet (in biger de arabant, pt.X, PP.149-150) as 'baseless'
on these grounds;
1. The Averrolst concession to religion is purely pragmativ »
religion being intended for the use of the vulgar.
2. m the event of conflict, averroes sacrifices the rights
of reason in favour of 'allegorical interpretation; vindicating thus
the supremacy of faith over reason.
3. xhe contents of the Averrolst system leave no room for
doubt regarding the sympathies of Averroes.
(83) The major tenets of ^atln Averroism which the condemnation
of 1277 singled out were; E. the error of the two-truth*.
2. the unity of the intellect { on this cf. xh.Aquinas s famous
tract, De Unitate intellectus contra Averroystas - Latin te^t and
jjrench trans, in upuscules, jno.16, Paris 1857). 3. The eternity
of the world. 4. xhe negation of creation ex nihilo, and 4. xhe





about in 1270 and was confined to 13 propositions, which coincide
I
roughly with the 2u thesis of. Al-Crhazali's Tahafut. ihis was
followed in 1277 by the final condemnation, by &tienne Templer ,
Bishop of Paris, at the instance of Pope John aXI of 219 propositions
which are declared erroneous and heretical, xhree significant
, propositions which figure out among the 12 props, condemned in
127u ought to be cited here, because of their bearing on what we have
called averroist determinism, ihese are the propositions relating
to the negation of providence and of free will. prop.3 runs thus:
"Quod liberum arbitrium est ootentia passlva non activa; et quod
necessitate movetur ab appetiblll" As to the negation of providence,
rrop. 12 runs thus: "Quod human! actus non reg^j'atur providentia pel44.
Note this prop. "Quod omnia, que hie inferius aguntur, subsunt
necessitate corporum celestium."(prop.4.) °ompare with this Q.l6
(PP.254-8; of Al-uhazali '$ To- h ( Co n it?/ f, 6 */. )
!
(84) Op.cit. P.13 and 15.
V85) - Ibid, hverroes aatuall-y distinguishes four modes of dialectial *
reasoning, employed by theology (ash-ohari'ah).
a. dialectical or rhetorical arguments whose premisses though n£t
apodlctic Txre commonly known or believed; but the conclusions of
which areneverthless apodictic,Zoology from these conclusions is
illegitimate, however, nellgious propositions belonging to this
category ought not to be interpreted allegorically ^ the vnri
I to
is awwala or .
b. arguments whose premisses, though commonly known or believed, are
apodlctic; and whose conclusions are signs (mithrxlat) of what they are
(63) 1
in fact designed to prove. These can he interpreted.
c. Arguments, whose premisses, on the contrary, are not apodictic;
but whose ponclusions coincide with what they are meant to prove.
( i.e. are non-aological in intent ion).The premisses of these arguments
can he interpreted but not their conclusions.
d. arguments, whose premisses are not necessarily apodictic, and
whose conclusions are signs to what they are designed to demonstrate.
The duty of the elect ( <v!^) in these is interpretation, of the
vulgar acceptance ab extrins&ro ( ) .
* 1
The general principle, Av9rroes concludes, is "that whatever
cannot be attained except through demonstration, in the matter of
allegorical interpretation, ought to be interpreted by the f'elect', •
I
and ought to be accepted by the vulgar ab extrinseco".Ibid.?.16
(
(86) Aristotle draws a general distinction between demonstrativfi
(or scientific) and sophistical knowledge - cf. An.Post.ak.I,2,
(and Topica 1,1,P.100a)
P.71 b. The whole of the Posterior Ahalytics is devoted to
demonstrative reasoning, its nature and conditions. *he Soph.
Elerxchls opens up with this distinction between genuine and soph¬
istical reasoning, sophistical arguments are divided into:
Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments, and contentious
arguments. Aristotle defines dialectical arguments as follows:
"Those that reason from premisses generally accepted, to the
contradictory of a given thesis".L.cit.ch.2, p.165 b; or as
"reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted". Top.Bk.I,
P.100a. The nature of thetorlcal reasoning is expounded in ak.I
of Rhetorlca. nere Aristotle sets nhetorlc in contrast with
Dialectic, in the genuine sense of rational argument.P,1354a.
(64)
Both, Aristotle believes, are concerned with matters "that come
moreior less within the general ken of all men".Ib. - wote the
contrast with wverroes's position, ihat fchetoric achieves its ends
by playing on the emotions of men is stated explicitly in P.1356a-
1445; followed by a discussion of the emotions in their relation
to persuasion in bk.il, chs.2-11. The greatest classic of the
latter aspect of Rhetoric is Plato's Gorgias. v
(87)'/.Fasl, P.17.&n scholastic theolog y, (Kalam) as dialectical.
%
cf . iUianahlJ, P.47.
f
. ■ '
(88; Tahafut and the retort of Averroes in rahafut at j.ahafut,
PP.495-500. Also, supra P. In the condemnation of 1277 there are
singled out, further, the ^eo-Platonic cdhtentlon regarding the
m
impossibility of the multiple emanating from the One. (Prop .44
xahafut,Q.3, 3rd .argument, PP .110-132 .and Tahafut'.at'lahafut -c lbidem,
rPvv173-L263 . . .(Note especially averroes's own positlonfpp .180-2;;
tt
as well as the whole series of corollorles of Neo-Platonlc
emanationism.(cf. Props, 95,94, 59,54,43). On ths determinism
and the negation of contingent causes altogether, cf.Props.195',
195, 60 y 206, 21, 59.On the negation of providence and of the
possibility of direct divine intervention in nature, cf.Props.63,
43,54,160.
For the history of ^atin Averrolsm andthe story of the condemnatiorB
of 1270 and 1277, see the monumental work of P.M^ndonnet - blger de
Brabant, Louvain, 1908-1911. vor a list of the propositions
condemned, Op-cit,Pt.II,PP.178-84 and Pt.I.P.lll.
(65)
An interesting tract, De Errorlbus Phllosophorum, attributed
-
generally to Gilles de Kome (cf . Renon-Averroes et L'Averroism^
P.349 a thesis contested ny Mandonnet in L.cit.) lists the
errors of Averroes under 13 items, which coincide with the main
propositions condemned in 1277; notably: the eternity of the
world, the falsity of all religionsQuod nulla lex est vera ,
licet possit esse utllis - No.2' . cf. Siger de arabafctt, Pt.II,
P.10 and 8-9;also Renan, Op.cit .PP.349-52. ,
(88 Y'. W 'JS -
«» ✓ « >
cf. Op.cit.P.21 and P.6. also, ^ashf, PP.58-9
(89) Fasi, PP. 6 and 7
(90) cf.TahadTut,pF.582-6. After expounding the agreement of
philosophy and theology, on the question here envisaged (sc.
resurrection), Averroes wfcltes:
"It is manifest from this that all the philosophers hold this
opinion with respect to religion: namely, thaththe prophets and
lawgivers be followed over the practical principles and the
promulgated laws of any given creed. According to them, the more
these necessary principles represent an incentive to virtuous
deeds, - the more commendable they are". Ib.P,584.
xhat theology has regard merely to what falls within the ,
scope of the consciousness of the vulgar can be seen fnom this
i
passage:
"All this, to my mind, is an encroachment ofl religion and a
scrutiny of what is not enjoined by any religion, owing to the
(66)
incapacity fof human faculties to attain to it. For not every science
on which religion is silent should he scrutinized and the vulgar
be informed about the results achieved by speculation... because
this would lead to great confusion.... such is the case of the
lawgiver (Prophet Muhammad) who imparted to the vulgar only a
, measure (of knowledge) conducive to their happiness". Ibid.PP.
jni ;r
428-9. Also, PP"357-8
(91) Averroes reproaches al-GhazalJ., | in more than one place,
for divulging the hidden secrets of demonstration to the vulgar, since
the knowledge of these pertains exclusively to the specially
gifted ( or ar-rasikhun fil-'ilm). cf. A'ahafut, PP .357,528,^.3,
108, 428. Also, Fasl,p.3 and 14, etc.
1
(92) cf. on the ouestion of daith in its relation to reason;
r ' 1
S . cont .i*ent., tsk.I, chs.3,5,7.
S.Theol., Ia, Q.I, as.l and 8.
II-II, Q.II, as.3 and A*
ue Trinitate, '4. III,*.I * etc.
(93) Averroes himself concedes this transcendance of revelation ,
at least nominally in xahafut, P.428. ^ut this concession is
offset by the opposltdethesis that the scrutiny of the inmost
secrets of religion, though prohibited for the vulgar, is





cf. ib.P357, for instance; pasl, PP.8 and9, and p.17
(94) I do not propose to dwell any further on this aspect of





singular originality of this reconciliation of the respective
claims of reason and faith. 1 leave the ettlogy of the originality
.
of this position to more eloquent panygerists.
cf.e.g., tiilson, Le Thomisme; phil .aui M.Age, />/>. tfv f // Marl tain.
f- *//• //
V. 5 7 . t>(uegres du savoir, v, < , £ ><• , oertl.11. • river!, c dunck tions of
Th';;: Urn.
(95) This term which occurs, in the same context, in the
introduction,?. 3 . M&st "be Justified. In the technical sense,
of course, neither aristotle nor Averroes believed in the
homogeneity of Being; since for them being is not a genus -, there¬
fore cannot be in one genus. The term is here meant to.denote
the uniform and natural character of being, and its laws, as
'1
opposed to the unique and supernatural, that is/heterogeneous character
(
of what religion introduces, as miraculous and extraordinary.
(96) cf . supra^p. £
(97) cf. Roland-Gosselin, Le de Ente et Essentia de St. Thomas,P.65
cf.Farabi - Ara' ahl al-Madinah al-Fad&ilah.
j.
(98) cf. Tahafut al-u'alsifah, PP.57-8 et seq.
(99) Ibid. PP.96-7 and 101
n
(100) It is interesting to note how the Neo-Platonlc notion of
necessary emanation is taken over by Aquinas and adapted to the
rationalization of the mode of the procession of the uivine Persons;
whereas voluntary activity is adapted to the doctrine of creation.
The emanation of the second and Third Persons from the Father is
called 'procession'; the emanation of the creatures called 'creation'*
v ' ■ I
(101) cf. S.Theol.Ia, Q,.13.arts.5 and 6; S3 .cont .Gent .Bk.I, chs.
30, 32-4. On will and freedom in crod, cf .L.cit .Q.19, arts.1.and ]LO*
I
(102) Averroes declares overtly his departure from Avicenna and
Al-Farabl over the emanationist scheme, cf.Tahafut,PP . 179-180
et seq.,229 at seq.,245-50;259-62. in this respect he lines up
7<«-
with al-Ghazali in criticizing the arbitrary construction of weo-
PlatorL-4.c galaxy of the Intelligences and the Planetary spheres.
ae does this, without doubtl in the name of genuine Arlstotelianism.
'
xf his genuine reading leads hi$ to take this independent view,
v I
he remains nevertheless a !child of his philosophical environment'
in adhering tacitly to the major imanatlonist tBnets of Arabian
Neo-Platonic Perlpatetism. cf. Tahafut,PP.210-8, in the course of his
exposition of the Peripatetics' procedure in formulating the scheme
of the celestial hierarchies - which it is true, he admits is not
demonstrative in character - lb.P.209 and 218 - Averroes sets forth
with tacit approval the motives of the peripatetics in formulating
i
this scheme.
cf .Gom.on.Met. pk.xii, f>f>,/^z~ciL
(103) This is precisely how Aquinas explains the failure of the
ancients to arrive at the notion of creation ex nihllo - In S.Theol.
la-Q,.44, art.2, <^.45, art .2.
(69) I
(104) cf. Topica, Bk. I, Ch. 11, P. 104b; Phys. VIII., Ch. 1,
250b & 251b. Aquinas' s defence of Aristotle over the problem
of the eternity of the world, in . Theol. Ia, Q. 46, art. 1, is
valid within the limited, formal context in which it is raised.
i
but seen in the perspective of the whole Aristotelian system
,with its irreducible distinction between Act and Potency, which
coincides with the parallel distinction between Matter and Form,
Aristotle's position can scarcely be said to be equivocal. In
this respect, we believe, Averroes is truer to the spirit of
Aristotle than Aquinas. Of course, the adducing of isolated texts
from Aristotle cannot settle the problem; for other isolated texts
can be opposed to these, - such for instance, Met. All, Ch. 10,
1075b34 - where Aristotle states categorically that the world is
I
eternal.
Maimonedes's defence of Aristotle (Guide, pt. II, Ch. 15)
seems to be the direct source of Aquinas's. The two are, in fact,
Identical.
(105) Supra;, P.?/.
The origin of Maimonedes's gibe against the ASh'arltes can
be found in Averroes, - Aashf 'an ManahlJ al-Adlll-qh, p. 26.
Averroes writes: "The famous method(of the Ash'arites regarding
the proof of the existence of God) rests on demonstrating that
the world is in time (had1th), which rests in turn on the theory
of the atomic composition of bodies .... This method, however, Is
not demonstrative nor does It conduce to certainty with respect to
(70) !
the existence of crod. Now if we suppose that the world is
created in time ^hadlth), it follows as they say that it should
of necessity have a Creator (muhdith). But it is precisely this
which is in question." For we would be confronted with an
insolublble dilemma with respect to this Creator, as to whether to
, posit him as eternal or temporal; either of which is absurd - the
latter because it would involve us in the predicament of an
Ml
infinite regress, the former because it entails one of two difficulties;
that the world should be eternal, since its Author is eternal; or It?
that its Author should be temporal, since this is necessitated by the
U
principle that the temporal should have reference to a temporal
agent, except on the assumption of a temporal act emanating from
an eternal agent - which is discounted by the Ash'arites themselves.
Op. Cit. P. 26 & Se^.
n
j, j
(106) cf. Tahafut, PP. 245-246.
(107) Tahafut, p. 495 & 497ff.
(108) Op. Cit. P. 10. Averroes writes:
"The second category is that which is a mean between these
two extremes - oc. the world as a whole - This is a being which
comes out of nothing and is not preceded by< time." This, however,
is offset by arguments based on Aoranic texts and purporting to
I i!
Hi
show that creation ex-nihilo and in time is not incompatible with
Kocpnic teaching. Ibid p. 11. cf. also, infra, P. 16 2 v- N x>i G
(109) This is what Aristotle calls it. Met. XII, 1074a 55-8 ,
& 1072a24. Elsewhere he calls it the rirst Mobile, Phys. viil.260a2.
jff"«i— innmMitfci«ao«ir»i»Ta>iiiiidia*fetftoae>r8^.-act* •< ».*,:< -'-oak-ma*wwnriite.... .<»; Tf r-T- r ■n«iTf>tMiifflfcrlrn » - •■• - ■ ,
(71) '
- generally the 'primary, eternal, single movement.' Met.xll. i
1073a25« Averroes calls it simply the 'Heavenly Body' - (al-
jurum as-Samawi), Tahafut, P. 59 •
(11 o ) cf. for this argument, Tahafut, PP. 58-59.
'(Ill) Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, p. 60.
" '
\
(112) Averroes, - Tahafut, P. 88.
(113) Ibid. PP. 95-97.




(116) Phys. VIII., Ch. 1, P. 251alO.
(117) Ibid. III., Ch. 1, P. 201al0. This is the general
Aristotelian definition of motion; the former being a mere
application of the concept of motion to that which is in motion.
Obviously, the. 'potential1 and the 'movable' - as well as the
alterable - ibid. 201al2, - are interchangeable concepts in the
Aristotelian scheme.
(118) Physics, VII. Ch. 1, P. 251a, 18-21.
(119) cf. Averroes - Tahafut, P. 97 - Al-uhazali's text; as in
Tahafut, P. 66.
(120) Tahafut, rP. 100-102.
(121) The former, because It la contradictory that not-being
Itself should become ueing; the latter because actualized being
is already Being in act. it is interesting to note how the
impossibility of admitting the conversion of not-being into Being
is the starting-point of r^leatic metaphysics and the ground of
' the parmenldian conception of being as one, abiding and Immutable.
Aristotle, as is well-known, solves the parmenidian, jileatic
dilemma of the. abiding Identity of being, by introducing the
notion of Being in potentiality and Being in act. as Averroes
observes,, becoming ought to be conceived as a process of transition
from the former state to the latter; rather than from not-being
to being. For Parmenides, Aristotle and Averroes the conversion of
not-ueing into being is impossible. Creationist in fact, begins
exactly where these three great advocates of the eternity of Being
leave off. The final enshrinement of creatlonism, in philosophic
t i
terms, as an absolute conversion of not-being to being was achieved
by aquinas.
(122) cf. Eahafut, PP.105 - 6.
The transition-from not-Being to being referred to above relates
obviously to relative not-being, that is of not -Being which is
in potentiality to being -, and this is precisely the role of matter
xhis not-being, that is to say, is the equivalent of potential being
cf. xahafut, PP.163-4
(11.2) Averroes actually attacks the teaching of islam, Christianity
and Judaism on the creation ex nihilo - (opinio ILoquentium in
nostr a lege et lege Christianfum: de qua ^omes Christianus opinabat
(73) I
quod posslbilitas non eat nisi in agente") (L.clt.P.143) -
elsewhere (overleaf lb.) he refers to the "Loquentes trium legum,
quae hodie quidem sunt, dicere aliquid fieri ex nihilo." His view,
which he argues is that of Aristotle himself, is stated thus:
''Biceraus sicut facit lnvenlrejSt est extrahare illud, quod est in
potentia in actum... j&t ldeo dlcitur quod omnes proporfclones^ et
formae sunt in potentia in prima materia et in actu in primo
motors, etaassimilatur aliquo modo esse': elus quod fit in anima
artlficls." In Met.xii, *enice 1552,1* .143^ •
cf.also, Ib.ix, r.loqa; in Phys. vlii, P. 155a.
Averroes returns to this question, with striking insistence
whenever the occasion arises, xhls, as well as the notion of
volitional activity, in God represent a recurrent theme in his
i
*
polemic against 'Loquentes nostra legis1.cf.m Phys.vlH P.159a,
l6lb.
cf. o.Theol.Ia, Q.44 arts.l and 2, Q.45, art.l; s,cont Gent.Bk.il,
chs.15,16. ue Potentia, '>4.111, art.l. xhe clue to the xhomist
solution of the problem of creation is the thesis that, contrary
e~rc <"*
to the assumptions of Aristotle and averroes,' is not a form of
mutation; but rather, a mode of activity sui generis, cf. x»ep
Potehtia, (4. Ill, art.2; B .Oont .uent .II, chs .16,17,18 .
*
■ / Quoted, nenan - Averroes er 1' Averrolsme, raris 1866,
PP.lu8 ff. The discussion which follows this nuotation ought
to be read with diligence, because of the earnestness with which
nenan expounds the Averroist teaching with manifest approbation.
^124) In pasi, P.10, Averroes points out that the philosophers
malttti 'iabffi: ■ f 11 -f^-vimrrttmh •-■■■'* ..w- ammam#"* *•»*«
(74)
and the Ash'arites are in agreement over the eternity of Pod and
the non-eternity of particular existents; but it is over thesstatus
of the world as a whole that they are in disagreement, jnow with
* respect to this, they are all agreed that it comes out of nothing,
is not preceded by time, and comes-to- be through an agent. with
V redpect to time, the opinions of Plato and Aristotle are at variance
the former holding it to be finite, the latter infinite. After this
analytical account, Averroes betrays his approbation of Aristotle's
position by declaring that the universe is neither raally eternal
nor really temporal(U^- —>); since "the really
temporal is necessarily absurd and the really eternal is without
cause". In support of his thesis, Averroes cites different verses
from the Qoran which are not incompatible with the eternity of the
world, were he writes:
j C> * (} •j^^u^
. * —
rol'lows an admonition for tolerance, as regards accusations of
infidelity, owing to the complexity of the problem.
(125) Tahafut, PP.96-7
(126) Ibid.P.162 - Averroes argues that the universe is not said
by the Philosophers to be eternal per se (qadim bldh-dhat); since
this would entail trtiat it is ct»i c t\ k s . It is said to be
. (75)
I
eternal, rather, in the sense of being in 'continuous production,
and"this is more appropriately referred to God than discontinuous
production." It was on this account that the ancient Philosophers
opted for calling the universe eternal.
-rk«_ //«.'s - <-/-■ 1, *5 / ^
(127) This statement of the matter would be inaccurate if it ^s uka*-
left unqualified.1 Fbrm' is complete and self-sufficient; it stands
in no need of union with Matter. Similarly Matter in its indeterminpss
i
r: ***3
does not limit the form in any way. ror Plato, whose startfpoint
is the uorm, the problem of the union between form and matter,
however, remains an insoluble riddle. Tor Aristotle, whose starting-
point is the fact of their concrete'union, the question as to why
they should copulate, as it were, does not arise at all. xt is to
be noted that the very distinction between these two principles
(Matter and Formi) is dictated by the desite to explain the fact of
this union; so that this naturally is in no need of a Justification.




(1) We have already noted how Averroes and Maimonedes expose
the futility of the Ash'arite, occasionallst argument for the
existence of uod from the nature of contingent existence,
c.f. supra,ff. ?/ ** 11°-If occasionalism is unable to demonstrate
this existence ;and If its claims that u-od is the unique agent in
the operations of nature are groundless, on account of its
repudiation of any causal relationship between agent and patient,
then its belief in the existence of u-od and His role as unique
Agent can only be an a priori and arbitrary belief.
^2) This manner of speech, as well as the figure of 'exteriori¬
zation' of the divine win which recurs in this section must be
justified, aquinas teaches that power, although it posits a real
relation in the creature, is not distinct from u-od's action
(Cont. uent. II, 8; ue Pot. Q. 3, art. 3 - ttes:) which is one
with Viis essence. Power must be conceived as a positive relation
in the creature, which posits merely a relation 'of reason' to
Cod (Ibid. 10, 13, 14; o. Theol. I. Q. 43, art. 3 - ad.l) but
leaves~t,hem totally unaffected in reality, aauinas is wrestling
with a genuine difficulty: creation as a temporal event threatens
to introduce change in uod or add something to fctiis perfection.
(II, bent., dlst. 1). In knowing and volition we are dealing with
immanent acts, which remain within an agent, out creation, although
immanent in a real sense, posits something extrinsic (viz; the
creature) to (rod's will. This difficulty is solved in o. Theol. I,
Q. 14, a. 8, by urging that it is God's knowledge and will which
are the cause of things, - both being Immanent acts of the
divine essence. Creation implies thus no exteriority, except
with regard to the creature; and here it signifies the mode of
relation of the creature to God, as its j?1 irst Principle (S. Theol.
I, q. 45, a. 3). with regard to God, creation is not exteribrity
since God knows and wills things in the unity of His eternal
knowledge and fore-ordlnation, rather than under the aspect of
temporality (Ibid, Q. 14, a. 5 & 7; Q. 19, a. 2).
That in creation there is an 'outgoing'of God is clear from
Aquinas' s teaching that liod is unto things the cause of being, in
wis capacity as unique First Being (Cont. Gent. II, 15; S. Theol.
1, Q. 44, a. 1). This teaching4need not be interpreted pantheisti-
cally, since the xhomlst conception of the analogy of being and
the absolute transcendance of God, Safeguard the irreducible
distinction between the creator and the creature, xhe creature,
however, participates in the divine being (S. Theol. Ib.) while
remaining distinct from it; thus it is other than God. This
otherness is meaningless from the standpoint of God, as we have
seen. But it must be a positive otherness, if we are to avoid
the pantheistic predicament and retain the irreducible distinction
between the Creator and the creature, inasmuch as it cannot be
an otherness of being, or of spatiality or contijiguity, or of
temporality ^since God cannot be included in the same category of
time as the creature), this relationship of otherness would have to
be conceived as one of transcendence or infinitude. If the
' r^ar.ir^yJ"T--^^.-: —-—-^-
^78)
causal conception is clearer than these two conceptions, then
this otherness could be described as the otherness of cause and
effect, - the common term in which is that of dependence, oo
that all that creatlonlsm asserts would be the dictum that an
order of being, existing in conditions of spatiality and
'
temporality, depends upon an Absolute Being, who is exempt of
these conditions, and that this dependence is an absolute
IDe, Pot., 4. 3, a. 3„£esp.)
dependence^ now the Absolute, Eternal, Principle of things can
bring forth that order of temporal being, in and through the
inward movement of hhls essence, is of course a mystery, Whatever
far-
its character, this creative act is*from being, in the strict sense,
an 'outgoing', a 'wandering beyond itself' of the Absolute - as
I
negelianism teaches.
ihe justifiability of the metaphoric.language we have used
can be defended by analogies from Aquinas himself, who speaks of
an exlre in creation (II, Sent. 1, dlst. 1, 4. 1, art. 2):
■
"Utrum aliquid possit exlre ab eo per creationem" and further on,
"Videtur quod per creationem nihi^a ueo possit exlre in esse.", etc.
(3) The term Loquentes refers to the Mutakalllmun, whose teachings




Perplexed', through which they became known to the 13th. century
|
scholastics. Chapter 71 relates briefly the origins of Mu'tazilite
and Ash'arite schools in their controversy with the philosophers,
1
especially over the question of creation ex nihilo. in the tiebrew
translation of the uuide (Moreh webukhim) the Mutakallims are called
a-





these Lioquentes \ or uoquentes In lege uaurorum - or - in lege
oaracenorum; lit.: disputants in the law of the Moors or the
Saracens ) occurs in Chs. 65, 69 and 97 of the Third Book of the
Summa Contra Gentiles of Aquinas, and inDe Potentia, Q. Ill, art.
7;• De.Verlt. Q. 5, a. 9 - ad 4.
'
Their teaching is criticised also in s. Theol. I. Q. 45, a. 8;
Q. 8, a. 1; Q. 115, a. 1; in II. Sent., dist. I, Q. 1, a. 4—-
cf. bchmolders, Essai, P. 138 and Gilson - Pourquoi St. Thomas
t
a critique St. August in, in Arch. d'.Hlst. doct. et litt. au
moyen age I (1926-27) PP. 10 & 15• A number of contemporary writerB
have made casual references to the Thomist critique of the
occasionalism of the Loquentes in question, e.g., Gilson in
Op. Cit.; M. Asin Palaclos in Algazel, Dogmatlea Moral, Ascetica,
P. 787 and Me'langes Mandonnet, !. II, PP. 60-64; S. De Beaurecucil
in Bulletin de l'Instltut prancals d1flrcheologle Orientale, Tome
XLvi, 1947 - PP.220-22; de Finance,in atre et Agir dans la
Phil, de St. Thomas, P. 154. The author rightly remarks that
the term Mutakallim or Loquentas, although it refers to all schools
of Muslim speculative theology, denotes especially the Ash'arite
school which represents the 'extreme right' of Muslim orthodoxy.
/
Mention must also be made of Renan's discussion of the
motives of the Mutakalllms In the formulation of their occasionalist
metaphysics, in Averroes et L'Avdr., pais 1866, PP. 106-7.
(4) cf. Mandonnet, Slger de Brabant, on negation of providence
fey Averroists, pt. I, pp. l60ff and PP. 136ff. Mandonnet's
(80)
summary of the tract De Necessitate et Gontingentia causarum,
generally attributed to Dlger can be read with interest, cf.
P. l65ff. rhe text of the tract is found in pt. II, PP. 111-128.
Props. 59, 58, 28, 5, etc. are directed against this negation of
providence .
(5) cf. Summa Theol. I, Q. 22, Cont. Gent. Ill, Chs. 64-77,
94-luO, De Potent la, Q. Ill, art. 7 and (4. V, etc.
nandonnet explains (in Op. Cit. P. 161) how the position
of Aquinas represents a reaction to the creative determinism
maintained in the tract mentioned above, nhereas the author of
this tract, Averroes, and the Heo-Platonists describe creation
as a mode of necessary emanation of the universe from God, Aquinas
I
insists that God created the universe through an act of His will rather
than through a necessity of His nature - cf. S. Theol. I, Q. 14,
art. 8, Q. 19, art. 4; Cont. Gent. II, Ch. 23. The Neo-platonic
doctrine of emanation (as taught by Avicenna and Algazel) is
expounded and criticized in De Potentia, Q. Ill, art. 4, PP. 151r*153.
(6) cf. Cont. uent. Ill, 64 & 93, 94 and S. Theol. I., Q. 22,
art. 2 - where Aquinas singles out i^emotTltus and the Epicureans
as negators of providence. Aristotle and Averroes are cited as
restricting the sway of providence to incorruptible things only,
cf. also, : De Pot. Q. 6, art. 1; In Sent. I, dist. 39, 2, a.2.
(7) cf. S. Theol. I, Q. 22, art. 2, Gont. Gent. Ill, 76.
^8) S. Theol. I, Q. 22, art. 4, Gont. Gent. Ill, 73.
(81)
(9) Cont. uent. Ill, 71. On evil, contingency, liberty,
fortune and chance - as falling within the order of divine
providence, cf. the four consecutive chapters, 71-74•
i
(10) Aquinas writes, Gont. Gent, ill, 70:
"Nor is it superfluous, if God can produce all natural
effects by nimself, that they should be produced by certain
other causes: because this is not owing to the insufficiency of
nis power, but to the Immensity of nis goodness, wherefore it
was nis will to communicate nis likeness to things not only in
the point of their being but also in the point of their being
causes of■other things".
Note this second key passage in S. Theol. I. Q. 22, 3:
i
"For He governs things inferior by superior, not because
of any defect in nis power, but by reason of the abundance of His
goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to
creatures
(11) cf. Gont. Gent. Ill, 65. as we have repeated ad nausea/h
this charge applies to the Loquentes (Mutakallims) in general.
but it is the Ash'arites, in the first place, who are aimed at.
(
Aquinas writes*. "Hereby is refuted the position of certain Moslem
Theologians (loquentium in lege Maurorum poslto) who in order to
be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held
that all forms are accidents and that no accident lasts for two
instants, so that things would always be in a process of formation;
as though a thing did not need an active cause except while in the
(82)
process of "being made."
A casual reference to the same error is found in b. Theol.
I, Q. 8, 1: "Hunc autem effectum causal Deus in rebus, non solum
quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conserv^tur- Reap.
, tl2) Co'nt. Gent. XII, 69.
(13) In the first paragraph of Cont. cent. Ill, 69, aquinas
speaks of the "error of those who thought that no creature has an
active part in the production of natural effects", without
specifying the proponents of this thesis. The commentary of
a'V
Ferrare,' however, sends to averroes, in wiet. xii, text 18 et ix,
text 7, and ^states!;explicitly that-the-'Saracens' are here in
question. This is confirmed by i)e Potentia, <4. 3, a. 7, Resp.
Further on in both works, Aquinas criticizes Avic^ebron's teaching
on the passivity of corpereal substances, bwing to their remoteness
from the First Cause, their quantitative mass and the absence of
an inferior patient upon which they can act - as set forth in Fons
Vitae, tract ii, 9, P. 40 seq.; tract ill, 44, P. 177; 45, P. 179 -
! /
Monast. 1895 - cf. .Leonine edition, Opera Omnia, vol. 14, P. 202.
cf. also, De Ver. Q. 5, art. 9, ad. 4; S. Theol. X. Q. 115, art. 1;-
vs. avlcebronj Xn Sent, xl., diet. 1, 14. 1, art. 4, bol.s- vs.
Loquentes \,ano^o
The impossibility of transitive operations, owing to the
fact that all 'natural forms are accidents' and that accidents
cannot pass from one object to the other is explicitly referred
to the 'loquentes in lege Maurorum' - as reported by 'Rabbi Moyses' -
(83) I
- and to this is conjoined the error that all production is
creation. "Forms and accidents cannot he made out of matter,
since matter is not a part of them, nence if they be made they
must be made out of nothing and this is to be created." Gont.
uent. ill, 69, r. 166.
The teaching of Avlcenna, - according to which 1 substantial
forms' emanate from the active intellect (or dator Formarum)
as we have seen, oupra, jr. ; whereas 'accidental forms',
being mere dispositions of matter, result from the action of lower
(Sc. natural) agents - is cited with partial approbation as
avoiding the error of the Platonlsts according to whom the Ideas
are the causes of being to particular objects of sense, in so far as
«./s 0
they participate in them, cf-. a. Theol. I?, Q. 45, a. 8; Q. 115,
a. 1.
(14) Aquinas was certainly familiar with the casual references
of Averroes to Ash'arlte teaching in his commentaries, especially
in the Metaphysics and the Physics. The commentary of Ferrare on
the Summa Contra Gentiles, published in the margin of the Leonine
edition of Aquinas's works, sends to Met. xii, text 18 and lx,
fi.ow.7 - in connection with the "error of those who attribute all
operations to God", at the opening paragraph of Ch. 69, Bk. III.
(cf. In Met., lx. Oh. 4, P. 109a;.xii, Gh. 3, P. 143a.) Also
Averroes's references to 'Loquentes nostrae legis' in Physic,
over the question of volitional activity in God, Bk. vili, 159b,
On their teachings that accidents do not endure for one Instant,
ib. 190b, etc.
(84) j
(15) Cont. Gent. Ill, 69, P. 168.
(16) Ibid, PP. 17O7I71-2.
(17) cf. Cont. Gent. I, Chs. 86, 87, 88 - II, 24.
(18) This, i believe, is the clue to the false dilemma of
absolute spontaneity and intellectual determinism, according to
which freedom is impossible on the assumption of a rationally,
imperative good determining the will. The distinction between what
1 called 'bad' and 'happy' necessity is borrowed from the Thomlst,
scholastic notion of 'violent' and 'natural1 action: the former
being action contrary to the nature of the agent; the latter being
action coinciding with this nature. Aquinas calls these the
'necessity of violence' and the 'necessity of natural ord6r',.
cf., e.g., Cont. Gent. H, Ch. 30, P. 60.
(19) This famous principle which is central to aristotle's
Physics is commonly known as ockham's law of parsimony.*
'»
(20) Cont. Gent. Ill, 70.
(21) It is a tenet of Thomism that peing and irue are convertible
notions, cf. p. Theol. I, Q. 16, a. 3; ce. Verlt., q. 1, a. 1 and
Q,. 21, a. 1. in S. Theol., ib., Aquinas puts the matter thus;
"Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ante seoundum
substantiam. aed verum quod est in intellectu, convertltur cum
ante, ut manifestativum cum manlfestato"~ Ad.tr. This relationship
of intelligible manifestation is described further in these terms:
"Et est simile slcut si comparemus intelliglbile ad ens» won enim
(85) I
potest intelligl ens, quin ens sit intelliglblle; sed tamen
V
potest intelligl ens, ita quod non intelligatur elus lntelliglbll^tas'i. j
ad ter. cf. ue Causis, i, 6, where aquinas writes: "Actualitas
rei est quasi lumen ejus'.' , P. 228. Here he is interpreting the
Aristotelian dictum that knowabllity is commensurate with the
actuality of the object; cf. Met. DC, c. 10.
(22) cf. on this question: J.de Finance - jfctre et agir dans la
rhil. de St. Thomas, pp. 63ff.
/
(23; cf. Rep. Bk. VI, P. 396., tr. by Jowett, uxford, 1875:
"In like manner the good may be said to be not only the
author of knowledge in all things, but of their being and essence,
and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in
dignity and power."
(24; Tim., P. 28.
(25; Ibid, p. 29.
(26) Aquinas accepts this Platonic thesis that liod'e goodness
and love are the first principle of creation, ne attributes this
thesis to augustlne. "For the divine goodness", he writes, "precedes
as the end and first motive of creation, aooording to augustlne
who says: "Because God is good we exist* (De doct. Christ, i, 32)."
Cont. uent. II, 28-29. In lb. I, 75, he argues that God wills
other things in the act of willing nimself. He concludes the
chapter as follows: "This is confirmed by the authority of noly Writ;
for it is written (Wis. XI, 25): 'For thou lovest all things that are
(86) j
and hate at none of the things which thou hast made'." The
multiplicity of things is explained,in the same passage, as
the outcome of uod's desire to communicate wis likeness to
things, cf. also, lb. I, 29.
In I, 91, he alludes to Aristotle's statement in met, I,
, IV, i., about parmenides and Hesiod who taught that Love was the
pirst Principle of things, - which he corroborates with the
authority of uionysius. "Certain philosophers also taught that
God's love is the principle of things; in agreement with which is
the saying of uionysius (Dlv. JNom.- iv.) that God's'Love did not
allow Him to be unproductive'
(27) Enneades, tr. Bre'hier, Paris 1925, vol.III,PP.167-8
(28) Ibid.P.166
(29) The Liber de Causis consists of 32 propositions embodying
the substance of weo-Platonlc emanatlonism, andils an arable
- « » i
recension oftroclus's Elements of Theology. '±he latter was
translated into hatin by rcilliam of MoerbeKe, at the Instance of
/
Aquinas - cf.mandonnet, blger I,P.138; HaUreau, de la philosophic
ocolastique.T. 1. .384-390) Gllson, Phil.au moyen Age,p.378.
The Arabic origin of de Causis is alluded to by Aquinas in his
commentary on ue Causis, who notes its relation to rroolus1s
Elements.cf.op.clt.i, lect.1,)
(30). Elem.i'heol.,prop.25. Eng. Tr .by"T.Taylor, London, 1816,
vol.il,P.320.
(31) This isthe date proposed by Grofrflan.Mandonnet proposes,
(87)
1269-73 .cf .uilson, Le Thomisme, P.533.
i32) Thefirst great commentator of uionysius was Maxlmus the
Confessor (580-662). Yet it was through j^rigena that his Neo-
Platonic mysticism exercised such decisive influence on the 13th
century, and especially on the three subsequent centuries,
cf. u-ilson - Phil.au Moyen Age, P.85 and P.201 ff.
133} Neither the exact name nor the date or birthplace of the
Pseudo-Dionysius a°a known . The first mention of him occurs in
532 (533) at the council of Constantinople, where his authority
was invoked by ueverus, Patriarch of Antioch, in support of
Monophysite teachings.
cf . nolt-Dion. the Areopagite on div.names, etc. Int.,PP.2-3.
Gilson - phll.au Moyen Age, *.80.
(34) cf.Summa xheol. I, Q.12 and i^.l3;cont (S-^nt .1, 29-35•
a complete analysis of the Thomlst teaching on this question is
given in Maritain - Degres du Savoir, ch.lV -'On the divine names'
(33) cf. de jaalo, Q.I. Note the many references to the uivine
Names. Also cont.uent.ill,1-16.
(36) cf .d "fheol. Qs. 50-63 j cont.uent. II, 91 ff, 46-55.
Aquinas has writte^a whole tract on angeleology: De t>ubstantis
Deparatis, of which chs.16,17 and 18 are based on uionysius
"Qui super alios ea quae ad spirituales substantias pertinent,
excellentius tradidit 1 - Ch.l6, P.128,' Opose.VXI.
(37) cf. Cont.uent.1,91.
(88)
(38) Div.iNames, ch.iV*, i,P .87 • xhe analogy of the u-ood and the •
sun is derived from Plato, cf.wote.p.JS , suora. xhls analogy
- a 3 -
is developed further, on pP.91-93 in Platonic terms.
in expounding this passage, aquinas remarks with a view to
warding off the danger of determinism, in the emanation of uod's
, goodness through a mode of natural necessity rather than intellect
and will, that unlike the sun, uod's essence being 1 intelllgere
et velle1 the diffusion of nis Essence comes about through
intellect and will. r,xp. super de div.nom.,p»332.
The teaching ofaquinas on the voluntary mode of uod's activity




(41) Ibid.ch.V, pP.136-37 and p.140. Dlonysius states that
being is the first gift cf uod, "the most primary ofnls gifts"-
p.136. ihis being of things is at the same time the souree of
^1) their premanence, and ^2) oftheir being principles of other
things, f or it is "only through their participation in jiXistence
that they exist and enable things to participate in them." P.137
142) Ibid.pP .96-7 •
143) Ibid.pp.100-1
144) Ibid .p .J115 j
(45)cfJbld . p.116
(89)
(46; ibid.PP.113-4• Compare-the ihomist doctrine that all things
act with a view to a good and that-the cause ofevil is a good,
oont.uent. HT, 3,4,10,71. ve Malo, <4.1., as-, 1.2,3;-o.xheol.I,
>oi .49, a. 1»
w jfi7,
(47; cf. o.iheolj <4.5,a.3; cont.uent.il, 3, 2u. ve.verit.421.a.2.
• J
^48; cf. b .Theol* , Q. 5.a .3 and a.l. Cont.Gent.I,37;II»7«
Aquinas writes, in b*Theol.,I,5>3:"Dicendum quod omnes ens,
inquantum est ens, est honum. Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens,
est in actus et quodammodo perfectum, qui omnis actus perfectio
quaedam est." On the qualification of this position, cf.infra.P.q
/✓# a. i-u.
(49) cf . De Pot., Q.2,a.l. Oont. Gent.II, 6,7,8,etc. On 'form'
J
as the principle of being and operation, cf.Cont.Gent.111,7,20.
(50) cf . gionysius - Civ .Names, ch.V; Plotlnus - axane' ades, III
P.167 ff.snd 175 ff.
On the identification <Sf *orm and Act in Arifetotle, cf.^et.
IX,8,1050b, 2.
(51) cf .b .Theol .1, Q,.5,a.l. £ or a discussion of this question
cf.J.de Finance - Etre et agir dans la ghil.de at.Thomas, PP.183-90
(52) Note in S.Theol.I,Q.5,a.2.Ad pr., the finallstlc Inter¬
pretation of the uionysian notion of the Good which he attempts,
cf. also, article 4, ib., where the authority of Aristotle on
this question is opposed to Dionysius (sed contra)etc.
(53) 'Averroes, in rejecting the emanationlst interpretation of
(90) I
Aristotle by Avicenna and Al-Farabl, was therefore perfectly
true to the spirit of the faster, cf supra, rie was equally
( V/V»A. to 2 i lx 3 y //. 1+ 1 >
true to this spirit in dismissing the question of the 'genesis'of
things, or their creation out of nothing, as we have seen in chapter
three, sect.Iff.
(54) I content myself here with noting the great difficulty to
the vindication of creation ex nihilo which the Aristotelian
distinctnore between Act and Potency raises, The notion of Act in
Aristotle is dictated by the necessities of a dualist metaphysies;
and has meaning only in condtradi'dtion to potency. Arlstldile
is, therfore, perfectly consistent with himself when he carries
this dualism to the extreme and sfets Act and Potency, uod and
Matter up against each other, as two co-eternal principles.
Greationism, on the other hand, can be rationally vindicated
only in terms of a monist metaphysics in which the initial
distinction between act and Potency does not as much as arise,
now the Thomist doctrine of creation ex nihilo can be fitted into
a metaphysics of Act-Potency is very difficult to see. a deeper
reading of Aquinas would show that his doctrine of creation 18 of
jNeo-Platonic, (notably uionysian)extraction; an emanationist monism
whose philosophical scaffolding is Aristotelian, and from which the
determlnist 'sting' has been artfully removed, in fact, Aquinas
speaks of creation as a process of 1 emanation1of things from the
first Principle in the s .Theol., i ,<$045.
(55) Supra P. \\l, .
(56) cont .Gent .il,15;s .Theol.I, Q.44,a.l.
(91) /
(57) «a .The°l .1 .Q.5,a .1 •: "Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti,
quod eat appetlblle, et per consequens divit rationem ultimi."
(58) Ibid.as.1 and 2. ue Ver.,Q.21, a.3. and 1-2.
(59) cf.cont.uent ill,17-19
(60) Aquinas explains,"cont. u-ent,iL,that the object of the
divine will is the divine essence, which is identical with the
divine goodness (I, ch.74,11, 22,28). This (iod wills of necessity
il.ch.80)1.. Inasmuch as nis essence is complete in Itself, -od
cannot be said to will things of necessity ich.8l). His will of other
things is, therefore, an instance of nis will of nis infinite
goodness, inasmuch as other things participate in it *ch.75^-»but
only in such wise that these things stand to it in a position of
superfluity, since it' is complete prior to their creation.
cf .also,o .Theol .I,Q.19,a .2 . c.f, ( v ) - . V- »
(61) Cont.ueht.III,21. ±he character of causality as a
perfection superadded to the perfectionof sheer being is described
thus*. "A thing is pBrfect in itself before being able to cause
another ... nence to be the cause of another thing is a perfection
that accrues to a thing last."
cf.a.Theol.*1.115,a.1. -Also. 1
(62) cont.Gent, ill,69.
Causality is stated to imply perfection in things in a threefold
manner:
1. iJ'lrst, Inasmuch as it manifests the abundance of the creature's
(92)
perfection.
2.seoond, Inasmuch as the good proper to one creature Is shared
by another and thus diffused unto other things.
^3. Third, inasmuch as causality id a principle of order in the
universe, whereby active and passive things are ordered unto
' each other
And lb. . <,
(63) Aristotle, Physics,1,8. The argument is clearly directed •
against Parmenides and the Eleatics.cf.also.i,9.
cf .Garr igou-hagrange , God, etc .Vol .1,P .194 f. x
(64) cf. "ont.Gent.II,17,19. we.Pot. Q.3,a.2.
o .Theol.I,H.45,a.2-a^U. 2.; II. sent ,dist .1, v^.l, a. 2 .
(65) This distinction is necessary, since the form is *'inal Uause,
only when conceived asr the abstract or ideal perfection towards
which an entity strives. In the constituted, concrete entity,
the normal and rinal Causes coincide, as the end coincides with the
fulfillment of that of which it is the end.cf.^et.IX,8,1050 a-b.
(66) The various forms of motion are reducible, according to
aristotle, to three: quantitative, qualitative and local.
rhysics.V.iji,7. Unqualified becoming or coming-to-be simpllclter
is not motion (v.1.225a,25 ff);the possibility of such beconing,
even in the case of substances, is precluded by the fact that every
form of becoming presupposes a subject or substratum ^1,7,190b-).
In 190a,38, Aristotle leaves open this possibility which he so
readily discounts, by arguing that 'only substances are said to
(93)
come to "be In the unqualified sense . In lb.8, he explains in
what way he is in agreement with the rarmenldian doctrine that
"Being does not come to be and in what way 1}e is not which
proves conclusively that an absolute genesis of being for him is
unthinkable.
% >
(67) The (jreek for the Aristotelian act is ' f Y t?~f (-'<*;
for Potency fi '.cf .phys.I,g. ; Met.V,22; c^b specially,
Met.iX,3,1047a, 30 sq; 6,lu48b,28 sq. ; 7, 1050a-,22; on the
distinction between energy and entelechy.
cf.on this question, De u'inance - .litre et agir, r.6 ff.
(68) Met,i,9,p.991a. Aristotle writes: "Above all one might
discuss the question what on earth the rorms cnntribute to sensible
things, either to those that aneeternally or to those that come
into being or cease to be. for they cause neither movement nor
change in them." That J-deas. cannot be alleged to be causes of
things as Plato claims in rhaedo (100 D) is discussed in the same
passage.
^69) Div.isames, v;P.136 ff; cont .uent .1, 22;il,15.
o •Theol.x,Q.3,a.4;,4fl3,a.ll; ve Pot. *.7.ct-2.
comp.iheol.,i.e.11.
(70) I'hat uod is His own oeing - <x> nt .uent. 1,22, d .Theol .1^.^a.4
That God is nls own u-oodness cont .u-ent. 1,37-8
That uod's action is riis own essence -xb.11,8-9
(94)
(71) Op.clt .^.2,a.l. J-t is very significant that Aquinas
discusses the procession of the divine persons and creation in the
saime context, an^educes them to the same movement of self-
communication on the part of uod.
(72) Aquinas attributes this dictum to aristotle ^4.mete©.ili,x.)
He writes, cont.uent.xx,6;"xt is a sign^ of perfection in things
ofthe lower world that they are able to produce their like, as
stated by the Philosopher." This does not change the fact}that,
we believe, that the doctrine of the self-communicability of the
Good is in a radical way, of Platonic, and weo-Platonic origin.
(73) Cont.Gent. 11,6,7,15., of£ also, S.Theol.I,Q.19,a .2.
J
(74) cf.De Ente et Essentia, Gap.IV;ICant», dist.2.Q.l.a.1, -ad/;
( cl.U-, O-V. /.
P'«3 5 > • 4«, ad 1.
b.Theol. I,Q.3, a.5.- Resp.
cf. the discussion of Koland-Gosselin in De Ente et Essentia,
PP.185 ff-
(75) cf .cont .gent .11,16 ; b .Theol, .'4.44, a .2.
For incommunlcability of creative power :© nt .Gent .II, 20-1;
b .Theol i-Q.45, a .5; De Potent la, Q,. 3 ., a .4 •
f
(76) Div.flames,IV,P.88.
bpeaking of the Angels, as the first creatures, uionysius writes :
Moreover all things appertaining to the celestial hierarchy, the
angelic purifications, the illuminations and the attainments which
perfect them in all angelic perfection and come from the all-
creative and originating goodness, from whAnce it^as given them
to possess their created goodness - and4o manifest the secret
Goodness in themselves and so to be (as it were; the angelic
evangelists of the Divine Silence and to stand forth as shining
lights revealing him that is within the shtlne." cf.also ibid.
I,P-^.53-4 and 56 ff. That creation utters its cause and Term,
'who is nameless, lb.P.60 f., P.71-2.
(77) In expounding the divine names,Dionysius distinguishes
•between two categories: undifferentiated and differentiated names;
the former applying to the total Godhead, the latter to the three
persons of the Trinity. The former are negative names, since they
relate to the "ameless uodhead in wls super-intelligible and
super-essential Being; the latter he describes as 'emanations and
manifestations', since they utter the ineffable secret of the
Godhead -cf .Div ."'ames .P .69 ff • J also, Gh.II in toto. "The
Initiates of our divine tradition," he writes,"designate the
undifferentiated attributes of the transcendantly ineffable
and unknowable permanence, as hidden, incommunicable ultimates,
but the benificent differentiations of the supreme Godhead they call
emanations and Manifestations... They say concerning the Divine
Unity or Super-essence, that the undivided Trinity holds in a
common unity, without distinction Tts Subsistence beyond being,
its Godhead beyond Deity, ltd goodness beyond excellence" lb.P.69
(78) cf.Dionysius -ulv.Namas,II,P.72 and78 ff.also,V, P.137.
(79) S .Theol., X .Q«2, as .1 and 2; Q.13, as.l and 5; aont.Gent.J,
10-12,3u; 11,54. do Trinit., Q.l, a.3.
(80) De Verit.Q.10, a.12.
ue Trinit., 4.i,a.2. ; a.Theol., I,<4.121,a.2.; 4.2, as.l and 2.
Aquinas distinguishes "between two methods of proof:
l.a priori (una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid,
et haec est priora slmpliciter).
.2. a posteriori (or: per e ffectum et dicitur demonstratio quia;
et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos) - S.Theol.4.2, a.2.Kesp.|
Demonstration through cause, and demonstration through effect do
not correspond fully with the Kantian distinction between a priori
and empirical (or aposteriori) procedure. The ^antian distinction -
has regard to the origin ofknowledge; the Thomlst to the nature of
the middle term employed. The a posteriori method is obviously
not one 1 through the effects-; since for ^ant the sensuous data,
which represent the 'material content' of knowledge (or manifold
of intuition) are designated as 'impressions' or 'sensuous \
intuitions', rather than'effects'. Sensibility is consistently
envisaged in the Aesthetic foom the standpoint of a 'receptive
subject', never an 'active object' - of which the impressions can
be said to be the effects, weedless it isvto say that this is the
outcome of the xiantian conception of causality as a 'pure
category of the understanding1, rather than an 'active intrinsic
power' in the object.
(81') cf.The masterly discussion of t.Garrlgou-.bagrange, in
liod, "is Existence and nis ^ature, and the refutation of the
empirical and idealist objections to the ffihomist proofs, vol.I,
P 61 ff. and 242 ff.
197)
(81) De Trinit. '4.1, a.2 - Resp.cf.on this whole question, Gilson
Le Thomisme,PP.140 ff and 69 ff.
(82) cont.Gent. i,22. "Existence denotes a kind of actuality:
since a thing is said to exist, not through being In potentiality
but through being in act." The same principle is enunciated In
-Lb.II, 53, in the course pf proving that in intellectual substances
there is composition of act and potency. cf.aio , in Sent,!, dist.
8,^,5,a.2. In S '.Theol. i ,Q .3. a .4 - aquinas argues that esse is to
essence what act is to potency, since" esse est actualitas omnia
formae vel naturae" - which implies that 'esse' is a form of
actuality superior to porjn it self. cf. cont .Gent .II, 54 for same.
This is the main thesis of ^Ilson, cf. -^e Thomlsme, $ .43. ff and
133 ff• The identification of "^eing and act would have to be
qualified in two ways: 1. EBse is act par excellence, - as in the
case of nod who alone is 'ipsum esse subsistens'.
and 2. xhis 'esse' transcends even the Form, as a principle of
— - > . •
actuality.
ihe latter qualification is dictated in the xhomist meta-
t
physics by the necessity of determining a unitary principle of
being in composite substances, which transcends the i'orm. xhis
Is how aquinas sets himself in opposition to averroes with whom
the J'orm was the exclusive principle of being, as we have seen -
supra,p. ((7. Aquinas, at least with respect to his conception of
existence as a principle superadded to essence, leae\s towards the
Avicennian position, cf. ue Ente et assentia, cap.i and II; and
discussion by n.Gosselin,p-t>.xvi ff, 189 ff .; 1
^-aL ,..Tln . T-r • .,, ||M||
(98)
Gilson holds (op .cit ,.rP . 56-60) that the Thomist position Is
generically different f rom both the Bverroist and AVicennian
postllons. in his emphasis on the unioue originality of Aquinas's
notion of the esse', uilson tends to overstate his case,
cf.also, ue Potentla, 1^.7., a.2 - especially ad 9 m. and the
discussion of uilson in Ihomisme, pP.5u-52.
^83) cf. ue Pot.f.4.3, a<t5. At is noteworthy that Aquinas prives,
from the degrees of being, that all things refer to God as ' unum
ens, quod est perfectlssimum et verissimimum ens1; from the
dependence of the relative on the absolute (quod est per alterum
est reducitur sicut in causam ad aliud quod est per se), that God
stands to things as 'actus purus, in quo nulla sit composltio';
to which things ought to be referred as the term upon which they all
depend, as 'ens quod est ipsum suum esse' - Resp. "ere it is
seen how the conception of God as Absolute being and Absolute Act
converge. Also cf. Comp.Theol .Iyjs.74; ll, sent. dlst .l,Q.l,a .2 sol.
(84) S .Theol .1,Q.2, a.3. 'quarta via'j cont.Gent. 1.13, Cod mp .Theol.
I,c.68» In De pot.a.5.-Resp., Aquinas notwithstanding his
attributing this argument to Arlfctotle in 2 summas, acknowledges
its natural affiliation to Plato's doctrine of participation as
would seem to be truly the case„ in the V-x't' r. oasr-age .
(85) cf. on this argument, Gilson, Le Thoraisme, pP .105-111
Aristotle remarks (Met.II.1.20 seq.) that the principles ofeternal
things being most true, are causes of the being of other things,
since ' as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect
4.- •„ V-. • • - -• «*«u* ■»""■**»»■ ■ ■>ttii->i"'*'iri "--
w-iii^iiii^HiiiaBr^iiii^ "«i fiM'Tf% iUTi ^iTlni^Yn tlrVwwlTrrTrmlMrTtfTrrr *r toX*'-■
(99) !
of truth.' In Met. IV, 4, 32 seq., he agrees that there must
be a pre-eminent truth which serves as the norm of grades of
truth, xhe Thomi3t argument rests upon two moments of reasoning:
1. the correspondence between being and truth - which is indis¬
putably of Aristotelian origin'(cf. Met. IX, 10: Jf, 7) and 2. the
.tendency of things to approximate their First Term, which is of
Platonic extraction.
a full discussion of this argument and of its exact relation
to Platonism can be found in (iarrigou-Lagrange, God, Vol. I, PP.
302-345.
(86) S. Theol. I, Q. 48, a. 5: "Actus autem est duplex; primus oA
secundus. Actus quldem primus est forma et lntegrltas rei; actus
I
autem secundus est operatio." - Resp. also, De Pot., '4. I, a. 1,
Resp> in Sent., I, dist. 24, 4. 1, a. 3.
(87) S. Theol. i, 4. 11, a. 1. "Unde manifestum est quod esse
cuiuslibet rei cons 1st it in indivlsione. Ft inde est quod
unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unltatem."
On the convertibility of being and one - 3. Theol. Ib., ad a. 2.
Gil son, le ihomisme, P. 149.
(88) Oont. Gent. II, 45; Comp. Theol. I, C. 72 & 73.
S. Theol. I, Q. 47, a. 1.
(89) Plotinus argues that the one cannot be any of the existing
things, because then it could not generate them; nor their totality,
since then it would be posterior to them and would thereby cease,to
be their principle, rie is emphatically opposed to a pantheistic-
view which would identify the une with every single thing, for
then "everything would be identical with everything else, all
things would be jumbled up together in confusion and there would
be no distinction in things." Enneades, III, P. 166, cf. also,
P. 165. On the transcendance of the One, Plotinus writes: "Certainly
this Principle is nothing, nothing of the things of which It is the
principle; neither being, nor substance, nor life can be affirmed
of it; because it is superior to all these things." Ib. P. 167.
(90) In the commentary on be Causis (Lect. vi.) Aquinas concedes
that the pirst Cause transcends being inasmuch as it is 'its own
infinite being1. "Causa autem prima secundum Platonicos quldem est
supra ens, inquantum essentia bo.nitatls et unltatis, quae est causa
prima, excedit etiam ipsum ens separatum ...: sed secundum rei
veritatem causa prima est supra ens inquantum est ipsum esse
infinitum." PP. 229-30. This is in substance the position
developed in d. Theol. I, Q. 3, a. 3. and Cont. Gent. I, 22; and
according to which the ultimate distinction between God and the
creature consists in that in God alone essence and existence coincide
and exhaust each other. In this manner :His existence excels all
existing things and He can be said hot to exist - lb. Q. 12, a. 1 -
ad. 3.
(91) ti. Theol. I, Q. 13, a. 3; Cont. Gent. I, 29-34. For the
doctrine of analogy, the important monograph of Pehido - le role
I ,
de 1'analogic en theol. dog. ; Maritaln, les degres du savoir,
Ch. IV ad Annexe II; Gilson, le Thomisme, Ch. V, PP. 140-170.
(101) 1
(92) S. Theol. X, Q. 12, a5. 1 & 2., Q. 13, a. 1; Cont. Gent. Ill,
47, 51-54. It is through this distinction that Aquinas reconciles
the apparently conflicting claims of negative and positive theology,
cf. Cont. Gent. I,. 30 & 14. "Accordingly in every term employed hy
us, there is imperfection as regards the mode of signification, and
.imperfection is unbecoming to God, although the thing signified is
becoming to uod in some eminent way .... wherefore, as Dionysius
teaches (Coel. Hler. ii, 3), such terms can be either affirmed or
denied of uod; affirmed, on account of the signification of the
term; denied, on account of the mode of signification." et sq.
Tb. cA . 1 o •
(93) Ibid v-h. 30. S. Theol. I, Q. 13, a. 4; Q. 6, a. 3. Gomp.
Theol. I, C. 21 & 22.
In Cont. u-ent. Ill, 20, Aquinas writes: "Wherefore, since a thing
is good so far as it is perfect, liod's being is His perfect
goodness; for in uod to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy and
whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness are
one and the same in God, as though the sum total of His goodness
were Godrs very being."
(94) S. Theol. I, Q. 13, a. 2.; ve Pot. <4. 7, a. 5; De Ver. 4. 2,
a. 2. In the latter, Origen and Augustine are referred to as holding
the second view. Also, Cont. Gent. I, 31.
It is noteworthy that Aquinas accepts both these aspects of
negative theology, as regards the inexpressible mode of divine
predicates, in Cont. Gent. I, 30. "Now the mode of super-eminence
in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God, cannot be
(102) I
expressed in terms employed by us, except either by negation,
as when we say uod is eternal or Infinite, or by referring
Him to other things, as when we say that He 1b the first cause or
the sovereign good."
(95) S. Theol. I, Q. 13, a. 6; De Ver., 4. 4, a. 1; Cont. went.,
'I.,34..
(96) S. Theol. I. Q. 4, a. 2. This article is permeated with
ulonysian influence. The infinity of the divine being who
comprises in nls uniqueness all perfections, aB well as the self-
1
diffusive causality of His being, are stated in the exact uionyslan
terms we have outlined above.
cf. also, Gomp. Theol. I, C. 21, 22; Cont. U-ent. X, 28; bent. I,
i ,
Dist. 1, 4. 1, a. 2,3; In Sent. I, Dlst. 22, 4. 1, a. 2.
(97) "At the basis of an analogical concept", writes penldo,
"we find a reality (life, goodness, being, etc.) which unfolds
itself according to diverse modes, albeit immanent. This immanence
is the ground of unity, but this diversity averts absolute unity."
/
Penido quotes here De Pot., *4. 9, a. 2 - ad. 6. "In analogls
conslderatur non diversa realltates, sed diversl modi essendi
eiusdem realitatis." cf. \e role de I'analogie, PP. 53-55.
' • /
^98) This too is the motive of Dionysius in affirming being and
negating it of uod: "For u-od is not existent in any ordinary sense,
but in a simple and undefinable manner embracing and anticipating all
existence in Himself, nence he is called *King of the ages', because
(103) 1
in nim and around nim all being is and subsists, and Hie neither
was, nor will be, nor hath entered the life-process, nor is doing
so, nor ever will, or rather ne does not even exist, but is the
essence of existence in things that exist." - Civ. wames, V, P. 135.
(99) cf. Supra, P. l<? i TP- '9*
(100) Aquinas declares,in S. Theol. I., Q. 2, a. 3, his predilection
for the 'first way' "Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae
sumltur ex parte motus." But the first and second ways are both
causal in character. The first proves the existence of a 'cause of
movement', the latter an 'efficient cause'. Gilson notes the
affinity between the two ways in Thomisme, P. 100.
(101) S. Theol. I, Ch. 2, a. 3. Cont. Gent. I, 13. Garrigou-
Lagrange, Op. Clt., PP. 289-293, with which should be read the
refutation of empiricism and agnosticism, PP. 84ff.
cf. the exposition of this proof in Gilson, le Thomisme, pp.
99-102.
(102) Cont. Gent. Ill, 69; Comp. Theol. I, 124, 130.
S. Theol. I, Q. 22, q. 3.
(103) cf. S. Theol. I, Q. 45, a. 8; and ue Pot., Q. 3, a. 8 -
for the problem here expounded.
On creation as the bestowing of 'being' on the creature:
cf. a. Theol. I, Q. 45, a. 2; 44, a. 2;-Cont. Gent, il, 15;
Comp. Iheol. I, 118.
un incommunlcability of the creative power, cf. Cont. uent.
(104) ,
II, 21; b. "l'heol. I, Q. 45, a. 5; rot., <4. 3, a. 4; Gomp.
xheol.I, 120.
The proportionality of the creative power to the divine being
and of the productive power to the being of the creature is
safeguarded through the conception of act, an analogically
proportionate to the r>elng of that of which it is the act, in a.
1
Theol. I, <4. 115, a. 1 -nesp.
In II Sent., diet., Q. 1, a. 2, Aquinas writes: "Unde causalitas
generantis vel alterantis non sic se extendit, ad omne illud quod
in re invenltur; sed ad formafy quae de potentia in actum educltur
(same position as in ve rot. Ib., nesp.): sed causalitas creatls




(104; cf. a. Theol.I, Q. 3, a. 5; Gont. tient., I, 25, 24; ue Pot.,
4. 7, a. 3; uomp. xheol. I, u. 13.
xhe Aristotelian argument for the non-generic character of
being (cf. Met., Ill, 998b.) rests on the perception of the fact
that the differentia is not predlcable of its genus; so that if being
were a genus, the differentia would not be. avery genus is specified
by a differentia which is extrinsic teethe essence of that genus.
nut no differentia can be extrinsic to being; since thereby it would
not be. xhe metaphysical consequence of this position is that it
culminates in an absolute pantheism which renders the solution of the
problem of diversity Impossible. ttqulnas writes, interpreting this
text of aristotle in o. xheol. I, 4. 3, a. 5: "Ostendet autem
j^hllosophus in III, Met. quod ens non potest esse genus allquld;
omne enlm genus habet differentiae qua sunt extra essentlam
generis; nulla autem differentia posset lnvenire; quae esset extra
ens, quia non ens non posset esse differentia."
That u-od is not in a genus dan be Bhown (in ib. and ve Pot.
4. 7, a. 5) thus; /\ memoer of a genus is differentiated in a
determinate way. xf we discover a hypothetical member in that
genus whose mode of differentiation is indeterminate, because
absolute - as in the case of the first rseing; then this member has
clearly transcended its genus, oince £*Gpod possesses all positive
perfections in a unity of self-subsisting being, tiis being
transcends all modes of subsistence so as to be incapable of being
included in a genus. ,£f. a. xheol. I, Q. 6, a. 3; 4. 4, a. 2;
uont. u-ent., III, 20; II, 8; I, 38, 45 - for uod's mode of possessing
knowledge, goodness., will, in the one unity of wis essence.
1105) The problem is stated in identical terms in oh. 98 of oont.
Q-ent. Book 3. The title of the chapter is: "How it is possible,
and how it is impossible, for ood to do something outside the order
of His providence." The same formula is restated in ue Pot., (4. 6,
a. 1.
(106) In Cont. (lent., II, 28-c9, aquinas disproves "the error of
some wno strove to prove that trod cannot do save what He uoes,
because He cannot ao except what na ought to ao." P. 51.
In Ib. 30, he shows tnat "though all things depend on uod's will
as their first cause, which is not necessitated in operating except
by the supposition of nis purpose, nevertheless absolute necessity
is not therefore excluded from things, so that we are obliged to
assert that all things are contingent." - P. 56.
In De Pot., y. 6, a. 1, he singles out three errors:
(106)
1. The error of an 'immanent, rational determinism' which
precludes the possibility of the intervention of a supernatural
cause in the course of natural events, as in anaxagoras.
2. The error of emanationist determinism, according to which
God's mode of operation is determined by the necessity of acting
through the mediacy of the intelligences; particular causes being
Inaccessible to Him.
3. The erfor of 'Creative determinism', according to which
God acts through a necessity of His nature.
(107) Cont. uent. I, 74; o. Theol. I, Q. 19, a. 3.
(108) Cont. Gent. I, 75, 76, 79.
I
(109) cf. Ibid; also: lb. II, 12-14; 0. Theol. <4. 45, a. 3.
(110) That God does not act of natural necessity - Cont. Gent. II,
23; 26 ; 3. Theol. I, Q. 19, a. 3; Da Pot. Q. 1, a. 5;
Comp. Theol. I, .97 ; I Sent, dist. 43, Q. 2, a. 1; De Verit
Q. 23, a. 4. That God acts according to His wisdom; Cont. Gent. II,
24. That a reason of the divine will can be assigned; Ibid. I, 86-7.
This is reduced, in Cont. Gent. Ill, 97, to the divine goodness, as
regards u-od's necessary volition of Himself; and to multiplicity or
hierarchisation, as regards the multitude of created things, cf. Comp
Theol. I, 101 & 102. On free will in God, cf. Cont. Gent. I, 88;
b. Theol. I, Q. 19, a. 10.
(111) Cont. Gent. II, 28-29; I, Sent.,, dist. 43, Q. 2, a. 2.
(107) .
(112) Cont. Gent. II, lb. ; P. 51-2.
(113) Ibid. P. 51 - Aquinas writes; "Nevertheless although
nothing to which anything can be due precedes the universal
creation of things, something uncreated precedes it, and this is
the principle of creation. This may be considered in two ways,
por the divine goodness precedes as the end and first motive of
creation ... Also, His knowledge and will precede, as by them
things are brought into being."
(114) Aquinas thus concedes a mode of necessity Immanent to
the divine being; which can be described as "the determinism of
divine wisdom", In its relation to the divine will. of. be Ver.,
Q. 23, a. 6 - nesp. and ad 4m. ve Pot. q. 1, a. 5 - neap* "Sic
autem
Cr o o!
xhat'acts in accordance with His wisdom and knowledge,
cf. £«•*■/.
(115) Cont. Gent / II, 28-29, P. 33.
/
(116) Ibid. I, 83; ue Pot. <4. 1, a. 5, nesp.; ve Verit. <4. 23,
ad. 1.
(117) Cont. uent. I, 83.
(118) Cont. uent. xx, 28-29, P. 54-
cl-
(119) Ibid, 30. It is noteworthy that aquinas considers this
necessity a necessity inherent In being, "prom these principles,
(108)
so far as they are principles of being", he writes, "a threefold
absolute necessity is found in things." P. 58.
1^120) Here aquinas makes his classical distinction between
•intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' action (cf. also, Gont. Gent. X, 45,
73 ; S. Theol. I, Q. 14, a. 2 and 4 )
action which remains in the agent and action which goes beyond it.
In the former case the necessity is Immanent in the essence of the
agent: in so far as this essence is simple; in the latter it is
consequent upon the 'form' of the agent of necessity, unless this
form is hindered by an external' factor. The former, however, is
always determined to act once it is actualized by its actualizing
principle, as in the case of the •intelligible species' in the
act of intellection, - unlike the latter which might be hindered
through an extraneous factor. The Instance which Aquinas adduces
in illustrating the latter mode of necessity is that of fire; "If
fire is hot, it is necessary that it have the power to heat, although
it is not necessary that it heat, since it may be hindered by
something extrinsic." - Cont. Gent. II, 30, P. 60.
This is exactly how Averroes solves the difficulty - Tahafut, P. 521.
(121) Cont. Gent., Ibid.
(122) Ibid. On the finalistic determinism of the good, cf.
Cont. Gent. II, Chs. 2-10. The Thomist teaching on the question
of moral freedom and the determinism of the good is expounded in
Marltaln: Freedom in the Modern World, London, 1940.
(123) cf. Cont. Gent. Ill, 71, 72, 94. Aquinas writes, against
(109)
the Loquentes (Ibid, Ch. 97) In a passage which sums up his
whole teaching on this problem: "It is therefore clear that the
dispensations of providence are according to a certain reason, and
yet this reason presupposes the divine will, according\y by a
twofold error is refuted by what we have said. First, there is the
error of the Moslem theologians in the Law of the Mohammedans, as
Kabbi Moses relates (Guide, ill, 25) according to whom the sole
reason why fire heats rather than chills is so because God so wills,
becondly, we refute the error of those who assert that the ordering
of causes proceeds from divine providence by way of necessity,
both of which are false." P. 51.
(124) cf. Gii.CZ, Supra, note llO»
(125) Cont. Gent, i, 74.
(126) Cont. Gent. I, 49; S. Theol. I, Q. 14, a. 5; I. Sent., diet.
38, 1, a. 1; ue Verit., 14. 2, a. 3i That God knows even the
things which are not: Cont. Gent. I, 66; S. Theol. 1, Q. 14, a. 9;
De Verlt. 3. 2, a. 8; I. Sent. dlst. 38, (4. 1, a. 4.
That ne knows the things which shall be;
Cont. Gent. X, 67; S. Theol. x, Q. 14, a. 13; x. Sent. dlst. 38,
<4. 1, a. 5; ue Verlt., Q,. 2, a. 12; Oomp. Theol. I, c. 133.
(127) Cont. Gent. X, 26, 27.
(128) This is how Aquinas puts it:
"This universal order in respect whereof all things are
(110) I
ordered "by divine providence, may be considered in two ways;
namely, with regard to things subject to that order, and with
regard to the reason of the order, which depends on the principle
of the order". Oont. uent. Ill, 98, P. 53.
(129) Cont. Gent. jlII, P. 98.
(130) De Pot., q. 6, a. 1, ad. lm; Cont. Gent. Ill, luO.
(131) Cont. uent. Ill, 99. The manifestation of God's power
is stated explicitly to be the 'motive' of miracle, p. 57.
That intervention in the course of nature by uod is designed to
advance His providence, cf. De Pot., Q. 6, a. 1 - ad 14, 19, 21.
(132) Ibid ; ye Pot., 6, a. 1, ad 6m. "Dicendum quod
ueus non faclt contra rationes naturales mutabili voluntate;
non Deus ab aeterno praevidit et voluit se facturum quod in
tempore facit. Sic ergo instltuit naturae cursum, ut tamen prae-
ordinaretur in aeterna sua voluntate quod pr-qeter cursum istum
grandoque facturus erat."
(133) Miracle, being referable to the action of the sirst Cause,
can therefore be God's work alone, although it might be done
through the agency of humans.
Cont. Gent. Ill, 102;. In Ibid, 103 and De Pot., 6, a. 3
nquinas criticises Avicenna's 'naturalistic' account of miracle
through the agency of separate substances, (sc. the dator formarum
alluded to above, Supra, P. I -*■
(Ill) ,
(134) Cont. G-ent. Ill, 100.
(135) Ibid. ; De Pot., Q. 6, a. 1, ad 19m.
(136) Cont. uent. Ill, 100.
i
(137) In De Pot., Q,. 6, a. 2, ad 3 - Aquinas distinguishes three
types of 'miracles'' -, i.e., deeds exceeding the powers of nature
and falling within uod's power. Certain miracles are above the powers
of nature (e.g. Incarnation); others contrary to nature (e.g.: that
the Virgin conceive;; still others are beside (prr^ter) the powers
of nature (e.g.: the conversion of water into wine, the Instantaneous
healing of the sick, etc.). In the extraordinary manner of their
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